Why I don't believe in the non-aggression principle.

@OP: I also reject the NAP as a final criterion of morality. It simply isn’t, though I think the counter-arguments you’ve given are not persuasive. The NAP simply isn’t consistent with human nature - a parent grabbing his child by the arm and yanking him out of the street by force is an example of where NAP is simply incongruous with human nature. Clearly, the parent is justified and clearly he is “aggressing” against the child since the same action could certainly be prosecuted at law as assault if done against an adult.

I really like your observation about decontextualization but I think you’re also guilty of it. In this article, I argue for a conception of law (and morality) that is grounded in fully contextual thought-experiments. What do we mean when we say that “aggression is immoral”, that is, when does it matter whether it is immoral or not? Well, the point at which it matters is the point at which we are in a post hoc dispute over the action. During the action, the fact that is aggression or immoral is not relevant even if it is true since the situation is tactical at that point and all that matters is my ability to defend myself against you - game theory (consequentialism) is the correct tool for analyzing such situations.

But it is a mistake to apply the same sort of reasoning to post hoc disputation - such as a lawsuit - that would apply during a tactical situation. For example, noting that “I could beat you up and take what I want from you” is not a serious legal argument - the whole point of a lawsuit is to settle a dispute without resorting to violence so threats of violence during the dispute are self-refuting. Put up or shut up.

So, I think that you need to go back and contextualize your arguments in the form of a real legal dispute between two (presumably peer) disputants. Once you do this, then you will see that law (and morality) is a kind of “social technology” by which we are able to settle disputes in a more efficient manner by examining the grand scientific experiment of human history to see what kinds of settlements to this sort of dispute have tended to work and what kinds have not.

The bully scenario (Leviathan, Mafia, slumlords, etc.) is an imbalance of power that prevents the application of the social technology of law and morality by turning a dispute into an “autistic exchange” - in Misesean terminology. The statist mistakes this failure mode of law/morality as an argument against the use of normative arguments in the settlement of disputes and proof that we have to settle for some form or other of consequentialism. In my view, this failure mode deprives the rest of us of valuable knowledge regarding the settlement of disputes that could be had if these settlements were arrived at through bilateral bargaining on the basis of legal precedent and moral arguments rather than unilateral imposition of the victor’s terms. In other words, it’s in your own interest (consequentialist argument) for customary law (rather than statutory imposition) to be as widely practiced as possible.

Clayton -