Why I don't believe in the non-aggression principle.

Aggression - any act that is hostile or forceful. Ex. Johnny was aggressive with his date last night since he wouldn’t leave his hand to himself.

The subjectivistic manner in which aggression is therefore defined dilutes the signifigance of the NAP, if not pushing back the questioning another step: how does one define hostile or forceful? Further, the example you provide could be interpreted to imply a violation of property rights (Johnny nonconsensually placing his hands on the body of his unfortunate date).

It’s nice that you define aggression that way, but it is not the definition that most libertarians are using when they discuss the NAP. From wiktionary on aggression:

The first definition is what libertarians use when discussing the NAP. The one you use is certainly common, especially in everyday speech, but it is not the common definition for libertarians (and especially in regards to the NAP).

Hostile toward what? Forceful of whom?

Individual rights, justice, and aggression do collapse into property rights.

As Kinsella points out:

“The nonaggression principle is also dependent on property rights, since what aggression is depends on what our (property) rights are. If you hit me, it is aggression because I have a property right in my body. If I take from you the apple you possess, this is trespass — aggression — only because you own the apple. One cannot identify an act of aggression without implicitly assigning a corresponding property right to the victim.”

Sorry if these have already been addressed:

Another fallacy in the Against me argument is saying that, “if you wouldn’t coerce me, you’re a hypocrite to think anyone else should”. This is another fallacy of decontextualisation. For example, I wouldn’t like to become a builder, it’s a line of work that I wouldn’t enjoy, but it doesn’t make me hypocritical if I hire builders. I support the idea of a legal system based on private defence agencies and private arbitrators, but does it make me a hypocrite if I would personally not want to work for a private court or defence firm? In the same way, if someone is uncomfortable with personally coercing you, it doesn’t make them a hypocrite if they advocate you being taxed.

The question is whether I think it’s ethical to tax the person. Saying that you wouldn’t work for a company but you would hire them is not the same thing. The same thing would be “I don’t believe it’s ethical to do the jobs that company does and I wouldn’t hire them to do the jobs either.”

Is it morally justified to ether a person, knock them out, cut open their body, let their blood spurt out and cut out a body part? Almost everyone would intuitively say no. But what if the body part was diseased and this person had consented to the operation?

They’d say no because they haven’t thought the matter through. Just as if you asked someone “Have you ever eaten DNA” they’d be like “Heck no!” until you point out that all plants/vegetables have DNA in them.

Coercion doesn’t destroy choice, it just shifts it from the coerced to the coercer

Actually an essential point. That’s why talk of “freedom” is pointless - your freedom from coercion limits my freedom to initiate coercion. Hence why I dislike anarchist talk of “freedom.” You cannot increase freedom, strictly speaking. You can increase people following a natural rights system, but not freedom through institutionalization.

In Friedman’s example of the man trying to commit suicide, the consequences are extreme, which is why most people don’t feel their moral intuitions strongly points towards leaving the person alone

Why are you assuming his argument is correct? Delving into it a little more deeply and expanding the scenario quickly breaks the argument down.

Slogans like “taxation is theft” are also contextual. “Theft” relies on an idea of who the legitimate owner is. In a communist society, everything produced is common property, so hoarding stuff for yourself is theft, relative to communist property norms. The fruits of your labour being commonly owned is theft, relative to libertarian property norms.

True. Nice point.

and so can’t be said to be objectively committing theft.

Also true. You also can’t objectively say that rape is illegal, but we can all agree it is. Correct? The point, thus, is to propose that libertarian property norms are more pleasant than others.

If someone wants to exit society the burden is upon them to end their life in a manner where the act does not effect others. Similar to trespassing, it is the obligation of a trespassor to provide notice not the trespassee.

Hah! Love it :stuck_out_tongue:

Interacting with people physically without (i.e. prior to) their consent isn’t necessarily aggression—a lot of just basically accepted touch is unrequested. The example of Jonny and his date could demonstrate this. The example of siblings, and normal people who are still comfortable with touch. So maybe saving a baby from death in the street isn’t aggression, we just are too dumb to piece together the proper argument for it.

Again, if we contextualize aggression (I really like that term, h/t to OP), nothing is aggression unless somebody complains. If I hit you, and you don’t sue me, then it wasn’t aggression. The only point at which the question of aggression arises is the point at which somebody complains. It’s not likely that my child will file a lawsuit against me if I pull him out of the way of oncoming traffic but perhaps my in-laws don’t like the way I did it and thought I was rougher than necessary. They might sue me claiming that I assaulted - aggressed against - my child. If I had done the exact same thing to an adult who then sued me, I would definitely be guilty of assault even if I had the intention of saving his life. Intentions don’t matter in law, only actions.

So, my point stands: there are many forms of aggression that are tolerated as a part of the human condition. On a deeper analysis, it’s not really aggression so much as dual-law that is at issue here - one body of law that depends on who you are (privilege) and another body of law that does not (law proper). The State is the aggrandization and universalization of dual law. However, dual-law is inherently discoordinating to the social order so the universalization of dual-law leads directly to the breakdown of society, cf Soviet Russia.

The Non-Aggression Principle is one way of saying “there should be absolutely no dual-law (privilege) whatsoever”. While I agree with the sentiment, I think that stated without qualification, it is just Utopian building-of-castles-in-air (to mix metaphors). First, it doesn’t matter whether I think there should or shouldn’t be any dual-law, it is a question of what are the facts of human nature on this point. Second, we don’t need to say “there should be absolutely no dual-law whatsoever” in order to say what the consequences of universal dual-law are (social breakdown) and to say that less dual-law is preferable to more dual-law because dual-law is progressively erosive of the social order (more dual-law results in more discoordination of the social order).

In its defense, I will say that the NAP is a great first-order approximation of free-market law. 99% of statist bullshit can be summariliy dismissed with a casual application of basic NAP analysis. But once you get into the question of how the social order itself is structured (can/do societies really adopt NAP as a fundamental social norm?), things get more complicated and clinging to NAP as a final criterion of legality/morality is detrimental.

Clayton -

Excellent post, Clayton! Bookmarked.

I’m confused, is there a case you can reference?

What makes you say this?

We had a famous case here in Oregon (I want to say 20 years back?) where a patron of a restaurant began choking on his food. Another patron came over and performed the Heimlich maneuver and dislodged the food, saving the man’s life. In the process, one of the choking victim’s ribs was broken or fractured. He later sued the guy who performed the Heimlich maneuver and won. No, I don’t know the case number and can’t you point you to a legal journal, you’ll have to do that legwork on your own. This was the basis of the analogy I gave above.

Even though I sympathize with the public outrage that surrounded the decision, I can’t say the ruling was incorrect. Performing an action on another person’s body that they did not ask you to perform is a very serious matter and I think you should be liable for any damage you cause, even in the process of saving their life. On the most extreme application of this reasoning, you could say that even if no harm was done, physically impeding or seizing a person - even for the purpose of saving their life - could be considered battery.

Clayton -

K, after doing some research I think what you’re talking about might now be covered by Good Samaritan Laws which exist in every state.

They do vary though and they’re not a license to be reckless or cause grievous bodily injury.

From GA’s Good Samaritan Law:

"Any person, including any person licensed to practice medicine and surgery

pursuant to Article 2 of Chapter 34 of Title 43 and including any person
licensed to render services ancillary thereto, who in good faith renders
emergency care at the scene of an accident or emergency to the victim or
victims thereof without making any charge therefore shall not be liable for
any civil damages as a result of any act or omission by such person in
rendering emergency care or as a result of any act or failure to act to
provide or arrange for further medical treatment or care for the injured
person. "

Not sure about injuring someone while pulling them out of the way of a moving vehicle yet. I apologize for the weird spacing this website is being crazy again.

Reads very similar to a position I have asserted in property conversations… “anything beyond self is a claim.”

Since we are having a candid conversation about aggression I wish to make a point about coercion that I object to.

Death of Coercor >---->------->------> Force >----->----->-----> | <----<-----<------< Resistance <------<-------<--------< Death of Coercee

If R > F submission does not occur so everything left of center does not apply to the concept of coercion.

If the coercee dies, submision does not occur so everything off the scale to the right does not apply to the concept of coercion. I suppose we could label both ends of the scale some form of conquest where force totally eliminates resistance or vice versa.

Coercion is when F > R and a coercee submits to a coercor.

The concept of coercion is submitting by not resisting force when F > R > R=0.

I agree coercion does not eliminate choice. One chooses to apply force. One chooses to resist. One chooses to cease applying force. One chooses to cease resisting force. Choice is always present however the concept of coercion is ex post facto choice, specifically after a choice has been made to submit. If the concept of coercion includes claiming threats of force how does one account for any personal responsibility to perceive threats or morally discern credible threats?

The concept of coercion morally justifies the act of submitting without any regard or consideration for that which one submits to. I strongly object to a belief it is ok to submit to anything so long as F> R > R=0.

To be clear. As soon as I witness evidence of societies comprised of dead individuals economically interacting with societies of living individuals I might be inclined to change my position the abstract concept of society does not include a presumption of life.

Whenever you tear an idea from its context and treat it as though it were a self-sufficient, independent item, you invalidate the thought process involved. If you omit the context, or even a crucial aspect of it, then no matter what you say it will not be valid . . . .

A context-dropper forgets or evades any wider context. He stares at only one element, and he thinks, “I can change just this one point, and everything else will remain the same.” In fact, everything is interconnected. That one element involves a whole context, and to assess a change in one element, you must see what it means in the whole context.

Whenever you tear an idea from its context and treat it as though it were a self-sufficient, independent item, you invalidate the thought process involved. If you omit the context, or even a crucial aspect of it, then no matter what you say it will not be valid . . . .

A context-dropper forgets or evades any wider context. He stares at only one element, and he thinks, “I can change just this one point, and everything else will remain the same.” In fact, everything is interconnected. That one element involves a whole context, and to assess a change in one element, you must see what it means in the whole context.

How do you know that the choking patron did not indicate his desire for assistance by displaying the choking symbol? If he did, then that was an incorrect ruling. However, even if he did not, the choking patron might not have been able to explicitly indicate his desire for help. The other person made an assumption. It would have been entirely reasonable in the court proceedings to ask that if the choking patron could have indicated his desire for help would he.

I suppose you could also say giving someone a congratulatory slap on the back is also an assault, but then you would have to totally ignore social customs and common sense.

This is a contradiction. How can aggression be both ‘defined by complaint’ and tolerated? Doesn’t a complaint necessarily imply intolerance?

tolerate

Verb

  1. Allow the existence, occurrence, or practice of (something that one does not necessarily like or agree with) without interference.
  2. Accept or endure (someone or something unpleasant or disliked) with forbearance.

Actually, I think Clayton is using two different forms of the word “aggression”. In the first case he is referring to aggression that is ‘defined by complaint’. In the second case he is referring to aggression as the naked ‘initiation of force’.

I agree that morality cannot be determined by the naked initiation of force in some cases. If we define aggression as the untolerated initiation of force (or whatever wording gives proper consideration to complaints), then the issue is solved. We don’t need a new moral theory, just a tweak in the ongoing quest for perfection.

I guess that makes this version of NAP a posteriori? Was the a priori nature of NAP the main objection to begin with? I think so..