That isn’t whats transpiring. What matters is if there is a distintion between logic and metaphysics, there is. (What is this 6 times now?)
Doesn’t matter. What matters is if there is a distintion between logic and metaphysics, there is. (What is this 7 times now?)
Doesn’t matter. What matters is if there is a distintion between logic and metaphysics, there is. (What is this 8 times now?)
Doesn’t matter. What matters is if there is a distintion between logic and metaphysics, there is. (What is this 9 times now?)
I’ve made it quite clear on several occasions what branch of philosophy he attacked. Remember my stabbing you in the arm means I also stabbed you. And my saying I eat steak doesn’t necessarily mean I eat all steak. You are having much trouble with simple grammar.
Depends on what you consider to be a philosophy, many say there is a line between science and philosophy others say not. Regardless, Mises considered praxeology to be the ultimate foundation of economics, and attacked various philosophies that attempted to eliminate human action from the equation.
Well for the most part he is right, philosophers have contributed rather little. I’ve been reading human action latley and to me it doesn’t seem as though he hated all philosophies but the ones that he attacked tended to be socialist and collectivist in nature. I remember him attacking the views of Hegel, Marx, and most of the other socialist doctrines. He did not attack many philosophies and certianly not the individualist ones. I’ve been flipping through certina chapters because I often know what he’s trying to communicate already or that I’m really just not interested in certian aspects.
Haha that hasn’t been about what this discussion has been about. Do not try to backtrack and say we were talking about logic and metaphysics. It was logic and philosophy.
Let me refresh you memory:
Which quote? The one on positivism? The one I addressed?
Yes, but then you have gone onto say that he attacked philosophy because you think he attacked metaphysics. Thus the conflict. Philosophy is the term given to the discipline as a whole which includes its branches. You cannot say ‘I’m attacking England’ then go onto say ‘I’m attacking the United Kingdom’ since the UK is made up of several nations and there are nations that you are not attacking within such a kingdom [ Scotland, Ireland and Whales ]. So it is disingenuous to say what you are saying, Hence the hubbub.
Logic is a subset of philosophy. A branch within philosophy itself. If you read through all my posts you will see I made such a distinction. Perhaps there are individuals who think that logic IS philosophy and they should be educated on what philosophy actually is. There is however someone here who thinks that logic is something completely separate from philosophy. In the sense that it is not apart of philosophy.
(And quoting my scare quotes actually strengthens my point. So thanks for that)
“I’m not telling you that mises didn’t attack philosophy. In fact, I’ve said multiple times now that he did.”
I’ve already explained this.
In fact, that second quote you seem to have purposefully ignored, as you only chopped the first section out. So please save your exclamations of my being blithely, dishonest, disingenuous until you have a leg to stand on. Harping about grammar isn’t fruitful, ignoring explanations completely and continuing to harp on grammar is just…
Well I figured you would actually provide a quote to Mises explicitly attacking metaphysics qua metaphysics. Not positivism. You have yet to do such a thing. And also are we going to have to have a discussion on how Hegel is not metaphysics? Or are you going to go loopy again and say that since Mises attacked Hegel that means he attacked metaphysics?
Really? You find strength in quotes in which contradict what you are now saying? Can your arguments get more muddled?
Yes, that is disingenuous. Are you trying to pass off that all philosophy is metaphysics [ then go onto try and denounce me as not making a distinction, the irony in that is wonderful ]? If you are then you lack a proper definition of what philosophy is. If you are not then you are purposely neglecting the other branches. If Mises attacked logic, ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics, then he attacked philosophy, or if he explicitly state that philosophy is bupkis then he attacked philosophy. Attacking a branch of a discipline does not infer that you are attacking the discipline. Do you see attacking Keynesianism as an assault on economics? I would think not, but who knows what you could possibly say next.
Anyone who wishes to read your quotes has the possiblity to, I have copy and pasted the prevalent part. I don’t see a ‘well whatever’ comment after your second quote to be a prevalent part of what we are discussing since we obviously care about which is right and wrong.
Muddled minds create muddled writing and I have ignored no explanations. I have retorted to each of your points while continuing to supposedly ‘harp’ on grammar.
Well you figured wrong. You purposefully skipped a quote that completely refutes about the last two pages of you incoherence. And you’ve been trying to suck my into another black-hole about whether Mises’ refutation of Metaphysics was intended toward metaphysics as a whole or just specific metaphysical theories. Its irrelevant. I’m not passing that event horizon
The quote basically spelled out your entire complaint. {Call me Nostradamus!] That was put there just to stop erroneous threadjackings over grammatic quibbles. Your first response to it should have made it obvious that you were having none of it. [“it” being basic comprehension]
Of course, I cannot stab you. I cannot eat steak. [You are hung-up on grammar]
Yeah, you read “well whatever” when it clarifies a simple grammatical issue.
Au contraire - “well whatever.” (Add muddled mind to the list)
Never said he was an enemy of philosophy. In my first post, “You could spend years trying to fully understand Mises’ views on philosophy. But he certainly didn’t detest philosophy. Von Mises simply stressed that Economics is the foundation for philosophy and not the other way (as others felt).”
Using attack in such a manner is correct:
S: (v) attack, round, assail, lash out, snipe, assault (attack in speech or writing) “The editors of the left-leaning paper attacked the new House Speaker”
S: (n) attack (strong criticism) “he published an unexpected attack on my work”
S: (n) fire, attack, flak, flack, blast (intense adverse criticism) “Clinton directed his fire at the Republican Party”; “the government has come under attack”; “don’t give me any flak”
Yes, second post. “As much of the what Mises attacks is Metaphysics (a branch of philosophy), such as that put forth by Hegel, so in correspondence with the OP it still holds true, just swap Metaphysics for philosophy.”
And as we all know Marxian economics isn’t economics. [:P]
Chapter 2 of Human action he defends praxeology [economics] from various “attackers.” (My word, not his)
Early in the Theory and History he defended it against metaphysical inquiry by defending the principle of regularity;
Human knowledge is conditioned by the power of the human mind and by the extent of the sphere in which objects evoke human sensations. Perhaps there are in the universe things that our senses cannot perceive…for the time being, no traces of their existence penetrate into our sphere in a way that can modify our sensations. It may also be that the regularity in the conjunction of natural phenomena we are observing is not eternal but only passing, that it prevails only in the present stage (which may last millions of years) of the history of the universe and may one day be replaced by another arrangement.
Such and similar thoughts may induce in a conscientious scientist the utmost caution in formulating the results of his studies. It behooves the philosopher to be still more restrained in dealing with the apriori categories of causality and the regularity in the sequence of natural phenomena.
as well as:
Human scientific inquiry cannot proceed beyond the limits drawn by the insufficiency of man’s senses and the narrowness of his mind. There is no deductive demonstration possible of the principle of causality and of the ampliative inference of imperfect induction; there is only recourse to the no less indemonstrable statement that there is a strict regularity in the conjunction of all natural phenomena. If we were not to refer to this uniformity, all the statements of the natural sciences would appear to be hasty generalizations.
He further defends the limitation on human thought in The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science. As I, Ryan has pointed out he uses a similar argument as Kant.
This sounds like a critique of the Hegelian dialectical theory of history in which he believed what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational. Meaning that there is a sub-layer of general guiding principles through the span of history which causes us to arrive at the very point where we are today. This guiding principle according to Hegel is the ‘will.’ This ‘will’ can be compared to something like Marx’s forces of production. Not visible on the surface necessarily but a prime force in the realization of history. Here is a good example at understanding Hegelian theory. Think of a potter at one of those silly little spinners for pot making. He is just starting off and the first pot he makes is nothing like it is suppose to be. He tries again, and it gets a little better yet still not perfect. The potter keeps on trying to make his pot over and over again until he gets it exactly right. Now install Hegelianism into the scene. The human race is the potter and the pot is our existence. According to Hegel, we are constantly striving toward self-perfection in the form of finding our own divinity as a human race. We have the chance to be gods, we just haven’t perfected the pot yet in a manner of speaking. Getting to that pot is the ‘will’
Its really just a brief defense of praxeology against scientism, behaviourism, and various form of metaphysics.
Mises actually heavily critiques Marx’s dialectical materialism (itself an off-shoot of Hegelian dialectics) and he doesn’t so much heavily critique Hegel’s theory of history as he just calls it useless - “an arbitrary guess”
Ok but these do not make the corpus of metaphysics. Yes he critiqued scientism and behaviourism but there are more metaphysical theories out there. So continuing where we left off, Mises critique metaphysical theories but not metaphysics itself.
Your trying to play the same grammar game as before, just swap philosophy for metaphysics (talk about irony), it doesn’t change the argument that Mises defended praxeology [economics] from challengers. And his hostility towards metaphysics is quite clear throughout his writing, it isn’t just the aforementioned groups and positivists. In fact, he agreed with the Positivist argument on the placement of science over philosophy (he was from Vienna after all), but lamented them for being nothing more metaphysicians themselves (at the time they were calling it “antimetaphysics”), as their theory of meaning directly challenges the foundations of praxeology. However, any metaphysical theory that didn’t challenge economics (i.e. try to overturn science) wouldn’t be of any concern to him and therefore irrelevant.
I agree with that statement. I am making the distinction that there are other metaphysical theories out there that do not necessarily contradict Mises’ views, therefore he would have no reason to attack them, therefore there are metaphysical theories Mises didn’t attack, therefore Mises did not attack metaphysics as a whole.
I don’t think this is true because Mises himself is considered a Kantian and Kant himself had much to say on metaphysical theory
And therefore irrelevent, as my proposition was that of Mises defending economics from “attackers.” Such metaphysical theories obviously wouldn’t be included.
To call him a Kantian would be a disservice to him, yes he agreed with Kant about the limitations of the human mind, but he rejected that a human needs a particular set of categories for experience. Further Kant and Mises had very different ideas about the noumenal self.