Here we go again. I have been searching on the Mises forum, but I’ve been unable to find a thread concerning my question to Hoppe’s argument.
I have read chapter 7 of Hoppe’s Eigentum, Anarchie und Staat along with The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, so I feel well-read. There is however one major problem that I find in Hoppe’s argument, and I hope that someone in here might be able to answer it.
The problem is as follows:
If we agree that argumentation logically must presuppose some norms, and that one of these norms is that you have to be an autonomous actor, which again must presuppose the ownership of your body. I.e. you can’t be autonomous without having a form of exclusive ‘right’ to the vessel, which you are using to engage in discourses. This is, as I understand it, the fundament for Hoppe’s theory.
The problem is however that only some parts are needed to engage in discourses. As far as I understand, this is what Robert Murphy and Gene Callahan criticizes Hoppe for. Hoppe’s answer would be that this is besides the point, because you also need external resources in order to engage in argumentation. This is what Hoppe argued in an interview with Juan de Mariana Institute here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AETnctIcpVI
However, it seems like Hoppe is begging the question, and assuming that the entire body is covered by the prerequisites for argumentation. If I accepted all of Hoppe’s argument, I would still see one major problem, namely that one would only have exclusive ownership over one’s ‘brain’, since it is this organ, that enables one to engage in discourses. Everything else, such as being able to verbalize something with a cognitive content, wouldn’t, since the organs enabling us to do this is replaceable through technology. If we only had ownership over our brain, and not our entire body, our exclusive right to every external object would therefore be undermined along with most libertarian norms.
So my question is this:
How does Hoppe go from the prerequisites of discourse ethics, to a libertarian ethics, where property rights are extended to every object?