It looks the discussion can be divided into DK’s statement in the OP (and what it actually means) and what Hayek’s arguments truly imply for government intervention. So let me address both parts of the discussion seperately.
#1. DK’s Statement in the OP (and what it actually means)
By the way, my argument has nothing to do with “a set of normative beliefs”. My argument is only about whether an economist can really say what is most optimal, or where optimality is – I am arguing that an economist can’t. Hayek would agree. I’m not misreading Kuehn, you’re just missing my point.
You still have failed to explain your point regarding this, or what that matters. That efficiency is subjective is precisely why Mises (and probably Hayek) supported free markets.
First, when I was talking about normative beliefs, I was explicitly referring to the fact that when you are evaluating a market outcome as being optimal or non-optimal (or more efficient or less efficient), you are having to make value judgements. This is why welfare economics (the branch of economics that tries to answer what exactly we mean when we use these terms) is inherently normative:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Welfare_economics
Second, when I am talking about efficiency, I am using the mainstream economic definition. That is to say, when you talk about gains in economic efficiency, you are a person “outside the market” looking at market outcomes and talking about improvements along some sort of normative standard. An example would be Kaldor-Hick efficiency:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kaldor-Hicks_efficiency
The reason I keep bringing up this point the is that it seems very odd you have no problem saying this or that is more efficienct (applying a normative criteria to market outcomes given available information), but blow a gasket when DK says a market outcome is sub-optimal. Indeed, based on that single term you assume that DK must be referring to a notion of optimality that can only be defined in terms of a static equilibrium. If that is what DK meant I think you would have a point. But I have never read anything by DK that would suggest he believes such an antiquated notion. Certainly not in the OP. I think you may be reading way too much into that single term.
#2. What Hayek’s arguments imply for government’s role in resource allocation.
If Hayek was completely consistent with the conclusions he draws in “Economics and Knowledge” and “The Use of Knowledge in Society”, he would disagree with most of what Daniel Kuehn is trying to argue.
Anyways, in order to make a market outcome more optimal you need to have an idea of what you think optimal is, because when you plan something through government the outcome is no longer spontaneous. The market doesn’t have a specific point to meet; the government does. Deciding where this point is still suffers from the Hayekian knowledge problem, since you still don’t hold the vast swaths of subjective knowledge necessary to centrally plan.
I disagree, both with your reading of Hayek and your (I would say) narrow definition of what governments actually do. Believe it or not, there are more ways the government can work to improve upon market outcomes besides the old-school socialist central planning Hayek argued against in the 1930s. And Hayek on more than one occasion supported those alternatives. I am specifically thinking about Hayek’s preference for common law (which is developed through an evolutionary process) over statute law (wich is not).
Think about it this way. Under property rules, rights to the use of this or that good are allocated through market transactions. And for the most part that usually works really well. But there are some times when property rights are hard to define or transactions costs are high. Under those circumstances, there is no reason to believe that property rights will be allocated to their most valued use (see Ronald Coase for further details). We can either pretend those situations don’t exist or pursue alternatives. Hayek chose to take these situations seriously. And one alternative to traditional property rules/markets that he wrote extensivedly about was the use of liability rules that are created through judicial decision (common law).
From your perspective, I would think this would seem like the worst of all possible worlds.
“A single man is asked to decide upon the allocation of resources whose values are determined subjectively and cannot be observed!? Where does he then get the information to make his ruling!? And don’t you realize his decision will create precedents that will influence subsequent cases he will never hear!? There is no way he has the information to adequately take those consequences into account!”
But Hayek himself had much more faith in the system than that because he realized that even though a single person was making a decision with limited information there was an evolutionary feedback process at work that would eliminate liability rules that are inefficient. The process for how this actually happens was expanded upon later members of the Law and Economics movement like Paul Rubin and John Goodman.
http://www.jstor.org/pss/724189
http://www.jstor.org/pss/724222
So I personally believe that if Hayek was completely consistent with the conclusions he draws in “Economics and Knowledge” and “The Use of Knowledge in Society” AND the Constitution of Liberty, he would NOT disagree with most of what Daniel Kuehn is trying to argue (at least in principle).