I disagree with most of what Gene Callahan says, and recoil at the way he usually says it, but he was on the money when he said this:
One of the most telling rhetorical tics one finds amongst radical libertarians is to refer to every single person who does not buy their entire program as a ‘statist’. Now, when Mises used that term, he was referring to people like, say, Mussolini, who were engaged in some form of state worship, who were making the State a God on earth. This made sense.
But many rad-libs today apply it to every person who does not want to destroy the State as a social institution. This is an extraordinary usage, as though I went around calling every person who does not think Major League Baseball should be abolished a ‘baseballist’, or everyone who doesn’t mind opera houses an ‘operist’. It says a lot more about those who are using the term than it does about those to whom they are applying it.
I’m not sure why people think I’m a “modern liberal”. I think it’s because we’re in the middle of a massive recession and I’m a Keynesian so I come across as a liberal. I think of myself as pretty non-descript centrist, with some strong libertarian sympathies. I used to be a libertarian.
As for the “modern” appendage there, I also find it grating when people treat “classical liberal” and “libertarian” as synonyms. So no need for that “modern” addition to refer to those to the left who are within the broader classical liberal tradition. If you need to clarify, “progressive” or simply “left” probably makes more sense with them. I’m on their side on lots of occasions, but I’ve never thought of myself as one.
Whether or not modern liberalism evolved out of classic liberalism, and whether or not there are certain harmonies regarding the intentions of the two, the policies classic liberals advocated are hugely different from the policies advocated by modern liberals, but very consonant with policies advocated by modern libertarians. Galbraith had as little as common with Hume and Smith as did Buckley.
Can you explain some of the benefits? I don’t see anything to be gained from using obviously flawed reasoning to build a formal model, but I’m up for enlightenment.
re: “the policies classic liberals advocated are hugely different from the policies advocated by modern liberals, but very consonant with policies advocated by modern libertarians. Galbraith had as little as common with Hume and Smith as did Buckley.”
I’m not even sure this is the case stated in this way, but I’m also not even sure it should be stated in this way. When we’re talking about actual policy recommendations, it might also be relevant to ask “What would Galbraith and Buckley have advocated if presented with the circumstances of the 18th century” and “what would Smith and Hume have advocated if presented with the circumstances of the 20th century?” I sincerely doubt they would be ardent Ron Paul supporters. Smith and Hume’s liberalism were less a function of some sort of modern libertarian/Rothbardian ethico-deductive tabboo associated with government and more associated with the liberal values shared across a wide swath of “modern liberals”, “modern conservatives”, and “modern libertarians”. This sort of foundationalist Rothbardianism and the tight connection that it makes between ethics, political philosophy, and policy was not the foundation of the classical liberals (although certainly it’s not inconsistent with it - I’m not trying to say Rothbard is outside the liberal tradition by any means).
The broadly consequentialist approach of Smith and Hume is indeed somewhat dissonant with Rothbard’s, and that does make for an interesting (if minor) distinction between the classic liberalism of Hume, Smith, Cobden, Molinari, Mises, and Hayek and the libertarianism of Rothbard and many Rothbardians.
But Hume and Smith were not Historical School Schmollerites. So, unless they actually changed their understanding of market processes and human nature (which would be an entirely different -and unguessable- question altogether), I doubt 20th century conditions would suddenly make Hume consider gold a “barbarous relic” or lead Smith to endorse Galbraith’s semi-institutionalism. And yes, I think they would support Ron Paul’s policies over those of Obama or Romney, even if they did not adopt his deontological stance.
re: “But Hume and Smith were not Historical School Schmollerites.”
And one need not invoke historicism to acknowledge that there is a distinction between political philosophy and policy recommendation (just like there is a distinction between epistemology and scientific investigations). In both of these circumstances you seem to take the relationship between practical activity (ie - policy, science) and philosophical justification as being much, much tighter than I do.
Indeed I do, and that seems to at least be the more obvious stance to take. Do you have any particularly strong reasons to not have your general views about validity guide your specific quests for the truth and to not have your general understanding of human affairs guide your specific positions concerning specific policies?
Certainly an understanding of human affairs is necessary as a guide - but so are circumstances and prospects for success. One need to have a historicist understanding of human affairs to have a historically contingent understanding of practicalities.
And even if you discount policies, what is the particular consonance between the political philosophies of Hume and Smith on one hand and Keynes and Galbraith on the other? The only way you can make the two sides consonant, is if you impose an undue emphasis on “cultural” matters and an undue neglect of “merely economic” affairs.