Anarchy is not an end in itself - the end is breaking the monopoly on law

Economics Political Theory
161

A GENERAL QUESTION:

Suppose you were given ten years to establish a libertarian community in some form.

How would you do it ?

A FEW ANECDOTES:

#1

I was working for a company and the manager of our department left and was replaced by a new manager. The department had been losing money. The new manager called everyone into his office and handed them each a sheet of paper. On that paper was a business plan. The business plan had various expenditures and incomes listed. The total of all expenditures and incomes on the business plan resulted in a profit of one penny.

The idea was that if the business plan were carried out, the department would make a penny of profit. I.e., in principle, the department would be profitable as opposed to unprofitable.

Our new manager explained that in the past, no one had actually sat down and devised a business plan that if it were carried out, would, in principle, result in profitability. The previous manager had lots of “action items,” and of course, each day was filled with various projects and with responding to various urgent matters (“putting out fires”). All these urgent actions, we had always implicitly assumed, had the goal of making money for the department. But the department continued to lose money under the old manager.

The new manager simply pointed out something that no one had realized until then: there was actually no plan in place for profitability.

In other words, though all the actions our department were taking were urgent actions, none of them were designed so that if they were successfully carried out, a profit would result !!

#2

It is common for beginners who have a great business idea to plan and envision every last detail of their business, except for the detail of how to sell their product to another person. (I know this from experience)

They will spend days and weeks on elaborate marketing schemes, on choosing office furniture, on printing up stationery, on making lists of imaginary expenses that balance against imaginary incomes, and on finding the perfect office and warehouse location. They will do all of these things first.

Then, once all the plans are made and the money is spent on all these things, and they are sitting in their newly rented office, they will come to the problem of how to actually sell their product to another person.

Unfortunately, selling the product to another person is probably the most important part of a business.

The beginner with a grand business plan often makes the mistake of considering most important part of the business last, instead of first.

In effect, he acts as if selling the product to another person were the least essential aspect of his business, when in fact it is the most essential.

I think these anecdotes apply to the libertarian movement.

We all write blogs, articles, essays, and books, and we all debate and discuss. We all have urgent “action items.”

But are any of these action items actually designed so that if they are completed liberty will come about ? Or are we just assuming liberty will result?

We also plan the grand details of a future libertarian society. We plan all of the agencies and institutions this society will have, what their documents will say, who will interpret the documents, what the penalty will be for not following the rules, and who will administer the punishment.

We plan every single detail of this future except one: how to actually obtain a state of liberty

We essentially plan the details of a future society under the implicit assumption that liberty has somehow emerged. This has the effect of placing the question of how to actually attain a state of liberty as the last item for consideration (to be considered after all the details of the future society have been worked out in our plan) instead of the first item.

We don’t have a credible plan for liberty. We have daily action items which we assume will result in liberty. But obviously this procedure needs to be questioned, since our action items continue to be completed (the books and manuscripts are piling high), but yet no liberty is emerging.

And what we do have that we consider a plan, is an intricate working out of all the details of an imaginary future society, that places the question of how to actually attain a state of liberty as the last item for consideration.

I submit that this is the reason liberty fails to materialize and statism continues to advance.

Libertarian minds are focused on the wrong problems and aimed in the wrong direction.

So the question is:

Suppose you were given ten years to establish a libertarian community in some form.

How would you do it ?

162

Adam,

Good post man. Before, I wasn’t trying to play contrarian, I was genuinely confused, that’s all.

As to an answer to your general question, I think amassing non-monetary capital, and manipulating the extant political systems, and becoming an example of freedom in action are the keys to independence. In short, grow a victory garden, buy property, run for office, and get to know your neighbors.

163

Jackson:

Paraphrasing your reply here, then something like this:

“Not operating outside the framework of the state on all issues…”

“Yet operating independent of the state on one or a few voluntarily chosen issues…”

Going back to the example:

(I’m going to keep using this example until either I think of a better one or someone else does)

Simply for the sake of discussion (since the particular kind of community is less important than the principle at issue) let’s assume that a large number of people begin billing one another by e-mail attachment for a penny an hour for intellectual services.

This will be (will constitute) an independent wage and trade agreement reached voluntarily, independent of the existing compulsory wage and trade rules.

This will be (will constitute) an independent community.

If this were done, it actually would be a libertarian community.

I’m trying to get people to realize this.

Once this is done, then things can evolve and grow from there. The next issue can be addressed. But then, things will be evolving from a situation where there is an actual libertarian community.

Now, debate and discussion, book and essay writing, can all occur in an atmosphere where there is an actual libertarian community to refer to, to debate and discuss, and to write about.

Then we can have meaningful discussions and exchanges with statists and other anti-voluntarists.

Again, maybe this idea is faulty in some way. Maybe some other way is better.

The idea is to somehow establish a libertarian community.

164

I understand the premise, and this is illegal. Communities such as this already exist. Take for instance the thriving “under the table” labor offers, (formerly) prostitution, and barter community on Craigslist. And as these communities grow and begin to make some actual waves, the state becomes more aware of the threat to their hegemony, and the are stopped, as Craigslist is beginning to, or Napster was. Take the recent imprisonment of the founders of Pirate Bay. As far as I’m concerned, this was just as much about the state feeling ignored or threatened than about protecting the IP of businesses. I think this is why AJ mentioned civil disobedience a few posts back, because that’s what this proposal is, essentially. Call me a pessimist, but I think as soon as a community like this is large enough to matter, it will be snuffed out. This may be cowardice, but I am already miserable living as a “free” person, I would really hate to be thrown in jail!

I prefer bending laws to overtly breaking them. Staying squeaky clean helps to prevent the state from concocting some BS to nail you (Capone and tax evasion?). Get in office, repeal as many laws as possible. Let the people experience freedom, and if we are right, the statists will have a hell of a time bringing those laws back.

165

Jackson:

OK I won’t argue with your preferences. Before, you were saying you didn’t understand. Now, you’re outlining all the reasons why you personally wouldn’t want to take any concrete steps toward a libertarian society that weren’t approved of by those who are explicit that they do not want to see a libertarian society.

Then I think we’re back to square one. There are things that are allowed (voting, book writing, debating, etc..), and there are things that are not allowed (various voluntary communities such as we’ve been discussing). You and I can’t work for one another for $4 per hour.

Your plan for liberty is, taking those forms of action that are fully approved and vetted by those who are explicit that they don’t want to see a libertarian society, and from these, working toward a libertarian society.

You are basically saying you want to vote your way to liberty.

Going back to a point I made with AJ, the example I’m using assumes that one has already reached the conclusion that for structural reasons, it is highly unlikely that a person or a group of people can vote their way to liberty.

If we can write more books and have more debates, and then eventually vote ourselves into liberty, that sounds like an attractive and “risk free” plan. Maybe something like that can happen. If that can happen, why would any reasonable and peaceful person be against it?

The kinds of suggestions I’m making are based on the assumption that the forms of “allowable” behavior are somewhat crafted to prevent liberty from emerging.

And what I conclude from this is not that anyone become mad, hostile, hateful, or violent. I conclude from this that the essential issue we are facing is whether or not the emergence of some nascent form of liberty will ever be “allowed”.

Maybe statist society will be dedicated to preventing liberty from emerging by altering the allowable forms of action toward that end whenever necessary.

Maybe when you get in office, if liberty begins to emerge that way, the allowable forms of action will simply be changed again.

Here in Washington state, the voters voted, by popular initiative, for limits on tax increases. The other day, the governor simply overturned the law.

Anyway, this gets into the whole debate about democracy which I assume most of us should be familiar with by now. Please let’s not debate whether democracy can turn itself into liberty.

My point is, assuming it can’t, then what are the possibilities? What can be done peacefully and consistent with libertarian principles?

(and, incidentally, I don’t consider voting on the laws that bind strangers to be peaceful or consistent with libertarian principles).

Will we be content to be the chroniclers of the decline of our civilization?

Or will we exhaust every possible path and route that is peaceful to try to change the course of things?

My personal preference is this:

When someone asks me why I didn’t do anything to change the situation, I am not going to reply to that person:

“I wanted to, but all the things I could think to do weren’t allowed.”

166

I didn’t realize that civil disobedience was what all that you were advocating initially. Sorry for the confusion.

Yes, because even if we manage to solve 1,000 of the 10,000 issues in the way of freedom those who explicitly do not want a libertarian society will stop you at problem 9,000. There is precedence for this sentiment (Waco, Ruby Ridge, the ones I referenced above). Like or not, those with the biggest guns set the rules. To not abide by them is eventual suicide.

Yes, but it is also important to act as a subversive influence. Take growing your own tobacco for instance, or brewing your own beer. If more people began to do this, the state would lose revenue. I think self-sufficiency is one of the best methods I’ve considered for smashing the state apparatus. I’m also OK with some civil disobedience, but it must be on a small enough scale to “fly under the radar” of the state. Ultimately though, the only recourse I can come up with to remove the state is by utilizing the state’s existing power structure against it via the electoral process. Like Roderick Long says, it’s sort of like flying into the Death Star to blow it up.

I would totally agree. The way I see it, this indicates exactly why hijacking the legislative process is so vital. You have to change the current paradigm of allowable behavior. I just don’t see how direct opposition can achieve that.

This is very true, but I think the state would loose a tremendous amount of credibility if they were to suddenly change the rules to suit their cause. One of the greatest strategic moves of the state was to convince the population that the bureaucrats are the servants of the citizenry. It is also a gamble though, because now they have to maintain that illusion by paying it lip-service. If they were to suddenly and abruptly discard that lie, than they would have to deal with massive dissent. Americans love the concept of freedom, no matter how perverted it becomes in the hands of the state.

LOL, maybe I give the masses too much credit. Is there any fallout resulting from that?

Maybe we could all quit our jobs, and drag the state down under our weight?

Yeah, it probably isn’t, but hey, I don’t really care about strangers anyways!

If you have guns and food, you can carry the torch of liberty until after the state rends itself apart.

A bit dramatic, but I see what you are saying. When someone asks me why I didn’t do anything to change the situation, I’ll reply,

“Why didn’t you?”

I’m not saying it’s right, but I value living an imperfect life over martyrdom for a perfect one.

167

There are a lot of voluntary societies that the state takes no action against, but apparently you mean voluntary societies that actually break state laws. If so, you’d be defining “voluntary society” to mean a group of people agreeing to ignore (and therefore sometimes violate) state laws. In short, a group of people that break state laws. Hence the above sentence would read, “I’m referring to the general principle that each time a group that breaks state laws is formed the state takes action.”

Unless I’m misunderstanding you, the general principle seems to be simply that the state enforces its laws.

168

Jackson:

I strongly disagree with your general notions.

I consider Rosa Parks and the civil rights movement to be exemplary, and I think they disprove what you say.

"When someone asks me why I didn’t do anything to change the situation, I’ll reply:

“Why didn’t you?”

Then that will be one perplexed ten year old living in a socialist paradise.

169

Sure, but you have to remember what happened to Rev. King when he began to question the government outright, rather than simply beg for equal treatment compared to the white thralls.

If he’s smaller than me, I’d probably shove him too.

170

AJ:

If we’re talking about a situation where there are coexisting communities, then why is it necessary to only refer to the “laws” of only one of them, when discussing the fact that the two sets of laws are inconsistent?

In other words, if those in community A are in violation of the laws of those in community B, then why aren’t those in community B in violation of the laws of community A in the case where those in community B initiate an action against those in community A?

In the quote of mine you provide, the emphasis is more on the idea that a voluntary community exists, and outsiders initiate some action against it.

Then, when you address the same issue, your emphasis is in terms of the coercive state as community, and the voluntary community as outsiders.

That is, your emphasis is on people breaking the laws of the state, with no corresponding emphasis on the state breaking the laws of the voluntary community.

Do you intend to make a value judgment on the ethical or moral superiority of one community versus the other?

171

Have you considered the implications of what you’ve just written, and you are willing to stand with this?

172

Adam,

We were discussing whether the fact that your proposal is risky automatically means it is advancing liberty, or if it could just be risky and not advance liberty. Nothing about value judgments, only the question of material risks faced by members. Here again is the context of my comments above:

You seemed to abstract these ideas into this principle:

I am simply saying that - given the sense in which you seem to be using the term “voluntary society” (i.e., only those that break state laws count) - this is tantamount to saying that the state enforces its laws, which seems uncontroversial.

Being a member of a voluntary society that breaks state laws is risky not because it’s a voluntary society, but only because it entails breaking state laws. You seem to be implying

(1) that the “voluntary society” aspect of your proposal entails additional risk (above and beyond the lawbreaking involved), and

(2) that this risk is proof that it is advancing libertarianism.

I don’t see how either is the case, except perhaps at some point when and if this movement were to gain momentum. Hence how the movement would gain momentum seems to me the critical argument to be made, yet you have avoided that perhaps out of the desire not to make concrete speculations. Once again I ask, how do you get around that dilemma? I threw out some possible ideas on how above, but I’m interested in your take.

173

I dunno, are they dire? I was merely relating why the civil rights movement isn’t the greatest example of challenging the state monopoly outright and succeeding.

174

AJ:

I think we may have a simple difference of opinion here.

Recall my previous post:

If we take a series of voluntary associations that libertarians might form, not limited to my example, and if we take a series of actions that the state might conceivably take, each action referring to a specific law, then we would have something like this:

Libertarians establish voluntary association A…The state takes action based on law W.

Libertarians establish voluntary association B…The state takes action based on law X.

Libertarians establish voluntary association C…The state takes action based on law Y.

Libertarians establish voluntary association D…The state takes action based on law Z.

I’m trying to say something like, that the general principle involved is not breaking this or that law. The general principle is doing something that another person doesn’t want you to do.

There are various ways a person can try to prevent another person from doing that which he doesn’t want him to do. Enacting a law is only one means. Other possible means could be simply physically restraining someone, morally shaming someone, killing someone, etc…

Thus I disagree with your characterization of the situation.

The general principle involved in statism is that a group of people A try not to allow another group B to do, that which group B wants to do.

If A could do this simply by nodding their head, waving a wand, or by moral persuasion alone, they may use those means. Since they believe those means are ineffective, then they enact laws backed by the threat of force.

The general principle involved is one person’s (A’s) will that another person (B) not do what B himself wills, but instead what A wills.

The particular means of A are accidental, concrete, changeable, etc…

So with respect to what you write above:

You seem to be implying

(1) that the “voluntary society” aspect of your proposal entails additional risk (above and beyond the lawbreaking involved), and

(2) that this risk is proof that it is advancing libertarianism.

Yes, that is correct.

What I am arguing for and trying to illustrate, is that establishing a libertarian society will likely entail B (the libertarian) doing something that A (the statist) does not want him to do. That is the general principle. That is where the risk comes from. It comes from A being upset, angry, mad, unhappy, etc., about what B is doing or plans to do.

You can see this easily, because A only gets angry when he doesn’t want a particular law broken (when he doesn’t want a particular thing done by B). In cases where A doesn’t care whether a particular law is broken (when he doesn’t care whether B does the thing in question), he doesn’t get angry with B, and thus takes no actions to enforce the law.

In other words, A is not primarily interested in what is written on a piece of paper in some building somewhere. A is primarily concerned with what B is doing, and whether or not that accords with A’s wishes. That is the essential issue, not words in books.

Thus, the risk is in trespassing the will of another, not in breaking a law per se. The risk is in doing what someone doesn’t want you to do, not from doing something different than what is written somewhere.

And thus, in a political context, B doing that which A does not want him to do, is establishing a “risky” principle:

I.e., that B can and will do that which A does not want him to do.

(and, for libertarians, this always means peaceful exchange, voluntary cooperation, etc…)

It is risky because it is believed by B to trespass A’s will.

It is risky by virtue of the presupposition involved: that A doesn’t want me to do this thing.

Doing something is ‘risky’ based on the presupposition that A doesn’t want me to do it.

Therefore, in doing X, I am automatically changing from a situation wherein I believe I am “safely” within the boundaries of A’s will (and thus he will not be angry with me), to a situation where I assume I am “dangerously” outside the boundaries of A’s will (and thus he will be angry with me).

So yes, as I am trying to argue, in a political context, the ‘risk’ associated with the voluntary community in the example, is proof, in principle, that a libertarian society is formed, since it is the establishment of a voluntary community as against the assumed will of another.

It is only risky because we assume it goes beyond the boundaries of what A wants. What is written somewhere is of secondary concern, and is not the essential issue.

So my reasoning, and the example(s) I’m providing, are based on this.

They are based on the assumption that A (the statist) will not want B (the libertarian) to form a voluntary community.

If that is the case, and as long as that holds, then, what are our options?

"In my opinion, Panarchism is primarily concerned with a political reality in which some or even most people do not want other people to have a political arrangement different from their own. In other words, I view Panarchism as obligated to solve the problem of political change and political evolution in the case where some or most people subscribe to a monopolistic conception of government. They subscribe to a monopolistic conception of government because this is the level of political development they have been able to attain (as our own conceptions of libertarianism or Panarchism constitute the level of political development we have been able to attain). In my approach, each person’s political beliefs are assumed valid (for himself) and I assume that people’s political convictions will not change in the near future.

So my vision of Panarchism begins by assuming at least two incompatible political philosophies, and I assume that in the foreseeable future our culture will be one in which political monopolism and geographically based government will be the dominant culture. I do not address a political future in which Panarchy might be “allowed” or agreed upon by a majority. Proceeding from these assumptions then, I conceive of Panarchy more in terms of an ethical program or political technique, and less in terms of an envisioned legal structure.

I believe this way of approaching things is appropriate. Because if we are pursuing a theory of individual political choice, then we are pursuing a theory where the concrete structure of society is the result of individual choices, and not the result of a theorist’s social vision. Thus, I don’t consider it my task to outline the structure of a future society. Instead, I view my task as demonstrating that a different political future is possible in principle, and that it is possible to achieve it by adhering to a consistent libertarian or individualist ethic."

175

If B and C agree to work for each other below minimum wage, the primary risk is harm from the agents of the state, not from statist civilians (A). (Is this really controversial?) Moreover, the agents of the state will do it perfunctorily, usually even if they don’t personally object to the civil disobedience, and even if no one else generally cares.

176

AJ:

OK Now we’ve subtly changed the scenario, and we’re talking about agents that have been dispatched to execute an order.

We’re no longer talking about forming a voluntary community against the assumed wishes of another person.

Here, the assumed action is not “forming a voluntary community” but “dealing with some agents.”

But again, within the context of such a face-to-face meeting, the only social risk A faces is if B doesn’t want him to do what he is doing or is planning to do.

Person A faces no social risk if B is OK with what A is doing (for example, the agents show up, but they are actually sympathetic to A’s cause, and so sit down and have a cup of coffee with A).

I don’t think you’ve overcome this principle.

177

That was your scenario: agree to ignore minimum wage. What we are doing here right now - talking about libertarian strategy - is against the wishes of certain people already. So would be an agreement to form a society that hands out mises.org flyers and where everyone wears a T-shirt that says TAXATION IS SLAVERY. None of these things are illegal, but they entail plenty of social risk, yet apparently these don’t fall under the purview of your proposal.

This seems to indicate that the key - in fact defining - element of what qualifies as a voluntary society within your proposal is that it breaks some minor state law, not that it is against anyone’s assumed wishes. In fact, the example you chose seems specifically designed to minimize social risk, yet it bears fairly significant legal risk.

178

AJ

What the degree of overlap is in what we are both claiming, or what the degree of difference is, I am not certain.

One could argue that it is the defining element of libertarianism as a movement, that it proposes future activities which are presently illegal.

I’m not sure if your criticism is that the e-mail invoicing idea is no different than any other libertarian proposal, and thus not unique, or, if your criticism is that it is different than other libertarian proposals in suggesting something illegal, and thus dangerous or irresponsible in your opinion. I’m not sure which criticism you are intending.

We may be utilizing slightly different theoretical or epistemological approaches, and this may constitute a large part of the difference in interpretations.

If this is a significant part of our disagreement, then this will take us further and further into the theory of action, and further away from any reference to the concrete proposal or suggestion we were originally discussing. I’m not necessarily for or against that, but the thread would turn into a praxeology thread, whereas the e-mail invoicing proposal seems to be in line with the OP which mentions breaking the monopoly on law.

The praxeological and epistemological issues toward which our exchange is headed have to do with the bracketed, bolded, and underlined parts of your post above. (I made minor changes for clarity)

These are the three specific characterizations of the original proposal or suggestion, and each one is of the same form.

First, there is reference made to an actor A who ignores, breaks, or bears something.

Then, there is reference made to the thing that actor A ignores, breaks, or bears:

Minimum wage law, state law, legal risk.

Those three things are the objects of A’s action, as is indicated in your post.

In all three cases, we have A’s action, and the object of A’s action. Exactly what that object is, depends on what your precise definition of a ‘law’ is.

Since we haven’t been discussing praxeology directly, but only indirectly through concrete examples, then there has been no need, and there is no need, to make precise praxeological conceptual distinctions.

As things head toward the purely theoretical, then we would need to make the definitions more rigorous and precise.

I will say that from my working knowledge in the field, it will make a difference whether a particular and precise definition of ‘law’ includes or excludes reference to a second consciousness.

Here, I don’t mean that any particular definition of law must do one or the other. What I mean is, as, or when, in discussing the concept of law, we either refer to or omit, reference to a second actor (second mind, second consciousness, etc…), then the formal implications of this reference or omission change. The implications of the argument are changed significantly if the concept in question does or does not refer to another mind.

What I propose is that if we are having these kinds of theoretical differences, we could either start another thread to discuss them, or you could write a paper or critique on some aspect you take issue with. Or maybe there is no interest in pursuing it further.

Rather than let the discussion devolve or evolve into a discussion on praxeology, meanwhile dragging in left-over disagreements from a previous and more practical oriented topic, I would prefer to, so to speak “formalize” and make explicit whatever the issue is, as the beginning topic of a discussion, debate, or paper. Then participants can each lay out their case explicitly and in full: why this or that idea or theory is faulty; what is a better alternative, etc…

If that is agreeable to you, I would prefer to deal with the praxeological aspect that way.

As for the e-mail invoicing idea, I’m still open to discussing it if anyone wants to.

My intention and hope with respect to the e-mail invoicing idea was that it would lead to brainstorming in this direction, as opposed to the main gist of libertarian theorizing which is aimed at constructing a hypothetical libertarian society, in theory, “whole cloth” so to speak.

Maybe that kind of brainstorming will occur in the future at some point. Maybe people haven’t given these ideas much thought, and time is needed. Or maybe they just disagree.

If you, or if anyone, believes the invoice idea is seriously flawed, then here would be another opportunity for a fresh discussion, debate, or paper topic:

“X idea has been proposed. Here’s why it’s wrong, and here’s a better idea.”

Doing so may entail some social risk, but luckily for all of us, at least so far, it doesn’t entail any legal risk. : - )

Adam

179

Sorry to interject again, but this is sort of what I was driving at. This is a quick summation of the proposals at hand as I understand them, utilizing this premise:

Adam: If we desire to engage activities that are currently illegal, then we should disregard the law, and pursue illegal activities.

Jack: If we desire to engage in activities that are currently illegal, then we should attempt to change the law, to make such activity legal.

I’m not really 100% sure what AJ is proposing as an alternative to your proposition, Adam, so I’ll abstain from making assumptions on his behalf.

I think we are at the point where we can begin to discuss what the ultimate goal is, which method would be better at achieving it, and why.

180

Jackson:

Please. You are contributing, not interjecting.

Here, I would like to ask for leeway so I can reply fully. I don’t want my reply to be taken as some kind of metaphysical journey or speculation. At the same time, I’m having a hard time accepting this kind of characterization of the situation.

Your characterization is of the same basic form as AJ’s:

“If we desire to engage activities that are currently illegal, then we should disregard the law, and pursue illegal activities.”

You have a “we” which is me, you, or us. Then you have an “illegal,” a “law,” and an “illegal.”

This is the same exact form of analysis AJ used above if you will look at the three bolded, bracketed, and underlined parts of his post.

We can look at it this way, but I think doing so is masking some important insights.

“Illegal” and “law” are social terms, and they imply, to me at least, that there is a person behind them. If not, then they are just words on paper.

I think we will understand the situation much more clearly as one in which we have what “we” want (A), and what “they” want (B).

I’m unwilling to grant any “ethical superiority,” real or implied, to what B wants, as opposed to what I, A, want.

I start off from the assumption that what A wants and what B wants are equivalent, morally, ethically, ontologically, whatever…

In conceiving that A does something “illegal,” and in leaving B out of the equation entirely, I think we may be inavertently introducing a negative moral or ethical connotation to A, while somehow implying that B is “neutral” or “good.”

We keep saying that A is “breaking the law.” Whereas, I suppose what I’m suggesting, is that we say that A is doing something B does not want him to do. In which case, we are forced to see that just as well, B is doing something A does not want him to do.

In my analysis, either we take out the moral connotation on A, or, we leave it in, and assign the same exact connotation to B.

There is what A wants, and there is what B wants.

Then we say: there are the consequences B states he will initiate if A doesn’t do what B wants. If we want to refer to those consequences as the “law,” then fine. Then in this case, let’s refer to any consequences that A threatens in return as the “law.” (i.e, for analysis, let’s assume that A can, in principle, do whatever B does-----A can form groups, write documents, call meetings, vote on actions, carry arms, initiate force, etc…)

The issue is the wants of B and the wants of A.

What is written on paper is inessential. B can write things on paper, and so can A.

Once we realize this, then we realize we have two sets of wants. In this respect, they are ontologically, morally, and ethically equivalent.

This is not the same thing as what you and AJ are continually referring to.

What you are referring to has the effect, whether intended or inadvertent, of characterizing A’s wants with a moral or ethical value judgment, and implying by omission, but not stating explicitly, that somehow B is “neutral” or “good.”

If you do that, then I’m going to suppose that a voluntary libertarian community is formed, such that any moral or ethical value judgment you stipulate as applying to A for “breaking the law,” I can then apply to B as well. I.e., now that A is part of a community, then B is doing something “illegal” in threatening A. Now B is “breaking the law.”

Either both A and B act “illegally,” or neither does. I believe we can do it either way.

I think this may be what I’m reacting to…

Thus, there are the wants of A and the wants of B.

Both will utilize means to attain their wants.

B is a statist, so coercive means are deemed acceptable. A is a libertarian, and in my assumptions, such means are not acceptable.

This is more than a moral intuition. Coercive means are assumed off limits because A’s using them transforms A into a statist. (here, leeway, I’m not talking about a praxeological category)

So if you look at my example, you can see that it comprehends and already assumes two different sets of means of attainment:

B, as a statist, will threaten, or will resort to, coercive means, in order to get what he wants.

A, as a libertarian, will resort to peaceful means in order to get what he wants.

As I’ve written repeatedly, no hostile actions are required on A’s part.

My example is realistic. It assumes that B will try to use force. And it assumes that A is trying to avoid doing so because he wants to adhere to the libertarian ethic of non-coercion (if you want, “NAP”)

Given these two sets of moral or ethical means, how could things be structured so that a libertarian society might be brought about, assuming that B will threaten or resort to force, and, assuming that A will not…

Is there any conceivable path that can satisfy this “equation.” ??

My assertion is/was: Yes, I think so. It might be possible.

If enough libertarians engaged in a certain type of voluntary activity, it might be too difficult and too expensive to prevent, even if force is or was threatened or used. This would allow, possibly, a libertarian society to form, that didn’t entail libertarians transforming themselves into statists (i.e, utilizing coercive means to attain their political ends). This wold allow, possibly, a peaceful way forward.

To reiterate a few more underlying assumptions:

I assume here that things will continue on as they have for the last century, and society will continue to deteriorate as statism advances.

I am not assuming that things, politically speaking, will improve in the next thirty or forty years, let’s say.

Under these assumptions, the choice isn’t something risky now, versus something non-risky later. The choice is, something risky now, versus a seriously deteriorated situation later.

The assumptions I’m working with are that now is the time for peaceful action, and that waiting as things deteriorate will make things much more risky and dangerous later.

(I think this principle is widely recognized, since all libertarians see current society putting off all problems indefinitely into the future, and we know full-well that this will only make things worse)

If someone can make a convincing argument that society is nearing or approaching some kind of reversal or spontaneous outbreak of liberalism—even a gradual one— my assumptions are not met, and my suggestion, or, the kind of thing I’m proposing has little use value. If someone believes that libertarian scholarship is making serious inroads, and that debate and discussion are changing the tide, then I understand, and I even agree, that what I’m suggesting would seem unnecessarily “risky” or “dangerous.”

Again, I’m assuming some kind of consensus that this optimistic scenario isn’t playing out, and isn’t likely to. If I’m wrong, so be it. Someone needs to make the opposite case.

I’m assuming that the solution cannot be a violent one, and that this would make things worse and not better. That is included in the example.

I’m assuming that the solution must be radically different. It can’t simply be “I’m right, so my use of force is right.”

There has to be a radical break from past methods and approaches. Hence, Internet communities, voluntarily formed, nonterritorially, with absolutely no attempt to alter or abolish existing laws or institutions, and absolutely no hostile or aggressive actions taken toward members of other legal cultures.

This allows libertarians not only to adhere to and aspire to their moral and ethical code, but to simultaneously demonstrate it in action.

If this is mis-guided, then someone needs to make the opposite case.

I could go on with some other important assumptions, but Jackson will call me dramatic.