Animal rights (is back) - a new type of reasoning?

I am not really talking about restitution. If you abuse your dog, I shouldn’t have a claim to a monetary restitution simply by taking the case to court. Similarly, if a person is murdered and has no legal heirs, restitution is moot. Or if the heirs are themselves the killers… Society at large, however, is surely interested in justice and preventing moral hazards for the future violation of rights. Thus, it chooses to punish the perpetrator.

Anyone can bring forth the case. One logic might be that allowing rights violations in such specific cases sanctions further rights violations. Since everyone has rights and injustice threatens these rights, enforcing someone else’s rights can legitimately be perceived as protecting one’s own. A simpler logic is that people don’t like injustice and choose to punish it…or people like punishing injustice.

For animals, I am talking more about protection. I believe animals have a right to be spared unnecessary pain. Thus, anyone can enforce that right on behalf of a dog. They could steal your dog from you vigilante style. This might cause further conflict, however. Courts are used as independent third parties who can wisely determine who is right and wrong and sanction force, such that conflict is reduced and justice is served, both in the current case and future ones.

To be clear, civil cases are not what I’m talking about.

I agree that torture is morally worse than death. I agree that death likely involves pain and the animal does not consent to it, which may be considered immoral. However, I think that such pain can be considered morally insignificant compared to the benefits, which do not take as much of a moral value as an economic one. I admit the moral inconsistency.

If you want a threshold, it is simply a judge’s discretion per a given case. But it all breaks down. If the decision is unpopular, it may go unenforced, and it may be disregarded by future decisions. If it is unpopular and enforced, there may be violent protests and riots. Or the enforcement firm and court could go bankrupt. We can’t firmly predict these things and determine what is best for any given society in advance by a set of universal rules and principles.

There may even be a utilitarian case against a moral foundation that has better principles. For example, we could claim it is morally correct to abolish taxation and government as we know it overnight. Yet, this would likely drive many people into panic or outrage, such that a lengthy era of violence would ensue. Perhaps there is a more desirable means from here to there, even if less moral in principle. (I do not necessarily believe abolishing gov’t overnight would be a bad thing, but you can see the argument.)

I can only tell you my own subjective beliefs and that I employ resources to see that they are followed. If others employ greater resources such that practically my beliefs are unenforceable, I still would not consider the ruling order of the day moral, just as I do not consider democracy moral. Others, however, would see it as moral. Principles and methodologies can help create consistent visions of morality and help people change their moral beliefs, but the root of moral opinion is subjective and individualist.

It implies a lack of consent, from the point of view of the victim, I agree. But it falls back to property and self-ownership as the moral basis. We could then ask why property or self-ownership are moral. Ultimately, morality, like all human desire, is emotional, not rational. What is the rationality of survival, or of prosperity? There is none. We simply subjectively prefer them given alternatives, but there is no rational explanation why. There is no rational basis to explain why we dislike pain and enjoy pleasure - it simply is what it is. (Note - this does not mean I’m a nihilist, or a hedonist, or whatever else you might infer.)

I don’t think animals can recognize the concept of life forms or that life is good in and of itself. Thus, they cannot consent to or argue against being killed. However, they clearly recognize pain and do not consent to it. I am not arguing for an animal’s right to life, only its right to be spared unnecessary pain.

Note, this is different from simple response to stimulus. For example, a plant grows towards light. Thus, we could consider it desires light, and would not consent to being denied light. Yet, plants are outside of this discussion. They do not feel pain, because they do not have a nervous system. Maybe the difference is purely one of perspective, not fundamentals, but simply put, I have no empathy for plants’ desires, whereas I do for animals. Note: I do not and never will “torture” plants. However, I view them solely as a means and not an ends.

Yet, most of society believes it is moral for other people to pay taxes against their consent. Most people believe in moral duties, with or without the consent of the actor. (I do believe in moral duties; however, I do not believe they can ethically be enforced violently.) We could say most people’s “morality” is simply wrong. Or we can simply say that others have different moral beliefs than ourselves.

Moral beliefs are not confined to the parties involved in a conflict, either. In fact, conflicting parties often seek 3rd parties to learn their moral belief about the particular case. The “losing” party may or may not drop the moral belief that was found in error. The beliefs of 3rd parties often play a greater role in determining our rights, or at least enforcing them.

A given moral methodology might tell you whether something is right or wrong according to that framework, but it cannot dictate a universal morality. There are many methods of determining morality, such as utilitarianism and deontological ethics. Also, we can judge by intentions or consequences. Or we can go by our gut. The methodological means are useful to attempt to universalize moral principles, but they cannot dictate morality.

If I accept moral methodology A and you a conflicting methodology B, we will arrive at conflicting moral judgments. Who is right, and who is wrong? One of us must prove the morality of our methodology. Now we’re in a circular logic. We cannot determine the morality of the methodology by using the methodology upon itself. There must be subjective reasonings why we each chose different methodologies. One could even start with a moral belief and work backwards to create a methodology that finds such a belief as correct.

So while there is no “right” and “wrong”, generally the moral structure favored by the majority of society will shape the legal arrangement of that society. Democracy may not be “right” from our perspective, but it is our reality, given the moral opinions of most of society on it.

Judging morality from owner’s consent implies that property rights are always moral - that they trump other moral concerns. I don’t think this is always true (however, it is so often true that I am indeed a libertarian). There can be cases where property rights are violated without immorality. Of course, this is only if you allow room for subjective beliefs on morality. If your methodology to determine morality is based upon firm property rights, their violations will always be deduced as immoral.

Also, moral judgments are the most conflicting for parties involved. Thus, morality shouldn’t be dictated by the aggressor or victim so much as an independent third party. The victim surely feels his aggressor’s act is morally unjustified - he does not consent to it. But a third party can disregard such if there are more pressing moral values.

Consider a man A who is trying to kill himself and is stopped by another man B. B has moral intentions, does not realize the man is trying to kill himself, etc. Basically, a third party completely exonerates him from any wrong-doing, even if A believes B improperly acted on his property against A’s consent. So who is correct, A., B, or the third party? They likely all have different moral beliefs on the case. Can the judge determine who is right or wrong, or does he simply offer his own moral opinion? He may use principles to determine his opinion, but how can we be sure the principles themselves correctly determine morality? Ultimately, we simply agree with them.

I didn’t mean the full vegan platform of giving animals all human rights wins. I simply meant that if you want the most consistent ideology, you either accept that animals should never be intentionally delivered pain, or that animals are the complete property of their owners and can be inflicted with pain to the owner’s desire. Few people, however, would outright accept such an ideology, instead favoring the compromise position I advocate. Although their desires conflict (they want to eat meat but they don’t want to harm animals), they seek to minimize the degree to which they do.

I don’t believe wild animals should be given a right to freedom, property, life, etc. I believe they can (and in most cases should) be owned, and the owner should accept liability for damages caused by their animals. I just don’t think owners have the right to purposefully inflict pain on their animals where can be avoided, although I do grant a limited buffer in using animals for common, non-controversial human ends, such as labor and food sources.

Me denying that children have rights is not the same as me denying that they are potential moral agents.

So will sperm and eggs. And you are advocating positive rights, which is completely un-libertarian.

Well when Aliens show up then we’ll figure that out. But at the moment that’s not the world we’re living in. To me, Humans have rights just because they are humans. That’s the only reason needed. I don’t see the point in trying to figure out the rights of highly intelligent extraterrestrials when they’re not here.

I guess we should wait until government disappears before we figure out what rights people have too, right?

Do you really think that’s a good comparison? If so then would you mind explaining why? I think I have a vague idea of what you’re getting at but I’d appreciate it if you made it more clear.

Aliens only exist in terms of the probability that the universe is so vast that there has to be some type of intelligent life outside of ours. I really don’t see the point in discussing the rights of unknown species as intelligent as ours when currently there are none known to us. Is that the only argument against humans having rights just for being human? That there may be intelligent aliens?

There is an essay I pointed out to you before re: aliens. You still strawmanned him.

I clarified what I meant, and all you are doing is repeating yourself and evading the original topic. Your claim that children have no rights undermines everything else you purport to stand for.

You are less of a libertarian than Glenn Beck and you have a serious misunderstanding to get that I am advocating “positive rights”. Your signature with an exact percent and a vague concept of resistance is contrary to Austrian economics as well. The only reason I feel the need to respond to your lunacy is that you are a huge embarrassment to our community and I know of no acclaimed libertarian author that is in agreement with you.

Humans are not asexual. Sperm and eggs must be combined to create a zygote. Even if it were true that sperm and eggs should be considered potential moral agents, all we would be considering is the right to ejaculate or menstruate, a “wilding of our reproductive cells”. People can create situations where positive obligations exist. This is the essence of contracts. By claiming guardianship, an adult must care for a child, otherwise their claim is invalid. If a parent wants to abandon their claim of guardianship, they must make this known (by whatever convention society adopts, say leaving the child at an orphanage or hospital). As is the case with other forms of property, the guardian may not forestall other would be homesteaders, for example by announcing that they relinquish their claim while locking the child in an unknown location.

Please respond in the relevant thread if you want to here.

I never argued that humans do not have rights. You however did assert that only humans have rights.

Because just claiming a species has rights for being some species is circular. Why do humans have rights?

You sure like to make a lot of assertions.

I hope everyone has as good of a laugh at this statement as I. Of course it is true.

No, using your logic, we would be considering whether or not ejaculating or menstruation is murder.

Do you have evidence of a contract between parents and children?

Which means a parent can do whatever he or she wants with his or her child. I am glad we finally agree.

“Hear ye, hear ye! Let the mad rush begin for taking away these parent’s child! The first person to nab the child get’s the kid!”

Uh yeah, right.

meambobbo,

You did an amazing job at avoiding all of my questions. Your post is full of, well, nonsense.

Your questions were basically moot. That should have been evident by our first exchange.

You don’t need a specific right to get a court case. Or I could point to any number of rights, like liberty or property. What does it matter at all?

As for a legal threshold, I said let judges decide for specific cases. As for my own opinion, I listed activities I agreed and disagreed with - anything further I’d have to decide on the specifics of the case. You’re free to disagree with me, but I’m just trying to make sure you understand what I’m talking about.

My only assertions were that moral opinions/beliefs are subjective, and that they don’t need a methodological backing to exist and function in society. Is that nonsense?

That was never an issue. The issue is, how does one derive the right to take a case to court on behalf of another? The answer is only by getting consent or having a claim to the other. If your neighbor is not treating his animal like you think he should, how do you derive the right to take your neighbor to court on behalf of the animal? The answer is, you cannot, because the animal is unable to give consent for you to do so, and you have no claim on the animal. All courts would throw out the case, because it obviously violates the property owner’s rights. So why would you take it to court in the first place?

But you are obviously uninterested in reality. Just spouting nonsense.

So let’s try this. You have my neighbor in a cage in your basement. You’ve told me so, and you’ve told me you’re holding him against his will. Only, I have no means to communicate with him, and he has not explicitly given me consent to call the police on his behalf. Or maybe you let me see him, but you’ve cut out his tongue, blinded his eyes, and cut off his hands, and he has no way to communicate with me. Maybe there’s even a video of this, but it is edited where he cried out for help. Better yet, it’s not my neighbor; it’s my cousin, being tortured in your cage.

By your logic, you are not doing anything unethical, as he has not consented that anyone stop you. Or maybe you are, but no one simply has the authority to stop you.

Realistically, people are quite in favor of humane treatment of animals. And they won’t care about any libertarian code or non-aggression axiom if it fails to protect ideals they cherish.

Your idea of ‘voluntary society’ sounds like legislating strict, basic, libertarian law to me, which seems ironic. The libertarian way is not to legislate or centrally plan, expecting society to conform to your moral pronouncements, but to harmonize possibly conflicting plans non-violently and freely by those whom it concerns. This means that courts discover laws about effective means to resolve disputes.

I just wanted to point this out again and also add that there isn’t any debate here (based off what I’ve presented) whether humans have more rights than animals or not; we do of course. But the question I’m posing is regarding whether humanity’s code of ethics requires that all sentient beings be afforded some type of basic rights, non-inclusive of contract-based human rights.

By the way, the aliens will fit in just fine given the ethics rules presented above, once we figure out what to rename the higher order set of rights. [:P]

I disagree with the reasoning on consent. Consent doesn’t imply ability to reason. Expressing consent does, because it requires reasoning to find out whether one consent or not.

If someone threathens me with a gun, I will most probably run away, fight or try to convince him not to shoot me. My lack of consent to be shot is obvious, but wasn’t found through reasoning. It was more a consequence of an emotional response or survival instinct than of rationnal thinking. I could as well consent to be shot and this would be the result of my reasonning, because I would have figured out whether I consent or not.

My point is that consent or lack of consent can very well be implicit. Applying this to animals, it seems obvious to me that an animal that runs away or attacks in response to a threath lacks consent to endure consequences of this threath. Even some plants developped strategies in order to avoid being harmed (needles, poison, etc.). And so, to some extent, even some plants implicitly lack consent to being harmed or killed.

The Pavlov’s experiment showed that dogs are able to refer to past experience to recognize a stimulus that makes him anticipate a future outcome (my understanding of conditioning). The process that makes the dog anticipate a future outcome is most probably not reasoning. Yet the dog anticipates and reacts. This basic combination is implicit consent (or lack of consent, depending on the reaction).

This reasoning would lead to the conclusion that the only “right” way of feeding ourselves would be through bodies which have adopted a survival strategy of being consumed (like some fruits and vegetables which don’t have any mechanism of self-protection).

I eat meat…but I don’t pretend to be “right”. Do we have to act “right” regarding other species? I don’t know. What I’m sure is that considering my ethical position on the subject, my action is either hypocritical or utilitarian. This to say that even if we prove that animals have rights, I don’t see them being respected as long as the cooperation benefits of our mutual interaction with nature have not been clarified. (Would be much easier to figure out if we had those weird Na’vi connectors in our hairs ^^)

True.

I only apply the claim that a certain species has rights just for being a certain species to humans. Why? Because I’m a human. That’s it really.

Bad news. The aliens have landed, and they think the same way.

Even more bad news. Primates have evolved, learned to talk (Planet of the Apes?), and decided only they deserve rights because only they are their own species.

I think something more is needed, such as perhaps a contract-based justification for the “higher order” rights of man, such as freedom (vs “basic” rights of sentient beings), which makes much more sense to me. (Not that this justification would negate the justification for respect of sentient beings that are unable to understand and abide by contracts.) Still hashing this out but I don’t feel this is an either/or issue where we simply draw up two categories and say “rights”/“no rights”. I think it’s much more complicated than that.

Seriously though, I’d say aliens’ rights is a valid thing to ask about because if we’re going to justify human rights based on some principle, that principle should be consistently applicable in all circumstances regardless of the specific context. I can’t see how a principle could be valid if it would clearly need to be re-evaluated in light of unexpected events. If aliens did get to the planet some day [8-|], I’d wager that most people (excluding out-of-control governments) would agree that these sentient, contract-abiding, moral agents would be entitled to the same rights as humans. So “rights are only for humans” doesn’t sound like the whole story.

Have any of you bothered to read anything on the subject? The “Rights” of Animals - MNR. As always he preempts the possible counter arguments.

"That the concept of a species ethic is part of the nature of the world may be seen, moreover, by contemplating the activities of other species in nature. It is more than a jest to point out that animals, after all, don’t respect the “rights” of other animals; it is the condition of the world, and of all natural species, that they live by eating other species. Inter-species survival is a matter of tooth and claw. It would surely be absurd to say that the wolf is “evil” because he exists by devouring and “aggressing against” lambs, chickens, etc. The wolf is not an evil being who “aggresses against” other species; he is simply following the natural law of his own survival. Similarly for man. It is just as absurd to say that men “aggress against” cows and wolves as to say that wolves “aggress against” sheep. If, furthermore, a wolf attacks a man and the man kills him, it would be absurd to say either that the wolf was an “evil aggressor” or that the wolf was being “punished” for his “crime.” And yet such would be the implications of extending a natural-rights ethic to animals. Any concept of rights, of criminality, of aggression, can only apply to actions of one man or group of men against other human beings.

What of the “Martian” problem? If we should ever discover and make contact with beings from other planets, could they be said to have the rights of human beings? It would depend on their nature. If our hypothetical “Martians” were like human beings — conscious, rational, able to communicate with us and participate in the division of labor — then presumably they too would possess the rights now confined to “earthbound” humans.[2]

But suppose, on the other hand, that the Martians also had the characteristics, the nature, of the legendary vampire, and could only exist by feeding on human blood. In that case, regardless of their intelligence, the Martians would be our deadly enemy and we could not consider that they were entitled to the rights of humanity. Deadly enemy, again, not because they were wicked aggressors, but because of the needs and requirements of their nature, which would clash ineluctably with ours.

There is, in fact, rough justice in the common quip that “we will recognize the rights of animals whenever they petition for them.” The fact that animals can obviously not petition for their “rights” is part of their nature, and part of the reason why they are clearly not equivalent to, and do not possess the rights of, human beings.[3] And if it be protested that babies can’t petition either, the reply of course is that babies are future human adults, whereas animals obviously are not.[4]

[2] Cf. the brief discussion of man and comparable creatures in John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (New York: Collier-Macmillan, 1965), p. 291.

[3] For the close connection between the use of language and the human species, see Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York: Macmillan, 1958), vol. 2, pp. xi, 223.

[4] A fundamental error, then, of the advocates of “animal rights” is their failure to identify — or even to attempt to identify — the specific nature of the species man, and hence the differences between human beings and other species. Failing to think in such terms, they fall back on the shifting sands of subjective feelings. See Tibor R. Machan, Human Rights and Human Liberties (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1975), pp. 202–3, 241, 1245ff., 256, 292. For a critique of the confusion between babies and animals by animal-rightists, see R.G. Frey, Interests and Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 22ff. Frey’s book is a welcome recent critique of the animal-rights vogue in philosophy.

Well that certainly makes a strong point. I’ll have to think about it some more; my thought process is based purely on ethics and that which humans consider morally relevant, but he seems to take an entirely different approach. One problem is that there remains a clear difference between inanimate property and a sentient being but that difference never seems to be addressed.