Are Booms and Busts in a Free Market Economy Normal?

According to ABCT, Boom and Busts are due to the Central Banks providing artificial information to the market via control of the interest rates and money supply. However, assume we do live in a Free Market. Are booms an busts in a free market economy normal?

I conjecture ups and downs are part of any market, but booms and busts, ie big ups and big downs are due to ABCT. Any articles on this topic?

I’m sure any one of the major authors will have written on this topic. Miscalculation is only human - nobody has perfect foresight and everyone has some experience with “crowd behaviour” (particular day traders - it’s easy to get sucked into the momentum through greed… thinking "If I don’t buy now I’ll miss out on all these massive gains everyone else is making).

But in a free market these mistakes are self correcting and unsustainable. A bunch of people might mistakenly go long or short on one commodity or stock but people who consistently do this will loose their money and thus their ability to influence the market. As such, only those that prove, over the long term, to be fairly good at predicting market trends will end up with capital and making decisions about future production.

I’m sure you could end up with the odd Tulip boom, even in a free market, but it wouldn’t be a global financial catastrophe and would be corrected quite quickly in a market that was free from government interference.

No doubt Mises himself has written on the topic - I can’t point you to any specific articles, but I’ve certainly seen this topic come up again and again. I imagine a quick scan of the literature section or the daily blogs would turn up all kinds of stuff.

economic bubbles and downturns have been around since the 16th century and thus are pretty inherent part of the market system,and because of this the market system itself is not perfect,and at times will need a deus ex machina in order to bail out the economy..

not the topic, per se, but you might want to check my thread on Malinvestment, How & Why, also my revised Primer on Malinvestment as it pertains to ABCT

That sounds rather dogmatic - I’d be interested to hear your reasoning though. What particular failing of the market do you suppose leads to these bubbles? What is it exactly about the free market that you think makes it incapable of correcting naturally?

First off, thanks for this. The content of those links are very well done. I’d be interested if you have anything to add to the thread I started the other day over how “natural” the business cycle is in the economy.

Specifically, I wonder what insights you have on why “crashes” tend to happen in a single market (housing, tech, etc.) and how you would address the claim that “there is simply not enough time for people to realize the gravity of their (usually undiverse) malinvestments and to allow the feedback mechanism of the market to be effective? In other words, most “financial crashes” happened in the space of a few days, hours even, up to which point, everyone believed their money was sound no matter how long or how fast credit was poured into the market in the first place.”

Just trying to get a little clarification in these areas.

Thanks.

This statement means absolutely nothing unless you back it up with a theory to explain it.

I’ll check out the other forum later today…

Just like we need God to provide order…

Oh wait. No, actually this deus ex machina is more like a malin genie. Like others said, though, offer an explanation.

Well, you might want to prove this. But before you start with trivial keysianomics, be sure to read some of the things here and get aqauinted to the austrian view.

The economy does not need to be “bailed out” by those that live of off producers, what get’s bailed out are privileged mercantilists. This kind of “bail out” from the not-haves, yes that is the government, comes at the cost of all those who produce value - no beaurocrats do not produce anything.

The believe that planers can in any way steer a market economy into anything else but desastrous failure is pure whishful thinking.

Leave the deus ex machina where it belongs. Mythology. And stop mixing science with myths.

Or ancient Greek drama anyway. [:P]

Lol. Touche´

Vienna,

The following perhaps suffices to answer your question. It should at least get you pointed in the right direction.

From Murray Rothbard, in The Austrian Theory of the Business Cycle (http://mises.org/tradcycl/econdepr.asp):

What, then, are the causes of periodic depressions? Must we always remain agnostic about the causes of booms and busts? Is it really true that business cycles are rooted deep within the free-market economy, and that therefore some form of government planning is needed if we wish to keep the economy within some kind of stable bounds? Do booms and then busts just simply happen, or does one phase of the cycle flow logically from the other?

The currently fashionable attitude toward the business cycle stems, actually, from Karl Marx. Marx saw that, before the Industrial Revolution in approximately the late eighteenth century, there were no regularly recurring booms and depressions. There would be a sudden economic crisis whenever some king made war or confiscated the property of his subject; but there was no sign of the peculiarly modern phenomena of general and fairly regular swings in business fortunes, of expansions and contractions. Since these cycles also appeared on the scene at about the same time as modern industry, Marx concluded that business cycles were an inherent feature of the capitalist market economy. All the various current schools of economic thought, regardless of their other differences and the different causes that they attribute to the cycle, agree on this vital point: That these business cycles originate somewhere deep within the free-market economy. The market economy is to blame. Karl Marx believed that the periodic depressions would get worse and worse, until the masses would be moved to revolt and destroy the system, while the modern economists believe that the government can successfully stabilize depressions and the cycle. But all parties agree that the fault lies deep within the market economy and that if anything can save the day, it must be some form of massive government intervention.

There are, however, some critical problems in the assumption that the market economy is the culprit. For “general economic theory” teaches us that supply and demand always tend to be in equilibrium in the market and that therefore prices of products as well as of the factors that contribute to production are always tending toward some equilibrium point. Even though changes of data, which are always taking place, prevent equilibrium from ever being reached, there is nothing in the general theory of the market system that would account for regular and recurring boom-and-bust phases of the business cycle. Modern economists “solve” this problem by simply keeping their general price and market theory and their business cycle theory in separate, tightly-sealed compartments, with never the twain meeting, much less integrated with each other. Economists, unfortunately, have forgotten that there is only one economy and therefore only one integrated economic theory. Neither economic life nor the structure of theory can or should be in watertight compartments; our knowledge of the economy is either one integrated whole or it is nothing. Yet most economists are content to apply totally separate and, indeed, mutually exclusive, theories for general price analysis and for business cycles. They cannot be genuine economic scientists so long as they are content to keep operating in this primitive way.

But there are still graver problems with the currently fashionable approach. Economists also do not see one particularly critical problem because they do not bother to square their business cycle and general price theories: the peculiar breakdown of the entrepreneurial function at times of economic crisis and depression. In the market economy, one of the most vital functions of the businessman is to be an “entrepreneur,” a man who invests in productive methods, who buys equipment and hires labor to produce something which he is not sure will reap him any return. In short, the entrepreneurial function is the function of forecasting the uncertain future. Before embarking on any investment or line of production, the entrepreneur, or “enterpriser,” must estimate present and future costs and future revenues and therefore estimate whether and how much profits he will earn from the investment. If he forecasts well and significantly better than his business competitors, he will reap profits from his investment. The better his forecasting, the higher the profits he will earn. If, on the other hand, he is a poor forecaster and overestimates the demand for his product, he will suffer losses and pretty soon be forced out of the business.

The market economy, then, is a profit-and-loss economy, in which the acumen and ability of business entrepreneurs is gauged by the profits and losses they reap. The market economy, moreover, contains a built-in mechanism, a kind of natural selection, that ensures the survival and the flourishing of the superior forecaster and the weeding-out of the inferior ones. For the more profits reaped by the better forecasters, the greater become their business responsibilities, and the more they will have available to invest in the productive system. On the other hand, a few years of making losses will drive the poorer forecasters and entrepreneurs out of business altogether and push them into the ranks of salaried employees.

If, then, the market economy has a built-in natural selection mechanism for good entrepreneurs, this means that, generally, we would expect not many business firms to be making losses. And, in fact, if we look around at the economy on an average day or year, we will find that losses are not very widespread. But, in that case, the odd fact that needs explaining is this: How is it that, periodically, in times of the onset of recessions and especially in steep depressions, the business world suddenly experiences a massive cluster of severe losses? A moment arrives when business firms, previously highly astute entrepreneurs in their ability to make profits and avoid losses, suddenly and dismayingly find themselves, almost all of them, suffering severe and unaccountable losses?How come? Here is a momentous fact that any theory of depressions must explain. An explanation such as “underconsumption”–a drop in total consumer spending–is not sufficient, for one thing, because what needs to be explained is why businessmen, able to forecast all manner of previous economic changes and developments, proved themselves totally and catastrophically unable to forecast this alleged drop in consumer demand. Why this sudden failure in forecasting ability?

An adequate theory of depressions, then, must account for the tendency of the economy to move through successive booms and busts, showing no sign of settling into any sort of smoothly moving, or quietly progressive, approximation of an equilibrium situation. In particular, a theory of depression must account for the mammoth cluster of errors which appears swiftly and suddenly at a moment of economic crisis, and lingers through the depression period until recovery. And there is a third universal fact that a theory of the cycle must account for. Invariably, the booms and busts are much more intense and severe in the “capital goods industries”?the industries making machines and equipment, the ones producing industrial raw materials or constructing industrial plants?than in the industries making consumers’ goods. Here is another fact of business cycle life that must be explained–and obviously can’t be explained by such theories of depression as the popular underconsumption doctrine: That consumers aren’t spending enough on consumer goods. For if insufficient spending is the culprit, then how is it that retail sales are the last and the least to fall in any depression, and that depression really hits such industries as machine tools, capital equipment, construction, and raw materials? Conversely, it is these industries that really take off in the inflationary boom phases of the business cycle, and not those businesses serving the consumer. An adequate theory of the business cycle, then, must also explain the far greater intensity of booms and busts in the non-consumer goods, or “producers’ goods,” industries.

Fortunately, a correct theory of depression and of the business cycle does exist, even though it is universally neglected in present-day economics. It, too, has a long tradition in economic thought. This theory began with the eighteenth century Scottish philosopher and economist David Hume, and with the eminent early nineteenth century English classical economist David Ricardo. Essentially, these theorists saw that another crucial institution had developed in the mid-eighteenth century, alongside the industrial system. This was the institution of banking, with its capacity to expand credit and the money supply (first, in the form of paper money, or bank notes, and later in the form of demand deposits, or checking accounts, that are instantly redeemable in cash at the banks). It was the operations of these commercial banks which, these economists saw, held the key to the mysterious recurrent cycles of expansion and contraction, of boom and bust, that had puzzled observers since the mid-eighteenth century.

my views are not Dogmatic and to suggest such a thing would be rude and improper. I am an individual who mixes a high degree of idealism with realistic solutions. Economic bubbles can be created by various behaviors involving economic actors,but the most common is speculation and at sometimes herding. Furthermore the free market may not always be able to correct itself because even if their is an abundant supply of unemployed workers,and unused factories there may not be enough demand. For example during the Great Depression we experienced low demand,despite their being an abundant supply of consumer goods,unused machines,and unemployed workers.

epic fail1

Far from being a homogeneous lump, capital goods can be very specific. A grain silo is capital in the same way that an assembly plant is capital, but neither is well-suited for performing more than 1 or 2 narrow functions. Retooling “capital”, directing it towards it’s next-best use, is often a very expensive proposition and involves significant dead-weight loss.

How much (if any) of this problem would you attribute to wage/price freezes and crippling tariffs?

How much (if any) of this problem would you attribute to the notorious practice of asking farmers to plow under their crops?

How much (if any) of this problem would you attribute to the likelihood that those factories should never have been built in the first place, and were built only under the illusion of prosperity created by easy money?

It was a statement of fact actually - you presented some claims without any argument whatsoever… the very definition of dogmatic.

OK, now we’re getting somewhere… you’re actually trying to form an argument. Bravo! However I can’t entirely agree with you. For example, in a speculative market for every long postion there is an equivallent short position… so for every loosing a buck there is a person making a buck. It is therefore impossible that the market, overall, can tank as the result of speculation… the result is simply that some people who misjudge the markets see their capital and their ability to influence future prices taken away from them and transfered to other people who prove to be better forecasters/speculators.

That is to rather misunderstand the meanding of a correction in the free market. The free market aims not to increase aggregate supply or aggregate demand - it aims to maximize the use of economic resources by best matching limited supply with what is almost always virtually unlimited demand. To suggest that there was a lack of demand during the depression is ridiculous - never have people been so much in need in the western world in living memory. There was demand there alright, for jobs, for food, for housing and for all sorts of other things.

What was absent in the great depression was the ability for supply to meet that demand. If you focus on unemployment in this issue you will get lost. I could, personally, employ everyone in the US tomorrow. I could hire them to dig holes and fill them in again and then I could go to congress and say “I need a few trillion dollars to stay afloat - if you don’t give it to me all these people are going to be unemployed”. Congress would be entirely justified in answering, “So what? All you’re doing is getting them to dig holes and fill them in again and we have need for neither. We need food, housing, health care and education”. That would be an entirely appropriate response. Employing people really isn’t important - finding ways to occupy people’s time is not difficult at all. What is difficult is to find ways to employ people such that their contribution has a positive impact on the economy as a whole - such that their efforts serve to improve both their own lives and the lives of other individuals. That is precisely why companies keep accounts - to gauge whether the sum total of their efforts is profitable… whether their output justifies the labour and capital that they have invested in order to produce that output. If they are not turning a profit then the logical course of action is to cease operations and allocate those resources to something else which is profitable.

Thus the unemployment that is witnessed during recessions is a sign of healing as people move from unprofitable lines of employment back into profitable lines of employment. Trying to fix the price of labor too high will merely prevent this process from occuring. Trying to keep them in their old (unprofitable) lines of employment will do the same and merely put off any return to profitability from occuring.

In order to understand how a bust must be cured, you first need to understand what has caused it and, I’m afraid, insufficient demand just doesn’t cut it - it is in contradiction to everything we know about economics - the primary constraint being the scarcity of supply and not any lack of things for people to wish for…

The Tarrif issue surrounding the great depression varies,but most agree that it was more symbolic then effective in messing up the market. I say this because the stock market crashed in 1929,and because overall world trade declined by 66% between 29 and 34. Thus the Tarrif that was passed in 1930 was not the sole reason as to why trade started to decline.

now we could debate causes of the Great Depression all we like,but it is well known that the GD was not the only economic panic in our history. What The Great Depression shows us though is that even if supply is abundant the market may not be able to recover on its own because demand is too low.

I would also like to point out that your questions sound more like suggesting as to why the depression happened,but you did not provide proof of those things. Remember i never made the Claim that X lead to the great depression,and thus any attempt to suggest what the causes could be have only discussed by you. Unfortunately you framed your question that implies X lead to the great depression,and thus before you ask any questions you must show how such things(x) may have caused the “great deflationary period”.

you suggest that demand was high during the great depression,but i disagree because the high unemployment rates suggest that employers had low demand for workers. Because of this Demand for consumer goods decreases because people are not making enough in order to buy the products that are on the market. When this happens factories go unused,and consumer goods sit in their warehouses,or on the shelves of closed shops.

you claim that unemployment is a frictional problem,but why must there be unemployment in the first place in order for workers to change jobs? I can easily switch from one job to another without quiting my job,or i could hold more then one job at once.

you claim that employment is unimportant and that it only matters that those who are employed are doing something productive. I disagree because receiving a wage for anything is payment enough to allow individuals to receive an income that they can use in order to spend on consumer goods. For example The building of an aircraft carrier generates jobs in the same way digging a hole generates jobs. Both of these things will eventually be finished,and may not serve that much economic use after they are built,but while they are being worked on they generate jobs and allow workers to receive wages.

you claim “The primary constraint being the scarcity of supply and not any lack of things for people to wish for…” you use this phrase in reference to economics. I disagree with this phrase because the homeless population does not produce as high demand for cars as they do other things. Furthermore during periods of deflation it is not unusual for their to be lack of demand for new workers,even though the labor supply has been increased by even as large as 20%.

< so for every loosing a buck there is a person making a buck.>

False because eventually those investors with less fall into debt,and when enough of them fall into debt only a few may be making a buck. eventually when enough people stop investing those who were making a buck stop profiting until investors find a way to make enough bucks in order pay off their debt.