If we look at the praxeological term “exchange”, then its a category of action, but the integral part of it is a concept of property. Both participants of an exchange must subscribe to a theory of property for exchange to exist.. But isnt a theory of property arbitrary? I havent seen it deduced from the action axiom. Further, if the participants of an exchange subscribe to different theories of property, doesnt the claim that both participants gain from the exchange become meaningless in the context of property and thus AE lose any connection to the material nature of the world?
Further, if the participants of an exchange subscribe to different theories of property, doesnt the claim that both participants gain from the exchange become meaningless in the context of property and thus AE lose any connection to the material nature of the world?
explain how it would? regardless of whatever crazy stuff these two people believe they reveal their preferences by their actions.
If i buy a watch from a criminal that just stole that watch from me and i know that, i still gain from voluntary trade with the criminal, otherwise i wouldn’t make the trade. Don’t see how different concepts of property change the logic of it.
Property isn’t arbitrary, it is an ancient convention (older than formal spoken language) that is a solution to a coordination game and is a nash equilibrium. It is no more arbitrary than conventions against torts like assault or murder.
Of course it is arbitrary. I don’t see how this is a problem though. Mises himself said that economics only really works when there’s peace which implies that almost everyone subscribes to the same concept of property. Trade only works if both partners agree to the same terms, it is mutual; if you deal with non-mutual exchange, the problem is no longer economic.
Property is implied in self-ownership. If the subject has sensory control and regualtion of his own body, then his body is his own property. Similarly, once he discovers self-ownership, for other things he controls, the results is inferred.
This is De Tracy concept of property, and it rests on the fact that sensations of one person are of that and only that person. Or as Bastiat puts it, want and satsifaction of the want must be in the same body; if I want to eat bread, then I cannot be satisfied by feeding my dog.
Claims arise once this is logically realized (hence animals can have property, but not claims to property, because they don’t, but have sensations).
Property is a physical law more than anything else.
If people could read minds and share sensations, then and only then would there be no such thing as a person’s property distinct from other people’s personal properties.
Thus, even IF the action axiom rested on personal property, then it would still be the only physically possible result.
But isnt a theory of property arbitrary? I havent seen it deduced from the action axiom.
Is it really that difficult to deduce it from the axiom of human action? While I don’t mean to provide an impervious praxeological argument for human action, a logical deductio from human action to private property would go something like this,
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Human action (human action is rational and aims at completing certain ends through the most [perceived] economic means).
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Rational market agents looking to complete certain ends look to retain said satisfaction.
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Private property is a way to ‘own’ the source of satisfaction, or gain utility.
Again, this is imperfect and incomplete, but I’m not sure why it would be difficult for someone interested in investing the time and effort to deduce private property … or even imagining it. Private property is not arbitrary. There are reasons why people prefer to own property and guarantee the fruits of their labor as much as possible (people are always looking to reduce uncertainty in order to make their actions that much more accurate).
The US and USSR used to trade all the time, but had different theories of property.
I don’t get this at all. As I understand it, economics [as a branch of prax] deduces what will happen given certain initial conditions. It doesn’t claim to say which theory of property is the right one.
The claim is that both parties would rather make that particular exchange than not make it. Since the exchange is voluntary on both sides, by assumption, I don’t see how this can be refuted. People only do something voluntarily if they think there’s something in it for them, be it physical or psychic improvement of their lot in some way.
That being the case, what difference does it make what their theory of property is?
This is exactly the problem with the interpretation of a priorism that is prevalent around the LvMI. Without situating analysis in the context of various institutions there’s very little meaningful we can say about the real world.
You’re not going to be able to deduce property from any axioms, because what is understood by the term “property” varies from place to place and is somewhat vague in any case.
The “theory of property” involved doesn’t need to be legal or ethical. All you need to do is suppose that one agent has effective exclusive control over one thing, and that another has effective exclusive control over another thing, and that each has the ability to transfer effective exclusive control to the other. If each values the exclusive control of the other thing more than their currently controlled thing, then transferring exclusive control of the one thing for the sake of acquiring exclusive control of the other, necessarily is beneficial in the eyes of the transferrers.