No, but I do consider the two categories much fuzzier than most people–especially Austrians–acknowledge.
[quote=“[Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein, and Drazen Prelec]
(http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.63.2976&rep=rep1&type=pdf)”][We tend] to explain behavior egocentrically—to attribute it to the types of deliberative processes that it is responsible for (see Richard Nisbett and Wilson 1977). A dramatic study demonstrating this phenomenon was conducted with a “split-brain” patient (who had an operation separating the connection between the two hemispheres of his brain). The patient’s right hemisphere could interpret language but not speak, and the left hemisphere could speak (LeDoux 1996). The patient’s right hemisphere was instructed to wave his hand (by showing the word “wave” on the left part of a visual screen, which only the right hemisphere processed). The left hemisphere saw the right hand waving but was unaware of the instructions that had been given to the right hemisphere (because the cross-hemisphere connections were severed). When the patient was asked why he waved, the left hemisphere (acting as spokesperson for the entire body) invariably came up with a plausible explanation, like “I saw somebody I knew and waved at them.”
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I believe automatic processes can be interpreted–mistakenly–by consciousness as deliberative processes; in regards to the brain, they claim, “[I]t is perhaps not surprising that it tends to over-attribute behavior to itself—i.e., to deliberative decision processes. Even though much of the brain’s activity is ‘cognitively inaccessible,’ we have the illusion that we are able to make sense of it, and we tend to make sense of it in terms of [deliberative] processes.”
[quote=“[Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein, and Drazen Prelec]
(http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.63.2976&rep=rep1&type=pdf)”]Research with EEG recordings has shown (Benjamin Libet 1985) that the precise moment at which we become aware of an intention to perform an action trails the initial wave of brain activity associated with that action (the EEG “readiness potential”) by about 300 msec. The overt behavioral response itself then follows the sensation of intention by another 200 msec. Hence, what is registered in consciousness is a regular pairing of the sensation of intention followed by the overt behavior. Because the neural activity antecedent to the intention is inaccessible to consciousness, we experience “free will” (i.e., we cannot identify anything that is causing the feeling of intention). Because the behavior reliably follows the intention, we feel that this “freely willed” intention is causing the action—but in fact, both the sensation of intention and the overt action are caused by prior neural events which are inaccessible to consciousness (see Daniel Wegner and Thalia Wheatley 1999).
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The metaphysical baggage of choice behavior needs to be pruned in order to more fully understand how neural systems generate both behavior and the conscious sensation of choice itself. Therefore, the Austrian insistence upon distinguishing between “action and behavior” becomes more untenable as neuroscience advances.