The argument […] that a parent does have some positive obligations toward the child, based upon the supposed contractual nature, or voluntary decision on the part of the parents to bear the child, may be easily shaken. Consider the following:
All children are equal in rights due them from their parents, regardless of the way in which they were conceived.
Specifically, the child who is a product of rape has as
many obligations due him from his female parent as any
other child. (We assume that the male parent, the rapist,
has gone.) No matter what views we have on rape, the
child who is a product of such rape is entirely guiltless of
this crime, or any other crime.
The voluntary nature of child rearing and conception
does not apply in the case of rape.
Therefore, the argument that the parent owes some obligations to the child which arise out of the voluntary
nature of the conception, or out of an “implicit contract,”
cannot apply in the case of rape, i.e., in the case of rape,
at least, the female parent owes no positive obligation to
the child, because she did not consent to its inception.
All children, being equally guiltless of any crime, in spite
of any theory to the contrary, such as “original sin,” have
equal rights due them from their parents. Since all such
rights (supposedly) flow from the voluntary nature of
conception, and the children born of rape manifestly
lack this voluntary aspect, they, at least have no rights
due them from their (female) parent. But their rights are
equal to those of all other children. Therefore, no child,
whosoever, has any positive obligations due him from his
parents.
This is some powerful logic. If our argument for positive obligations arise from the voluntary nature of conception and we accept that all children have the same rights, then it must logically follow that no parents have positive obligations to their children.
Block argues that it is, but only in a way. The “right” they have is one of caretaking. I am not sure how much I agree with him on that, though. Anyway, the point was about an argument about positive obligations.
Actually I’ve always seen a giant hole in his argument in exactly the part you brought up here. Because the parent is obviously not in a contractual agreement to rear the child in the case of conception by rape he leaps from there to conclude that this is therefore the case in all instances of conception. I don’t see where that comes from at all. The point isn’t about child equality, the point is that you can not enter into a contract with an act of non-acting. A person who is raped is passive, it does not engage in anything. Therefore it couldn’t have possibly made a deal with anyone. That is not necessarily the case with a person who takes action knowing it may lead to it concieving new human life.
Now I do agree with his conclusion that ultimately the de facto situation is as if there were no positive obligations owed, but that is only because I take the Rothbardian rathern than the Blockian view on voluntary slavery. I do believe concieving enters into an existence a contractual obligation not to take action that would lead to the death of this new human life, but as no penalty for not doing so is specified in the contract the parent, in keeping with the principle will is inalianable and people may change their mind at any time, may annul it at any time without reprecessions.
So actually I think it is inconsistent for a voluntary slaverist like Block to be an evictionist, only a Rothbardian can take that position without leaving gaps in their logic.
Very interesting points, Marko. In my own opinion, an obligation doesn’t exist without a penalty. So something like “You hereby agree to build me a house or else” is not enforceable at all, and therefore doesn’t constitute a valid contract.
That’s not really helpful. You simply repeated something, which is arguing by assertion.
Who cares who has the same rights? If we are talking about deals, contracts, promises… If I have the same basic natural rights Jennifer Lopez does does that mean I can show up at one of her concerts, climb on stage and sing a few songs and will then be owed bags of money from the organizers, just like she is? Of course not! Because nobody promised me anything like they did J Lo. Screw the children and their rights, that’s a total non sequitur. You have to look at the other party.
If I pick up a hobo in town and drive him over to my farm to stay a night under my roof, there is an implicit promise involved that I will not then wake him up in the middle of the night and throw him out in the cold and the rain (albeit since no penalty for doing so has been specified in advance I can nonetheless later change my mind and do just that without legal reprecussions for myself*). There is no such promise, or expectations involved in the case that some maniac threw a hobo into my car against my will and forced me to drive him home. It does not matter if the two hobos have the same human dignity and rights and are equally guiltless and will be equally hard done by in each of the cases if I do not prove a good host. I accepted (at the time) obligation only toward the first, but not toward the second. I have no deal with the second and made no promises to him.
*But the reason I can do that is because I am with Rothbard on voluntary slavery. But Block would actually have to argue that the hobo, given I promised him to stay the whole night, now has a legal case against me and can sue me for damages, or alternatively forcefully re-enter my house and go back to sleep on my property until morning against my will.
I do not disagree. I am merely saying aborting human life that was not concieved through rape may, and in my opinion does, consitute breaking a promise. Now, breaking a promise does not mean much to you or me (in the objective sense, leaving aside estetics), however, it is technically very meaningful to a voluntary slaverist like Block (and like my former self) who believes a person may not go back on their word like that, without reprecussions even when these are not specified in advance.
This is a valid argument. I question the premise “that all children have the same rights.” It could be that all children have the same negative rights, and a child has positive rights when he or she is conceived without coercion. “[T]he same rights” is pretty broad, so I don’t think it can be used to answer the question of whether or not children have (specifically) positive rights.
I see what you mean, Marko. As in “everyone has the right to obtain property legitimately” but not “everyone has the right to this specific piece of property.”
This is nuts. Just a few minutes ago I finished reading Defending the Undefendable, which I started while the power was out and before reading your post. I didn’t realize that’s where Block made this argument. Did we reach for the same book during the same storm??? XD
Sorry to ressurect another old thread of yours, but I decided to write a paper on the subject of positive rights for my Ethics class.
It could be that the child does have positive rights, only it is the rapist obligated to “meet” them (for lack of a better term; maybe you know one). Suppose the rapist does not or cannot fulfill these obligations. It doesn’t mean that the child conceived in rape has no positive rights, it means that the child’s positive rights are being violated by the rapist not sending child support, nurishment, etc.. Thus, Block’s statement is unsound.
I hesitate to mix the words right and economics. Not because they can’t be synthesized, but because it’s not what we’re doing here. (I’m thinking Misesian utilitarianism and Hayekian social evolution).
I think QC has a valid point.
The argument for children’s rights is usually that the act of voluntary conception creates an implicit contractual obligation to the child. However, why not argue that rapists do the same thing? They create contractual responsibility over the child. Sure, it’s not the same kind as the voluntary one in the previous case, but while we’re at making implicit contracts, why not run wild with it.
Hence, I think that Block might actually have been wrong. Should I write to him?
I disagree with Hayek? I hesitate to care at all dude… He’s someone I rarely cite in any discussion. Further Mises was not a purist either.
I would argue you’re being a little lazy. you can have whatever opinion you want on this issue, but if you use “positive right” in one of your posts it certainly gives the wrong impression.
To a very limited degree, you can give the child away but child support is not an Austrian idea. Women can have abortions all the time if they feel they can not keep up with child support, child support is just an act of aggression against men. Men and women come up with individual contracts for child support.
I still don’t see what this has to do with positive rights? The rapist violated the explicit rights of the woman, and as a penalty he should pay child support. Your argument is very classical liberal, if anything.
The victim is not acting and therefore can not be entering into a contractual arrangement, but that is not necessarily the case for the rapist who is taking action.
