Clayton: Uncertainty. The future is uncertain - no one knows for sure how things will turn out. For example, a farmer might plant a drought-tolerant crop because there was a dry year last year and then his fields get flooded in unseasonal rains this year. Not only does impersonal Nature change unpredictably, but human preferences also change unpredictably. Last year, there was high demand for red clothing, this year, there is high demand for blue clothing.
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The economic calculation problem arises from the abolition of entrepreneurship. Reference the first point above: “Uncertainty”. Nobody knows what is the right combination of goods which will be demanded in the future, and what is the correct configuration of the time structure of production to best meet those future demands. The entrepreneurial market process discovers this mix of consumer production and capital structure by means of trial and error, that is, ventures that either succeed or go bankrupt.
Maybe I don’t understand you, but I don’t see how uncertainty can enter into it. So let’s take your example of the red and blue clothing. Since the preference is unpredictable, then businesses must guess as to what color people want. In the first year, Business A produces red clothing and Business B produces blue clothing. By chance, Business A gets it right, succeeds, and is empowered to produce again next year. Business B, on the other hand, goes bankrupt. So year 2 comes around. The demand for blue clothing, as you say, is unpredictable. But if it is truly unpredictable, then it doesn’t matter that Business A survived and Business B went under. Business A’s correct guess the previous year has nothing to do with conditions this year. If the future is truly uncertain and up to pure chance, then it doesn’t help consumers at all to reward those who make correct guesses.
On the other hand, if what you are saying is that some entrepreneurs are more skillful at predicting future demand, then in fact there is something in the current conditions that gives away the future preferences. If this is the case, there is no reason to assume ipso facto that a central planner can’t learn to analyze the data in the same way, or that the best central planners can’t be democratically selected, or that socialism is “impossible.” To call the basis of this argument “uncertainty” is really misleading. What you would actually be arguing is that some people know the future more than others.
Trade. When people trade voluntarily, we know they are better off because they reveal their true preferences by acting on them.
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While both of these are fatal problems in any economic proposal whose aim is to abolish trade or abolish money, these are still not the economic calculation problem, which is more serious yet.
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It is also a crucial point that true preferences are only revealed in exchange. By definition, the bureaucrat who will supposedly get promoted or demoted on the basis of his job performance in allocating economic resources is not acting in an entrepreneurial role.
I’m confused here. First you say that trade reveals peoples’ true preferences, but that this isn’t the calculation argument. Then you seem to say that true preferences revealed in exchange is crucial to the calculation argument. Is this or is it not a part of the calculation argument?
But assuming it is part of the argument, the statement that true preferences are only revealed in exchange strikes me as very misleading. Why wouldn’t my true preferences be revealed in all of my actions and not just those that pertain to exchange? If I illegally download the latest Katy Perry album, do I not express my true preferences?
This seems to be an argument of the form that I’ve seen many here make: “everyone benefits from voluntary exchange, therefore we should all engage in voluntary exchange.” The problem with this argument should be obvious (in some ways, it’s similar to the ontological argument). When we say that everyone who engages in voluntary exchanges benefits, we do so because we are taking those exchanges as actual. That is, if we see someone do something, we must conclude that he expected to benefit. The problem comes in when we try to transfer that conclusion to hypothetical exchanges. I could imagine going into Best Buy tomorrow and buying the latest Katy Perry CD. Thus this is a hypothetical exchange. If I actually do go into Best Buy tomorrow and buy the CD, then you could conclude that I expected to benefit from doing so. But at this moment, as I contemplate going to Best Buy tomorrow, as I imagine walking in and buying the CD, I cannot conclude that this voluntary exchange would actually benefit me. In fact, since I prefer to download the CD, I can conclude that such a voluntary exchange would not benefit me. Thus you can see that there is nothing beneficial in the pure form of a voluntary exchange. Rather the conclusion we draw about the expectation to benefit comes from the exchange’s form of actuality. Thus, since libertopia consists purely of hypothetical voluntary exchanges, we can’t conclude that anyone can expect to benefit from any such exchanges!
[Aside: I wonder how the calculation argument applies to intellectual property markets. If there was no IP, would Katy Perry have trouble correctly allocating her vocal resources to meet consumer demand? Would she mistakenly start singing punk? Would the phenomena of musicians becoming “reverse sellouts” impoverish modern culture?]
[Aside 2: I don’t actually plan on downloading the latest Katy Perry album. That was only a hypothetical actuality!]