Can You Define Natural Rights as a Meaningful Concept?

[Amanojack]

@Zavoi

Would it be correct to say that you reject this argument on the basis that the premise “Alice is in a debate” is not necessarily true (for the definition of “debate” that I gave)?

Yes.

[Zavoi]

@AJ

@Zavoi

Would it be correct to say that you reject this argument on the basis that the premise “Alice is in a debate” is not necessarily true (for the definition of “debate” that I gave)?

Yes.

This is good. We agree on something. [:)]

The key point I’m trying to convey is this: While you, as a third party, can make this objection, Alice herself cannot because it would silence her own objection.

Again, consider it from Bob’s perspective. He is about to do action X, and anticipates that Alice might say “X is objectively wrong.” Setting aside the question of whether this claim is true, false, or even meaningful, it is clear that if Alice says this, then Alice accepts that she is “debating” about an objective issue. Therefore, when Bob formulates his argument to refute this claim, he can take as a premise that the Alice is engaged in a debate. If Alice were not debating (which is entirely possible), then the need for Bob to actually use his argument never arises because there is nothing to respond to.

Here’s another way of thinking about it: Bob might come up with an argument like this:

1. There is a debate over whether X is ethical. (Premise)
2. Therefore, the ethicality of X is objective.
3. [A series of valid inferences…]
4. Therefore, X is not objectively wrong. (Conclusion)

Now imagine that Alice were to say “I object to this conclusion on the grounds that the premise is false.” Do you see why this is a self-contradictory statement? The very fact that Alice is objecting to the conclusion proves that there is a debate about it.

If such an argument can be constructed, then it will show that the claim “Bob doing X is objectively wrong” always leads to a contradiction. We would then say that Bob has a “right” to do X. This is all that I mean when I speak of “rights.” It’s not that there’s something transcendentally “good” about the action X; it’s just that the claim “X is wrong” is logically incoherent.

[adam_knott]

@Zavoi

#1 While… a third party can make this objection, Alice herself cannot because it would silence her own objection.

#2 Alice might say “X is objectively wrong.” … it is clear that if Alice says this, then Alice accepts that she is “debating” about an objective issue.

Zavoi:

In my opinion, you are assuming that people are objecting to this type of objective ethics or argumentation ethics because they don’t understand it. Perhaps this is the case for some. But others are objecting because these types of theories cannot be consistently maintained.

In your #1 above, how exactly does any objection Alice might make “silence” her own objection? This seems wrong on its face. Can’t she continue to object, and thus “demonstrate” that her objection has not been “silenced.”?

This type of proposition is of the same general form as the standard Rothbardian argument that a person engaged in a certain kind of activity “has no business” being engaged in it, or that their only option is to “shut up,” and similar… But it is clear that a person may continue to “be engaged” in said activity, and they may not shut up.

If a person says aloud “I am not talking,” there is no reason why that person cannot continue to say that, and they can say it for any number of reasons (intentions). They may be practicing for a play, or seeing what other people’s reactions will be, or trying to annoy objective ethicists, etc…

Not only can they continue saying “I am not talking” aloud (not only won’t they be “silenced” by doing so), but doing so is not necessarily contradictory as the example demonstrates.

In your #2, we can see that if Alice says “X is objectively wrong,” she also might be practicing for a play, or seeing what people’s reaction will be, or trying to annoy value-subjectivists, etc…

So it is not clear that Alice is debating about an objective issue as you write.

I believe this is what AJ was trying to get at when he wrote that the argument you are advancing assumes Alice is debating about an objective issue.

You are including the idea that Alice is debating about an objective issue as part of your premise.

But then in your argument, when you describe Bob’s perspective, you imply that Alice’s statement makes it clear to Bob that Alice is debating about an objective issue.

You are taking what you yourself are supposing of Alice (your premise about what Alice is doing), and implying that when Bob hears Alice’s statement, he must necessarily suppose the same thing.

But this is not necessary at all.

If Alice says “X is objectively wrong,” this does not necessarily mean she is debating about an objective issue. And if Bob hears Alice say “X is objectively wrong,” this does not necessarily mean Bob believes Alice is debating about an objective issue.

(Reference(s) Minds, Brains, and Science, John Searle, pages 57-58)

[Amanojack]

@Zavoi

The key point I’m trying to convey is this: While you, as a third party, can make this objection, Alice herself cannot because it would silence her own objection.

Again, consider it from Bob’s perspective. He is about to do action X, and anticipates that Alice might say “X is objectively wrong.”

It seems that, implicitly, you’re defining objection (at least for Alice) in terms of objective ethical truths. You’re saying, in effect, “Alice cannot deny being in a debate, or else that would contradict her putative objection.” However, you’ve defined debate in terms of objective ethical truths, so that the previous sentence would have to imply, “Alice cannot deny that there is such a thing as objective ethical truth, or else she can’t coherently object.”

Surely she can object by denying she’s in a debate about which position agrees more with objective ethical truth, without denying that she’s in a debate full stop. If you assert that she cannot object in that way, I maintain that you’re defining objection in terms of objective ethical truths, which again seems to amount to assuming that which you aim to prove.

@Zavoi

Again, consider it from Bob’s perspective. He is about to do action X, and anticipates that Alice might say “X is objectively wrong.” Setting aside the question of whether this claim is true, false, or even meaningful, it is clear that if Alice says this, then Alice accepts that she is “debating” about an objective issue.

Sure, in Bob’s mind, he may perceive that she accepts she is debating about an objective issue, but that doesn’t have any bearing on whether she really does accept it.

@Zavoi

Here’s another way of thinking about it: Bob might come up with an argument like this:

1. There is a debate over whether X is ethical. (Premise)
2. Therefore, the ethicality of X is objective.
3. [A series of valid inferences…]
4. Therefore, X is not objectively wrong. (Conclusion)

Now imagine that Alice were to say “I object to this conclusion on the grounds that the premise is false.” Do you see why this is a self-contradictory statement? The very fact that Alice is objecting to the conclusion proves that there is a debate about it.

Her statement is only contradictory if object (verb) is defined as “reject on objective ethical grounds.” That would again seem to be assuming that which you set out to prove.

[Juan]

This is good. We agree on something.

Zavoi, it’s quite likely that you are wasting your time, if you believe that people like AJ or Adam Knott will really listen to you. No matter what sort of explanation you provide, they will ‘re-interpret’ it in order to fit their position.

[Zavoi]

@Juan

Zavoi, it’s quite likely that you are wasting your time, if you believe that people like AJ or Adam Knott will really listen to you. No matter what sort of explanation you provide, they will ‘re-interpret’ it in order to fit their position.

I appreciate your concern, but I think I’ve learned a lot about my own position from this. And I don’t wish to presume that my opponents are closed-minded or acting in bad faith. If my argument is any good, it should at least be able to convince a fellow libertarian.

[Zavoi]

@Adam Knott

In your #1 above, how exactly does any objection Alice might make “silence” her own objection? This seems wrong on its face. Can’t she continue to object, and thus “demonstrate” that her objection has not been “silenced.”?

This type of proposition is of the same general form as the standard Rothbardian argument that a person engaged in a certain kind of activity “has no business” being engaged in it, or that their only option is to “shut up,” and similar… But it is clear that a person may continue to “be engaged” in said activity, and they may not shut up.

If a person says aloud “I am not talking,” there is no reason why that person cannot continue to say that, and they can say it for any number of reasons (intentions).

Of course, it’s not literally impossible to say “I’m not talking”: it just demonstrates its own falsehood by being spoken.

@Adam Knott

They may be practicing for a play, or seeing what other people’s reactions will be, or trying to annoy objective ethicists, etc…

Not only can they continue saying “I am not talking” aloud (not only won’t they be “silenced” by doing so), but doing so is not necessarily contradictory as the example demonstrates.

In your #2, we can see that if Alice says “X is objectively wrong,” she also might be practicing for a play, or seeing what people’s reaction will be, or trying to annoy value-subjectivists, etc…

I was assuming that the participants in the argument mean what they say, and are not just lying or making noise. Otherwise, there really isn’t anything to talk about, any more than one can argue with a blank piece of paper.

@Adam Knott

And if Bob hears Alice say “X is objectively wrong,” this does not necessarily mean Bob believes Alice is debating about an objective issue.

Again, only if Alice is lying or babbling would Bob be unable to come to this conclusion. At the very least, Bob can know with certainty that “If Alice really believes what she says, then she is debating about an objective issue.” If Alice doesn’t believe it (because she’s practicing for a play etc.), then she hasn’t advanced any position at all.

[Zavoi]

@AJ

If you assert that she cannot object in that way, I maintain that you’re defining objection in terms of objective ethical truths, which again seems to amount to assuming that which you aim to prove.

I’ll try to avoid using controversial words such as “object” [verb] and “debate,” since their definitions seem to be a major point of disagreement. I probably shouldn’t have used them in the first place.

@AJ

Sure, in Bob’s mind, he may perceive that she accepts she is debating about an objective issue, but that doesn’t have any bearing on whether she really does accept it.

If Alice is being consistent, then it’s impossible for Alice to say (and believe) “X is objectively wrong” without also believing “The ethics of X is an objective issue.” Bob doesn’t need to be a mind-reader to know this.

@AJ

Her statement is only contradictory if object (verb) is defined as “reject on objective ethical grounds.” That would again seem to be assuming that which you set out to prove.

In order to reject the conclusion (statement #4 above), one must make the opposite claim, namely, “X is objectively wrong,” which is inconsistent with the claim that “The ethicality of X is not an objective issue.”

At the risk of repeating myself, I think it would help if I summarized my argument from the beginning without using ad-hoc definitions of words. Hopefully then I can understand your critique better:

• Let “W” stand for “Action X is objectively wrong.”
• Let “E” stand for “The ethics of action X is an objective issue.”

Now, whatever the truth-values of W and E may be, I think we can agree that the following statement is obviously false (stop me if there’s anything problematic with this):

• W and ~E [I.e., “Action X is objectively wrong, and the ethics of action X is not an objective issue.”]

So we begin with the axiom ~(W and ~E). We can then apply a few basic transformations as follows:

1. ~(W and ~E). [Axiom]
2. ~W or ~~E. [De Morgan’s Rule]
3. ~~W implies ~~E. [Disjunctive syllogism]
4. W implies E. [Eliminate double negatives]

Now suppose there is an argument G which shows that E implies ~W. We then reason as follows:

1. W implies E. [From above]
2. E implies ~W. [Argument G]
3. W implies ~W. [1, 2, Transitivity of implication]
4. W implies W. [Tautology]
5. W implies (W and ~W). [3, 4]
6. ~(W and ~W) implies ~W. [Contrapositive of 5]
7. ~(W and ~W). [Law of non-contradiction]
8. ~W. [6, 7]

Thus, if argument G exists, then it can be proven that X is not objectively wrong. All we have to do is find G. But since G states “E implies ~W”, we can take E as a premise, and search for a chain of reasoning that leads us to ~W. We would then be able to plug this chain of reasoning back into #2 above, finally producing a sound proof of ~W—in other words, a proof that Action X is not objectively wrong. This is all that I mean by a “right”: an action that can be proved to be not objectively wrong.

[zefreak]

What is this all about, then?

[Solid_Choke]

@Zavoi

Thus, if argument G exists, then it can be proven that X is not objectively wrong. All we have to do is find G. But since G states “E implies ~W”, we can take E as a premise, and search for a chain of reasoning that leads us to ~W. We would then be able to plug this chain of reasoning back into #2 above, finally producing a sound proof of ~W—in other words, a proof that Action X is not objectively wrong. This is all that I mean by a “right”: an action that can be proved to be not objectively wrong.

Might I suggest that you call something that is not “not objectively wrong” a liberty and not a right? It seems to me that a right implies and obligation. For instance, A and B both sign a contract that states that A will give B $100 for 10 hours of labor. It this case, B is obligated to work for ten hours and A has a right to 10 hours of B’s labor. In the same way, A is obligated to provide B with $100 and B has a right to A’s $100. I find that this liberty/rights distinction clears up confusion, especially when you are debating about justice or responsibility.

[Juan]

If my argument is any good, it should at least be able to convince a fellow libertarian.

Is that necessarily so ?

Anyway, this is not really about arguments but about premises. Some people just hold to the dogma that certain things, (or everything for that matter) is ‘subjective’ .

Morality qua morality doesn’t exist - it is just subjective preference - or so they assert (without ever proving it of course).

[Amanojack]

@Zavoi

If Alice is being consistent, then it’s impossible for Alice to say (and believe) “X is objectively wrong” without also believing “The ethics of X is an objective issue.”

I certainly agree here, because she has now made an assertion herself that implies that she believes “objectively wrong” is a coherent concept (whether or not it really is).

@Zavoi

In order to reject the conclusion (statement #4 above), one must make the opposite claim, namely, “X is objectively wrong,” which is inconsistent with the claim that “The ethicality of X is not an objective issue.”

Statement #4 above was, “X is not objectively wrong.” You’re saying that the only way to reject this statement is to say, “X is objectively wrong.” However, this is only true if “objectively wrong” is a coherent concept, which is the very thing I believe you aim to establish. Similarly, we can reject (meaning dismiss) the statement “X is not wqxfzogyt” as incoherent [or of questionable coherency] without having to assert “X is wqxfzogyt.”

Again, the coherency of the concept is the very issue in contention. You are claiming that there is something called “objectively wrong” that is a coherent concept, and I am asking how it can be defined so as to be coherent.

To see the difficulty I am getting at, imagine an alien visits Earth and claims there is something called “pan-galactically wrong,” and that it is a coherent concept. We attempt a “common sense” interpretation of the alien’s claim, but we can’t find a coherent interpretation. We wonder if this concept is even meaningful, so we ask how it can be defined so as to be coherent. The alien then reasons as follows:

I can prove the existence of pan-galactic ethical truths. Assume the statement, “X is not pan-galactically wrong.” In order to reject this statement, one must make the opposite claim, namely, “X is pan-galactically wrong,” which is inconsistent with the claim that “The ethicality of X is not a pan-galactic issue.” Therefore the ethicality of X is a pan-galactic issue, by which it follows that pan-galactic ethics must exist as a coherent concept.

@Zavoi

• Let “W” stand for “Action X is objectively wrong.”
• Let “E” stand for “The ethics of action X is an objective issue.”

Now, whatever the truth-values of W and E may be…

Since the very coherence of the concept of “objective truth” is the issue under contention, it is important to note here that the truth-values may be true, false, or indeterminate. Must we assume true/false truth-values to the statements “X is not wqxfzogyt” or “X is pan-galactically wrong”? If so, the alien’s argument is looking pretty good.

Technical note: The objection may be raised that the truth-values are in fact not “indeterminate,” but simply unknown to us, by the reasoning that all statements of the form “[noun] is [adjective]” (or “[noun] is [noun]”) actually do have true/false truth-values even if we cannot figure out what they are. As a counterexample to negate this objection, I need to provide a statement of the same form whose truth-value is definitely not true and also definitely not false. Here’s one: “This statement is false.” (Or, “This statement is a falsehood.”) Assuming it’s true leads to a contradiction. Assuming it’s false also leads to a contradiction. Therefore, it has a non-true and non-false truth value.

@Zavoi

I think we can agree that the following statement is obviously false (stop me if there’s anything problematic with this):

• W and ~E [I.e., “Action X is objectively wrong, and the ethics of action X is not an objective issue.”]

Since W and E may have indeterminate truth-values, “W and ~E” may be indeterminate as well. We cannot know until we’ve established that “objectively wrong” is a coherent concept. I really appreciate the symbolic logical exposition, but to make use of it we would first need to establish that W and E have truth-values that are either true or false.

[Juan]

“This statement is false.”

LOL. That statement is not false. That statement is meaningless although it looks like valid English. Yeah, I know, pseudo-logicians would devote whole libraries to babble nonsense about ‘paradoxes’…

[Lilburne]

@Juan

Zavoi, it’s quite likely that you are wasting your time

No, it’s your snide comments that are a waste of time, Juan. Zavoi, unlike you, is a credit to objective ethics, because he’s engaging in something called “thoughtful, respectful discussion.” You should try it sometime.

It’s amazing, really. It’s not enough for you yourself to degrade discourse here. You also feel the need to actively discourage those who are trying to enhance it.

[Juan]

Oh Lilburne your words are so full of wisdom! You are my hero.

[Juan]

By the way, when you say I ‘degrade’ discourse, you are making just a subjective. unfounded, irrelevant assertion no ?

[liberty_student]

@Juan

By the way, when you say I ‘degrade’ discourse, you are making just a subjective. unfounded, irrelevant assertion no ?

It is subjective, but it is not unfounded and irrelevant.

It is disingenuous for you to claim that lilburne’s criticism doesn’t have merit, when the outcome critiqued is exactly what you aim to accomplish.

Or would you have us believe that you really are trying to show zefreak and others respect, and simply suffer from low impulse control and/or a limited English vocabulary?

[Juan]

Are you talking about your subjective opinions LS ?

[liberty_student]

@Juan

Are you talking about your subjective opinions LS ?

No, that’s a logical summation. You treat subjective ethicists with disrespect and disdain. You have proudly promoted this fact.

So to then claim that lilburne’s criticism of your stated opinions and objective are unfounded and irrelevant, is disingenuous.

That is, unless you do respect subjective ethicists.

You can’t have it both ways.

[Juan]

I’m not sure I understand your subjective opinions LS. I’m not that worried though, because, you know, they are just your subjective opinions.

You treat objective ethicists with disrespect and disdain.

I’m not sure what you mean by ‘disrespect’ and ‘disdain’ - Are you talking about some sort of subjective concept/feeling or even subjective moral judgment ? Well, ultimately your judgments are, uh, subjective opinions.