Thank you for your insights Zavoi. Succinct and powerful.
The architect of quantum mechanics wrote “Insistence on the postulate of complete logical clarification would make science impossible.”
Hoppe needn’t, in my opinion, meet an impossibly high standard of complete logical clarification. But I believe he does need to answer relatively obvious questions that his theory suggests. At its strongest, the argumentation ethics leaves at least one crucial question unanswered, and to me this indicates that the theory hasn’t been thought out well enough or developed thoroughly enough.
I will refer to his presentation of his theory as they were presented in chapter ten of The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, pages 203-208.
The primary point Hoppe makes is that in proposing a non-libertarian ethic, the proposer contradicts himself. On pages 204 and 205, Hoppe refers to the idea that the proposer of a non-libertarian ethic contradicts himself in eight or nine separate instances, e.g.:
in violation of demonstrated preference, contradict, belied by, falsified by, contradicting, logically incompatible, incompatibility, impossibility proof, etc.
The obvious meaning is that one who proposes a non-libertarian ethic is doing something contradictory on a fundamental level. They can propose such a non-libertarian ethic, in words, in thoughts, in writing, etc., but doing so results in some kind of self-refutation which Hoppe is struggling to capture and conceive.
When I approach the argumentation ethics as a proposed theory of the ultimate foundation of libertarian ethics, I tend to grant one of Hoppe’s premises that there is something “wrong” with non-libertarian ethics. The intuition that something is amiss with statist or socialist ethics is what binds libertarians. The theoretical rationale explaining this is each theorist’s specific theory striving to give a rational account of this fundamental intuition (natural-rights, natural-law, argumentation ethics, eudaimonism, flourishing, utilitarianism, etc.). Hoppe’s theory is one such theory. So I’m generally willing to grant Hoppe that there is something contradictory about non-libertarian ethics, and then move on to examine his explanation of exactly what this is. Obviously, not everyone is willing to grant this, but I believe his theory has a fundamental problem even if we grant that non-libertarian ethics, proposals for them, and the act of proposing them, are contradictory.
Hoppe provides no demonstration or explanation of how a ‘contradiction’ impacts the happiness or well-being of the one maintaining it. For the sake of argument, we could just assume that contradictions are painful or harmful to the individual who “has” them. But to me, this seems a shirking of the primary responsibility of the ethicist. In the context of Hoppe’s theory, a demonstration of exactly why one might want to avoid contradictions is not a minor point. It is the main thing, because that is the “penalty” he puts forth that results from proposing a non-libertarian ethic. It is thus incumbent on Hoppe, as ethical theorist, to demonstrate why contradictions are to be avoided.
But the problem for both Hoppe and Rothbard as trained economists, is that neither thinker has constructed a theory of human happiness/unhappiness as a basis from which they could demonstrate how various ethical acts (such as proposing a non-libertarian ethic) impact the happiness of the individual actor. The quote you provided from Rothbard is his vision of natural law, as a ‘science of happiness.’ But The Ethics of Liberty is not a theory of a science of happiness, it is a proposed libertarian legal code, and essentially Rothbard’s blueprint for which ethical acts he believes should be punished.
Hoppe and Rothbard have or subscribe to a theory of economics, and they have or subscribe to a theory of libertarian law. But neither thinker has or subscribes to an articulated ‘science of happiness’, a theory that “provides man with…the paths which will lead to his real happiness.”(EOL p.12) Hoppe and Rothbard were trained economists who then tried to rationalize (provide a rationale for) a libertarian legal code. They weren’t interested in ethical phenomena per se; they were interested in politics and law. Their focus was changing the acts that people receive legally approved punishment for, from what they are now (from a social-democratic basis or justification) to something else (to a libertarian basis or justification). In essence, they want(ed) to change the “punishment structure” from a social-democratic theory to a libertarian theory. This is not ethics per se, but only one sub-realm of ethics:
“It is not the intention of this book…to elaborate a natural-law ethic for the personal morality of man. The intention is to…elaborate that subset of the natural law that…deals with…“politics,” i.e., with violence and non-violence…to set forth a political philosophy.” (EOL p.25)(italics added)
Hoppe and Rothbard were/are not interested in ethics, they are interested in political philosophy. And this probably has something to do with the fact that neither thinker thought it necessary or important to develop or articulate a theory or science of happiness which could indicate how various ethical acts impact an individual’s happiness. So the primary shortcoming of Hoppe’s theory is that even if we grant the idea of “contradiction,” this falls short of a demonstration of how this impacts the contradictor’s happiness, and thus falls short of showing the contradictor why he may want to avoid contradicting himself (by abstaining from proposing nonlibertarian ethical systems during argumentation).
This particular shortcoming is likely common to most or all libertarian “ethics” theories that are really political theories. The same problem is seen with Rasmussen. O’Neil writes:
“Rasmussen is consious of the problem of the man who escapes the dire consequences of the moral maxim(s) of the…natural law”:
And quotes Rasmussen:
“A human can, of course, act in a manner inconsistent with the standards set by his nature and not be literally dead, but such “non-death” cannot be considered life or, at least, successful human life. To ignore the principles that human nature requires and to attempt to live without regard to them in any manner one might choose is to opt for an existence as a metaphysical misfit…”
O’Neil continues:
"Rasmussen threatens the moral malefactor with the possibility of becomming “a metaphysical misfit”—reminding one of the W.C. Field’s admonition “Don’t be a moon-calf! Don’t be a jabbernow! You don’t want to be one of those things, do you?” At the risk of belaboring a point: Why oughtn’t one to be a “metaphysical misfit…” ?
The main point I’m making is that much of libertarian ethics theory is political theory requiring an ethics theory foundation. The ethics theory foundation is what connects the various ethical “acts” of the individual, to some impact on the individual’s happiness (well-being, flourishing, eudaimonia, etc…)
Theories such as Hoppe’s and Rasmussen’s ulitmately tell people: “you contradict yourself,” or “you are a metaphysical misfit.” But as these theories are at root political theories, and not theories of ‘a science of happiness,’ (not ethical theories rooted in an articulated theory of happiness/unhappiness), they are ultimately unable to demonstrate or conceive exactly how doing or being those things are harmful to the individual concerned. The same will apply if one were to tell another: “doing X will diminish your flourishing.” This is meaningless without a rigorous, unambiguous definition or conception of flourishing.
In the older presentation of Hoppe’s theory referred to above, Hoppe is clearly struggling to arrive at some imperative or mandate that nature or human nature will impose on one who maintains a contradiction. But as he is working without a developed theory of happiness, he is unable to find it. Such a theory does not exist in economic doctrine nor in political philosophy.
Regarding your passage:
"This is the “fulfillment of human nature” approach, which runs into the problem I mentioned earlier: it is simply not true that Rothbard’s norms maximize happiness for every person (consider luxurious dictators and people with cushy government sinecures). Hoppe writes,
It has been a common quarrel with this [natural law/rights] position, even on the part of sympathetic readers, that the concept of human nature is far “too diffuse and varied to provide a determinate set of contents of natural law.” [A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, p. 235]
(I suspect that he is being diplomatic by avoiding direct criticism of Rothbard.)" (bold and underlined added)
This is essentially a one sentence refutation of Rothbard’s natural-law approach. It’s placement in Hoppe’s book and it’s brevity speak for themselves.
I bolded and underlined “happiness” above to reinforce my point that when we are dealing with ethics, ultimately this refers to happiness and unhappiness. Then, the theory proposed can only be as accurate and as consistent as the underlying theory of happiness referred to. Thus, it is not optional whether or not to have a theory of happiness and unhappiness when dealing with ethics theory. The question is only one of the accuracy and consistency of the theory of happiness one is working with.
I close with a quote from an important social thinker. : - )
“…every ethic, no matter how strict an opponent of eudaemonism it may at first appear to be, must somehow clandestinely smuggle the idea of happiness into its system.”
(Epistemological Problems of Economics)
