capitalism IS central planning

Ludwig von Mises in Omnipotent Government or Friedrich Hayek’s in The Road to Serfdom brilliantly describe the “economic calculation problem.” Mises famously said that “…that rational economic activity is impossible in a socialist commonwealth.” As far as state socialism, he’s completely correct, but what baffles is how anyone believes that most any form of capitalism is not almost as vulnerable to this critique as state socialism.

Capitalism does great advantage over, say, Soviet central planning to the extent that it relies on the “spontaneous order” of the price mechanism. But this reliance is extremely limited, applying at most to a few narrow areas, such as selling price and wage levels, while in all other areas decisions are made via central planning.

As an example, in capitalist societies, all publicly-traded corporations are governed by a politburo of (usually 12) well-connected governors. Like in the Soviet Union, there are elections for these people, but they are a sham, as is pointed out (for example) in this article by noted capitalist Carl Icahn. Elections are only open to voting by party members, who are known as “shareholders.” It is the job of this Central Committee of 12 to set all basic policies of the corporation (which may be as large economically as the Soviet Union under Stalin or China under Mao; often larger). Policies set by the gang of 12 include the hiring of the Chairman (or CEO) and all chief Commissars, who then delegate to political officers below them, who delegate to officers below them, who then relay the policies of the Central Committee to bottom level workers through a system that resembles a parlor game of ‘telephone.’ The nomenklatura, or ruling class of any sizable corporation is usually known as “the management.” Management members rarely are promoted up from people who know how to do or have done the actual job, but instead are usually brought in from various ideological training Commissariats called ‘business schools.’

At every level throughout the Corporate Commissariat, decisions are made not on the basis of reliable price signals, but instead by centrally-planned attempts to reconstruct them. For example, workers may be evaluated on the basis of output per hour, but then this may have the unintended effect of workers working faster but more sloppily, so another centrally planned policy of a quality control mechanism and quality control Tsar will have to be enacted. This may lead to yet another problem, such as workers working to fulfill the narrow goals set by the central planners while neglecting other important job functions not yet measured, which will in turn require yet more testing mechanisms to provide feedback to the Commissariat. This results in a large, expensive class of managers, human resources personnel, security guards etc. who do little work themselves aside from supervising the work of others.

Another glaring example of inefficiency is that workers are rarely rewarded on the basis of their economic contribution to the Commissariat, (in part because this is unknowable due to the absence of internal price signals), but instead workers are usually compensated in the best case on the basis of an individual manager’s limited information, or, worse, his personal whims. This usually leads to an attitude of indifference towards the organization similar to those of workers in Soviet factories; promotion and firing decisions are seen as somewhat whimsical decisions of management (often unseen upper-management), so workers and management become more interested in ingratiating themselves personally with individual superiors, with maintaining an outward appearance of productivity and with meeting the centrally planned production criteria, regardless of their broader rationality. This can lead to whole organizations of people who’s main concern is carefully calibrating their work speed to fill the time allotted, to find ‘make work’ projects so as not to appear idle, and to ingratiating themselves with politically essential Comrades.

If Central Planning doesn’t work, why does it persist?

The Soviet Union lasted almost a century, survived a World War and long survived the Cold War hostility of the West. It’s replacement has hardly been a utopia of freedom, prosperity and decentralization. So why does central planning happen, how does it survive? The simple answer is simply that central planning works very well, for the people who control it. Just like the upper level of Soviet society enjoyed a life of unearned luxury and power, so too does the upper level of the business world. An extremely blatant example of this are the “golden parachute” provisions negotiated by many corporate politburo members, which guarantee a high level of compensation regardless of performance.

Free-market capitalism couldn’t prove its superiority within the Soviet-sphere for a simple reason; it would be stomped out by the nearly infinite capacity for violence of the state. Existing varieties capitalism and ownership by title can likewise only exist with the subsidy and backing of the violence of the state. Most employees in any industry only consent to be ruled by economic central planners because their three options are to leave and work for another set of central planners, to comply, or to be attacked by state-subsidized violence. If the state were not expected to interfere, the management, shareholders and bondholders of very many corporations would be overthrown, and replaced by internal price signals, such as democratic decision making capacities within departments, self-management and individual compensation by the performance of the individual, unit and firm, and repayment of investors only in dividends, not in political control. There are very good reasons to believe that such a system would be vastly more efficient, both in cost per unit of output and in reducing externalities onto society than the current model of highly concentrated property-by-title.

The main function of the state is to enforce and expand the property claims of the dominant class. In the Soviet Union this was the Communist nomenklatura and in the West this is the ‘market winners’ or those with accumulated wealth in conjunction with the government class. As central planning by private investors and shareholders continues to increase, it will become increasingly irrational, as we are in fact now seeing in the decline of demographic indicators across the board in the U.S. and many post-Soviet economies as well. Concentrated private property ownership is in a death spiral because it makes rational economic activity impossible.

Corporations may be run in the same way a government is (to some degree) but the main difference, as far as I know, is that the consumer plays a much more direct role in the allocation of resources in a market than the demos does in a state run society. So I think you’re really downplaying the role of the consumer here.

Actually, a bigger difference is prices.

It is not limited in the fact that it applies to wide and important areas such as selling prices and wage levels. This mechanism isn’t some neat little feature. It’s one of the major differences between capitalism and socialism, and why socialism is terrible at finding cost-effective means of doing things. It lacks proper monetary calculation and valuation.

Yes, companies are centrally planned. The difference is, when they don’t produce things that people want cost-effectively, they shrink or go away. Whereas in an organization that has a monopoly on law and violence, violence is used to keep power in the hands of those who don’t produce cost-effectively but who are politically powerful.

Economic calculation and the spontaneous order extends beyond selling price and wages. If you read the work out of which you quoted Mises - Socialism - you will see this. Very quickly: interest rates, capital investment, wages, capital value, partial manufactures… anything that is not superabundant and is demanded is ordered by price on the market. I might argue about how narrow “selling price” and wages are, but there is no need: the spontaneous order of prices goes well beyond these “narrow” areas.

Rothbard demonstrated that a corporation that grew to encompass an entire economy would be as blind as a government. The fact that the corporation has some superficial similarities to the body politic is irrelevant. The corporation deals with a certain area and operates on the market with prices, just like any individual does. Sure, large corporations are cumbersome, which is part of the reason why economies of scale do not go on forever.

On life support. As Mises, among others, pointed out in the book from which you quoted him. USSR would not have made it past WWII without support from the west.

This situation is itself a product of government intervention, such as regulation of “hostile takeovers”. These regs make it easier for a mutual backscratching society of managers to develop in a corporation. But this sort of thing is weeded out much more easily in a free market.

The superiority of the free market is not measured by it’s ability to out-violence the State.

You are asserting much but demonstrating little.

What varieties of capitalism? I could tell Benjamin was an anti-capitalist troll a while ago and am not going to waste more time on this. I suggest you guys do the same.

But there are many firms…

  1. I’m not sure what you are saying. If I own something and hire workers, they should be allowed to take it away from me?

  2. Can you tell me “what the very good reasons to believe” are? I mean abolishing the age old institution of private property, which has existed in all recorded history, needs a bit of substantive support.

  3. I don’t understand how democratic decisions or self management are price signals. Doesn’t a price signal by definition need a money price?

  4. I think the soviet union lasted 70 years [not a century] because it takes a long time to bleed a whole country dry. You will note that you only mentioned lasting and surviving, not flourishing. But corporations, with all their problems, actually make money and produce things people want. So they must be doing soemthing right.

  5. Since every company has one primary goal, to keep the goose laying those golden eggs, why have they all not jumped on your bandwagon of “democratic decision making capacities within departments, self-management and individual compensation by the performance of the individual, unit and firm”? Are they determined to lose money and be inefficient?

  1. What is your evidence for this?
  1. What is your evidence for this?

The most obvious difference is that government has a coercive monopoly over its region of “service”, whereas many companies and corporations exist only as long as they can retain enough customers over their competitors. If one company blows up and does something terrible, it is limited and localized in its damage, and quickly taken care of, whereas governments can engage in and socialize much greater damage throughout society.

It is also argued that corporations, being themselves a privileged creation of government, could not exist, or at least, could not exist with privileges, in a truly free market society.

And talk of the longevity of the Soviet Union isn’t complete without mentioning the several times that it was "saved’ by loans and subsidies from the Western World, initially as early as the mid-1920’s, but also significantly in the 50’s and 70’s. The mere fact that the Soviet Union needed outside help to feed its population, and that it was fed by comparatively more capitalist and more free countries like the U.S. strikes a blow against central planning.

They’re not price signals; they’re arbitrary decrees made out of self interest which lack the relevant information.

I don’t understand how democratic decisions or self management are price signals.

Because a boss in a hierarchical system, be it public or private, suffers from limited knowledge. All of a workers co workers combined may have near-perfect knowledge of the performance of an individual worker, but one individual does not and can not. There are usually no and occasionally a few weak means of gathering this information in a hierarchical organization.

I’m not sure what you are saying. If I own something and hire workers, they should be allowed to take it away from me?

Allowed by whom? All I’m suggesting is that if you own something very big and hire a very many workers, the only way to reasonably maintain control of it is through a publicly subsidized state.

If the state became weaker, monopoly control by an individual over a great amount of physical property would simply be impossible.

So you’re saying workers have a natural tendency to steal property(and to be clear we’re not talking about pencils or staplers, but entire factories and office buildings?) and take control from whoever they work for? Do you think that owners won’t hire security if they feel that way? If workers do have that kind of tendency- management would try to make sure as best as possible to try and hire workers who have some moral scruples.

How would you explain workers who are good at what they do- but have neither have the knowledge nor the interest to try and take control of every single facility of production? Why would an IT guy who earns a good living want to engage in ousting the current owner of his property and engage himself in financial decisions that hes not even trained for? Why I want to work with a group of people that just stole the owner’s property? I wouldn’t be able to trust them with anything.

Why would an IT guy who earns a good living want to engage in ousting the current owner of his property

You’re right, he wouldn’t. It would probably work the other way around; the IT guy would be ousted because the owner of the factory wants to move production to a cheaper location or something like that. If the owner is doing a good job running the place, obviously everyone will be happy.

At the same time, a hundred people most likely wouldn’t tolerate their livelihood being sold out from underneath them for the personal profits of one man unless that one man had the state behind him.

If the IT sector is expanding and the IT man can find another job as simple as that, again, he probably wouldn’t care much. But if employment prospects aren’t so great, well, you talk of scruples, and the IT man might consider continuing to feed his family as more scrupulous than honoring a piece of paper, especially if by doing so he’s not depriving anyone else of their dinner.

Well if the IT guy was really valuable- even if the owner wants to move the factory to a different location- there’s no reason the owner won’t offer him to come with- it does happen.

Can you clarify what you are talking about when you say people’s livelihoods are being sold out from underneath them for the owners personal profits? Are you talking about in instances of the owner committing fraud and stealing from the workers by not following the terms of the contract that him and the employee took up? What do you mean exactly?

How do you know you’re not depriving the owner’s family(and how many other families the owner might be feeding) of dinner by stealing his property?

Can I guess that you have no experience in a large corporation???

The Board of Directors (let’s drop the silly soviet terminology) has little day-to-day involvement in corporations. There is no ‘sham’ in their election. Owners of the company (the shareholders) get a vote. ANYONE can be an owner of a company.

While BoD set the tone, they probably have little involvement in the setting of a company’s many policies. My company has many policies, dealing with stuff like IT, security matters, employees, etc. I seriously doubt the BoD have reviewed these.

Many companies promote from within. Some bring people in from other companies. Their experience (having the knowledge, having done the job) is a big plus. The best is to get such people to get some business training (MBA or the like), so they have the knowledge/experience, plus the business savvy.

And this ignores the many small companies which become big, still lead by the people who established them.