Of course it does! If you prefer, call it Panarchy instead of anarchy.
A state is a monopoly dispenser of justice. It has nothing to do with land tenure other than as an historical artifact of the Treaty of Westphalia.
Relative to the geographical area encompassing the city, this too is a monopoly dispensation of justice. Of course, I don’t think the monopoly position is the only feature of a state - the unqualified/arbitrary authority over those that reside within a geographical area itself is. This is why, by anti-authoritarian standards, anarcho-capitalism (at least in this particular model) is just a bunch of private city-states. The only thing that’s been changed, other than a matter of scale, are the ground rules for aquiring state power (I.E. the land aquisition norms). Otherwise, there is no meaningful difference. You still have a certain individual or group with essentially unqualified “ultimate decision-making power” over the lives of other people within a given geographical area.
Relative to your property, you, too, are a monopoly dispenser of legislation.
So what are these people doing on your property if they don’t like your rules? In what way should decision-making power over one’s own property be limited? And isn’t this essentially global statism with Brainpolicean preferences?
Good call. As I was reading this thread, I was thinking, “what is the difference? How can you prove the USA’s monopoly on a particular landmass is illegitimate, but the City of London’s is acceptable?”
by ‘The City of London’ do you mean the collection of dispirate individuals each of whom own distinct portions of the land, the total of which is therefore owned, thus ‘covering’ the territory of the city of london by ‘rightful owners’, …or… do you mean the ‘City of London’ which is a disembodied corporation, by which individuals seek to live at the expense of others, and organise the plunder of rightful property? iotw a state?
I mean the merchants of the city who originally chartered it and still run it.
What is the statute of limitations on “original ownership”? I’m sure there were some saxons formerly living in the area who would like it back.
the part about a state being those individuals that violate property rights seemed pretty simple to me
thanks.
The charter? the constitution of the united states of london?
Continued exercise of property right.
The one thing that is so interesting about the City of London is that it has kept working the same way for more than a thousand years. It might have been there before the Saxons.
What if you’re forcibly removed from your property?
OK, well how about the Romans, or Celts?
They haven’t been.
I don’t claim a “right” to literally tell whoever is in my home to do whatever I want them to - I do not claim the authority of a ruler as a reasonable extension of my ownership. The issue of monopoly is irrelevant to the question at hand, because the question at hand is the type and scope of power derived from ownership. In the absolutist propertarian view, this power is either explicitly or implicitly absolute.
I’m simply pointing out that absolute land property rights (at least potentially) justify the state all over again. And no, it isn’t “global statism”, it’s a deductive argument that the simple criteria of land aquisition is insufficient as an opposition or check against a state. To the extent that your “decision-making power over your property” extends over into “decision-making power over people”, there is a clear dillema within Rothbard’s system between the absolute nature of the land property norm and the concept of personal sovereignty (or, to couche this in typical terms that I don’t like, “self-ownership”). To the extent that you appeal to land property rights to justify unqualified/arbitrary decision-making power over other people’s lives, you’re using the exact same line of reasoning that statists often use and are justifying the same type of power in principle.
The “love it or leave it argument” for the state is repeated verbatum by the absolutist propertarian - “state” and “not a state” is semantically relativized to how the land is aquired, but the function or power of a state is not opposed in principle. In other words, the “state didn’t aquired the land the right way” reply, while it might be necessary in some sense, is insufficient. One has merely established a new standard for “legitimacy” through which the same thing (state sovereignty, arbitrary authority claims over the people in a geographical area, unlimited legislative power, etc.) can be argued for. The logical implication is that if the state did aquire land the right way, it would suddenly be legitimate. Anti-authoritarians still think it would not be legitimate, because we think that there is a problem with that type of power in general.
Here are some more detailed expositions of the problem that I just summarized:
http://polycentricorder.blogspot.com/2009/08/ultimate-decision-making-power.html
http://polycentricorder.blogspot.com/2009/12/soft-and-hard-arguments-against-state.html
http://polycentricorder.blogspot.com/2010/02/explaining-anti-authoritarianisms.html
? So the Normans were welcomed with open arms?
you really don’t claim a right against the local homeless to stay out of your house, and you really don’t claim a right against the local party loving kids keeping you up all night by using your home as a permanent rave?
It seems that claiming a right without backing it by force is impotent to stop them, so why add the extra step?
are we not men?
This is a weak attempt at reductio ad absurdum that is predicated on an absolutist, either/or view. You’re conflating exclusion in general with absolute rule-making power. It’s basically context-dropping (the problem with many libertarians is that they have little sense of context). My perspective is that I can exclude, but I do not have absolute rule-making power or the authority to tell whoever is on my land what to do.
If someone tries to rob my house, I’ll protect it. If some group of people try to just barg in and make my home their own, I’ll oppose them. That is a particular context. But that is an entirely different matter than me claiming that by virtue of my ownership, whoever is in my home must do whatever I tell them to do. I don’t accept such a notion of positive obligation any more than the scenarios you bring up imply a positive obligation in the oppose direction.
The logical implication of the absolutist propertarian view is actually a positive obligation on the part of people to do whatever the owner tells them to do - and this is essentially authoritarian. The logical implication of (some version of) the absolutist anti-propertarian view is a positive obligation on the part of the owner to allow others have open license on the property, and this is essentially authoritarian. I reject both of these views.
We are DEVO! Sorry, couldn’t resist. I dunno, what’s a “men”?