Collective bargaining is a right. I should have a right to freely associate with my employees and form a union.
no one is prima facie obligated to refrain from believing and/or arguing logical contradictions. Furthermore, why does A have to ask B to prove that B should not be interfered with? A needs no justification - he can simply interfere with B and be done with it.
I never said they were. I’m talking about the logic of law, whether or not people want to use coherent jurisprudence is their own affair. Act like an animal and get treated like one.
Is it not a duty for one to refrain from invading others’ property? Is it not a duty for one to refrain from killing others when they haven’t already tried to kill him?
No, it’s not. I do not believe in moralization.
Apparently some people get treated very well when they “act like animals”, as you would put it. How do you reconcile that with what you just wrote?
So then, if I have no pre-existing contractual arrangment with you to not kill you or invade your property, why shouldn’t I do either or both of those things?
In one of the two articles, de Jasay mentions that, without the presumption of liberty, the notion of liberty becomes less coherent and difficult to define. How do you argue the existence of specific freedoms (e.g. the freedom to dispose of one’s property in some collection of conventionally accepted methods) with someone who denies the presumption?
For example, if I were to say, “Maybe a hundred years ago it was okay for an employer to ignore the demands of his workers, but today conventions and laws exist which make such an act a wrong.” Or I could argue that social conventions made the welfare state necessary. But as long as I refuse to presume liberty, it becomes very difficult to argue that the status quo is somehow mistaken.
If you posit that the employer has the freedom to pay or not pay whomever he wants, and I simply deny it, what is the next step? Suppose I make a case that the permission of collective bargaining (while prohibiting the employer from simply firing the lot) is a social convention.
Even if the logical structure de Jasay wrote about is useful in dealing with those who are willing to presume liberty, I suggest it doesn’t provide much help when dealing with those who deny it. And, to reiterate, that a set of definitions has utility for whatever reason still has no bearing on the correctness of the definitions. The conventions of language are not decided purely by utility. In order to use the definitions you propose, you must still convince all those with whom you argue to accept them.
Also, to address your most recent post:
What do you think moralization is? Moralization, at its core, is just the discrimination between freedoms and unfreedoms (“wrongs”), as de Jasay might put it. Even if you avoid rhetorical baggage about rights or justice, when you decide to not commit a crime for which you will benefit but can reasonably expect to not be caught, you are moralizing.
What do you think moralization is? Moralization, at its core, is just the discrimination between freedoms and unfreedoms (“wrongs”), as de Jasay might put it. Even if you avoid rhetorical baggage about rights or justice, when you decide to not commit a crime for which you will benefit but can reasonably expect to not be caught, you are moralizing.
Nope. I think contract and tort law is a logical structure, and what exists of civilization depends on it. That being the case, I really don’t think you ‘have’ to respect civilization or law. That’s up to you. There are no ‘good guys’ or ‘bad guys’, just people with conflicting ideas and goals.
I was just reading Will Provine, a historian of science, so I’ll quote him: “No gods, no life after death, no ultimate foundation for ethics, no ultimate meaning in life, are all deeply connected to an evolutionary prospective. You’re here today and you’re gone tomorrow; and that’s all there is to it.”
Though I’m generally in favor of the distinction between liberties and rights, I’m not totally convinced rights-talk is entirely incoherent or is deserving of too much hostility. “I have the right!” meant something real and important. Still, we do not live in the 17th century, and rights-talk has - predictably and legitimately - been expanded to the abomination it is today. There may be some use in saying, “In our imagined society, these rights are to be respected,” but it is best to avoid rights-talk and start using the perfectly serviceable word ‘liberty’.
Yes, the substance is what matters, but words are not unimportant. The whole point here is that the word ‘right’ is pliable enough to accomodate both the classic conception of “negative rights” and these arbitrarily declared positive rights. And do you not see a difference between “I have the right to crack my knuckles,” and “I have the liberty to crack my knuckles”? The former is bound to inspire many different interpretations. If you have the right to do it, must we provide you the means to do it? Must we ensure you are well nourished and have the bone density to crack your knuckles safely? If you break your hand, must we make sure it is quickly repaired so that you may again enjoy your right to crack your knuckles?
Yes, you can go back to the concept of negative rights and clarify just what it is you meant, but we can avoid much of the confusion and disagreement by simply substituting liberty for right. “Right” carries considerable baggage. Best to leave rights to explicit “claim-rights” created by contract.
Try harder? Trace the implications of denying the presumption of liberty? The presumption of liberty is a logically sound principle which anyone interested in an orderly, peaceful society ought to adopt. It is a firm foundation on which to argue for a liberal society and severely constrained state (if it must exist at all). I would prefer not to abandon it for a less sound justification, such as appealing to the highly problematic doctrine of rightsism, in the effort to convince you that contracts ought to be respected or that people ought to be free to dispose of their property. What are you going to do about those who deny the existence of rights, or who think all rights exist because of the state? Or what about the many people who, seeing rights as a good thing, can’t help but think, “the more rights, the better!”?
It seems like you’re trying to solve the is-ought problem here. “Doing X is logical; therefore one ought to do X.” For that to follow, you must first presume an ought-statement: “One ought to do what is logical.” There’s no way to derive that ought-statement from an is-statement.
It’s one thing to talk about contract and tort law as a logical structure. It’s another thing to talk about why or whether people will follow it.
I also don’t believe in gods, life after death, an ultimate foundation for ethics, or an ultimate meaning in life. Yet I’ve drawn some different conclusions about things than you have. Why would that be? Maybe there’s something else to be taken into consideration?
How can a presumption - a premise - be logical or illogical per se?
http://mercedinstitute.blogspot.com/2011/03/unions-bad-good-and-ugly-by-alex-merced.html
“People voluntary organizing for common benefit is how most environment, safety, and other disputes should be resolved since it can be more dynamic and flexible than state and federal legislation. Although, if legislation takes out the voluntary nature of this organizing and negotiating then it turns to be just as onerous, frigid, and coercive as the government itself.”