I think a lot of the issues on this forum boil down to not agreeing as to what a “right” is. So, what is a “right”?
Nonsense on stilts.
A “right” is the preclusion of the need to gain consent from others before one can embark on a given course of action without losing their moral credibility.
If you need to gain permission from someone else before you can morally embark upon a given course of action, then you’re dealing with a privilege and not a right. I would argue that state constitutions or “Bills of Rights” which make lists of important “human rights” are, by their nature, a list of priveleges granted by the state to its human property, and not an enumeration of real natural rights. One does not need to enumerate natural rights.
Why is that? Not that I necessarily disagree. I am just wondering if you would mind expounding?
Jeremy Bentham called natural rights “nonsense on stilts”. He believed there was no basis for rights without a state to grant them.
He was also one of the first proponents of “animal rights”. Make of that what you will.
So more like a state privelege then?
@OP: I think what people (including non-libertarians and people who haven’t given much thought to the matter) mean by “rights” are those actions which you are entitled to insist upon, possibly even using violence if another person attempts to prevent you from engaging in them.
But there is a larger problem surrounding the whole issue of rights and that has to do with whether the State’s capacity to prohibit actions - even actions which you think you are entitled to insist upon - is delimited by ethical/legal bounds or merely by the bounds of political practicability. The root of the difficulty lies in the fact that it is supposed by the vast majority of people that any violent resistance to the State is prima facie a crime. Hence, while I have the “right” to remove you from my property if you attempt to prohibit me from smoking a cigarette (perhaps you believe you’re saving my life), I do not have a right to forcibly remove a police officer doing the same thing, if he is backed by law and even if he isn’t*, I probably still don’t have a right to use force against him in any way, shape or form. Basically, short of the police officer actually attempting to rape my family and murder me, I could never justify the use of force against him in a court of law because the judge is, for all intents and purposes, his boss.
Clayton -
*There are at least a dozen “excuses” the officer can manufacture on the spot, such as by issuing a lawful order to cooperate with his demands… thenceforth, all acts of resistance become defiance of a lawful order and, if he arrests me for such defiance, he can always pile on charges of obstruction of justice and resisting arrest just for kicks.
Technically, “right” means whatever the speaker intends by it so we must await each speaker’s definition (notoriously variable, usually incoherent or just boiling down to personal preference/disgust). But for a reasonable definition that seems to help people distinguish what they believe from what they believe they believe, here is J. Hasnas from Toward an Empirical Theory of Natural Rights:
In the absence of civil government, most people engage in productive activity in peaceful cooperation with their fellows. Some do not. A minority engages in predation, attempting to use violence to expropriate the labor or output of others. The existence of this predatory element renders insecure the persons and possessions of those engaged in production. Further, even among the productive portion of the population, disputes arise concerning broken agreements, questions of rightful possession, and actions that inadvertently result in personal injuries for which there is no antecedently established mechanism for resolution. In the state of nature, interpersonal conflicts that can lead to violence often arise.
What happens when they do? The existence of the predatory minority causes those engaged in productive activities to band together to institute measures for their collective security. Various methods of providing for mutual protection and for apprehending or discouraging aggressors are tried. Methods that do not provide adequate levels of security or that prove too costly are abandoned. More successful methods continue to be used. Eventually, methods that effectively discourage aggression while simultaneously minimizing the amount of retaliatory violence necessary to do so become institutionalized. Simultaneously, nonviolent alternatives for resolving interpersonal disputes among the productive members of the community are sought. Various methods are tried. Those that leave the parties unsatisfied and likely to resort again to violence are abandoned. Those that effectively resolve the disputes with the least disturbance to the peace of the community continue to be used and are accompanied by ever-increasing social pressure for disputants to employ them.
Over time, security arrangements and dispute settlement procedures that are well-enough adapted to social and material circumstances to reduce violence to generally acceptable levels become regularized. Members of the community learn what level of participation in or support for the security arrangements is required of them for the system to work and for them to receive its benefits. By rendering that level of participation or support, they come to feel entitled to the level of security the arrangements provide. After a time, they may come to speak in terms of their right to the protection of their persons and possessions against the type of depredation the security arrangements discourage, and eventually even of their rights to personal integrity and property. In addition, as the dispute settlement procedures resolve recurring forms of conflict in similar ways over time, knowledge of these resolutions becomes widely diffused and members of the community come to expect similar conflicts to be resolved in like manner. Accordingly, they alter their behavior toward other members of the community to conform to these expectations. In doing so, people begin to act in accordance with rules that identify when they must act in the interests of others (e.g., they may be required to use care to prevent their livestock from damaging their neighbors’ possessions) and when they may act exclusively in their own interests (e.g., they may be free to totally exclude their neighbors from using their possessions). To the extent that these incipient rules entitle individuals to act entirely in their own interests, individuals may come to speak in terms of their right to do so (e.g., of their right to the quiet enjoyment of their property).
In short, the inconveniences of the state of nature represent problems that human beings must overcome to lead happy and meaningful lives. In the absence of an established civil government to resolve these problems for them, human beings must do so for themselves. They do this not through coordinated collective action, but through a process of trial and error in which the members of the community address these problems in any number of ways, unsuccessful attempts to resolve them are discarded, and successful ones are repeated, copied by others, and eventually become widespread practices. As the members of the community conform their behavior to these practices, they begin to behave according to rules that specify the extent of their obligations to others, and, by implication, the extent to which they are free to act at their pleasure. Over time, these rules become invested with normative significance and the members of the community come to regard the ways in which the rules permit them to act at their pleasure as their rights. Thus, in the state of nature, rights evolve out of human beings’ efforts to address the inconveniences of that state. In the state of nature, rights are solved problems.
Hasnas excerpt from Toward and Empirical Theory of Natural Rights:
In the absence of civil government, most people engage in productive activity in peaceful cooperation with their fellows. Some do not. A minority engages in predation, attempting to use violence to expropriate the labor or output of others. The existence of this predatory element renders insecure the persons and possessions of those engaged in production. Further, even among the productive portion of the population, disputes arise concerning broken agreements, questions of rightful possession, and actions that inadvertently result in personal injuries for which there is no antecedently established mechanism for resolution. In the state of nature, interpersonal conflicts that can lead to violence often arise.
What happens when they do? The existence of the predatory minority causes those engaged in productive activities to band together to institute measures for their collective security. Various methods of providing for mutual protection and for apprehending or discouraging aggressors are tried. Methods that do not provide adequate levels of security or that prove too costly are abandoned. More successful methods continue to be used. Eventually, methods that effectively discourage aggression while simultaneously minimizing the amount of retaliatory violence necessary to do so become institutionalized. Simultaneously, nonviolent alternatives for resolving interpersonal disputes among the productive members of the community are sought. Various methods are tried. Those that leave the parties unsatisfied and likely to resort again to violence are abandoned. Those that effectively resolve the disputes with the least disturbance to the peace of the community continue to be used and are accompanied by ever-increasing social pressure for disputants to employ them.
Over time, security arrangements and dispute settlement procedures that are well-enough adapted to social and material circumstances to reduce violence to generally acceptable levels become regularized. Members of the community learn what level of participation in or support for the security arrangements is required of them for the system to work and for them to receive its benefits. By rendering that level of participation or support, they come to feel entitled to the level of security the arrangements provide. After a time, they may come to speak in terms of their right to the protection of their persons and possessions against the type of depredation the security arrangements discourage, and eventually even of their rights to personal integrity and property. In addition, as the dispute settlement procedures resolve recurring forms of conflict in similar ways over time, knowledge of these resolutions becomes widely diffused and members of the community come to expect similar conflicts to be resolved in like manner. Accordingly, they alter their behavior toward other members of the community to conform to these expectations. In doing so, people begin to act in accordance with rules that identify when they must act in the interests of others (e.g., they may be required to use care to prevent their livestock from damaging their neighbors’ possessions) and when they may act exclusively in their own interests (e.g., they may be free to totally exclude their neighbors from using their possessions). To the extent that these incipient rules entitle individuals to act entirely in their own interests, individuals may come to speak in terms of their right to do so (e.g., of their right to the quiet enjoyment of their property).
In short, the inconveniences of the state of nature represent problems that human beings must overcome to lead happy and meaningful lives. In the absence of an established civil government to resolve these problems for them, human beings must do so for themselves. They do this not through coordinated collective action, but through a process of trial and error in which the members of the community address these problems in any number of ways, unsuccessful attempts to resolve them are discarded, and successful ones are repeated, copied by others, and eventually become widespread practices. As the members of the community conform their behavior to these practices, they begin to behave according to rules that specify the extent of their obligations to others, and, by implication, the extent to which they are free to act at their pleasure. Over time, these rules become invested with normative significance and the members of the community come to regard the ways in which the rules permit them to act at their pleasure as their rights. Thus, in the state of nature, rights evolve out of human beings’ efforts to address the inconveniences of that state. In the state of nature, rights are solved problems.
Avast! I’m here to argue with Old Mexican. Here’s the beginning of our talk (about halfway down), if you care to know…
Great example. It helps to point out that I don’t need the right to object in order to object.
If they don’t impede action, then what is their purpose?
No, there are lots of reasons why I don’t murder people. Although I can guarantee that “humans have a right to live” is not one of them. See, rights are at best irrelevant (and unless you have a completely ideologically homogenous population open the door for Leviathan), and at worst, don’t exist except as wheels in your head.
It is possible to deny objective rights without going into ethical/legal nihilism. Rights exist in the same way any human lingual category does. I have a right to eat my dinner undisturbed because that’s just the way things are and “right” is the way we use language to describe the way things are, in this regard.
Note that “rights” is opposed to “wrongs” and has meaning, ultimately, in the context of a legal dispute. We say that the person who is in the right has the right to do as he was doing under whatever circumstances the dispute initially arose. So, rights are opposed to wrongs, that is, torts. If I am not in the right, then I am a tortfeasor and I am liable for restitution or even retributive violence. I have no “right” to do as I was doing when the dispute arose.
How legal norms emerge in a natural order society, however, is another topic unto itself.
Clayton -
I would contend this position, but I fear a return to the semantic debate. Which is to say I don’t interpret a “right” as simply an expression of the status quo, although I seem to be in the minority on that one.
As is how the enforcement of rights (in the legal sense you provided) would occur without coercion. Perhaps violent retribution is acceptable as long as it is enforcing a voluntarily agreed to contract?
Or, how would conflict get solved if one party refuses to consent to voluntary third party ajudication?
the power / ability to stake a claim that others recognize. The power/ ability to create and settle claims that others recognize
Well, I am not saying that a right is merely an expression of the status quo, see my above post on how rights emerge in a natural order from resolution of legal disputes.
I think retributive violence is acceptable in exactly those instances in which it is legally justifiable. In other words, there is no simple criterion that can tell us whether retributive violence is justified or not. The only way to know is to wait and see what happens. People will go about their business, disputes will arise, people will try a variety of responses to those disputes, some responses will be justifiable and others will not.
Martial contest.
Clayton -
It must also be stated, that any other definition of “right” may not be inherently wrong, so long as it fits the context. Like oh so many things, without context, these ideas are meaningless. We live in the realm of perspectivism, the world of Nietzsche, when speaking of such things..
It’s a good question. What is a right?
I don’t have any answer.
But I do have a deep suspicion that it’s all a load of guff. I suspect there’s no such thing as a ‘right’ and all the arguments are a load of long-winded, self-interested, pious claptrap. As evidence - watch people scrabble around for justifications to their ‘rights’? What’s the preamble to the declaration of independence say? God given! Well, ok - but what about the atheists? What’s their justification? They just spring it out of a hat…
What you are saying is true in some instances, but not most. Consider two random individuals involved in a dispute. The dispute could be over anything, and the individuals could be anyone from the President of the United States to the homeless guy standing at the intersection with a cardboard sign. What determines the outcomes of disputes? Well, it all depends on the nature and circumstances of the dispute and the nature of the individuals involved in the dispute.
Let’s say I’m at a high-end bar and accidentally bump into the DA not watching where I’m going. Maybe he’s miffed and says, “watch where you’re going!” A dispute might arise. Now, there’s really only two ways the dispute can go. Either the DA can grant immediate clemency and either ignore me or accept my apology or he can take issue with me. Either way, my response to the incident is irrelevant. Why is this the case? Because the DA possesses disproportionate legal powers with respect to me. I cannot hope to successfully sue the DA and any act of immediate retaliatory violence towards him, on my part, could only make my situation worse vis-a-vis his ability to have me thrown in jail and prosecuted to the nth degree.
This same situation of disproportionate power arises in many other contexts. If I’m in the back alley behind a night club and bump into some private security guard for one of the local badasses that frequents that club, I will be in a very similar situation. I can only hope for clemency but the dispute will be resolved as the security guard decides to resolve it. I have no input in the dispute because he possess overwhelming advantages over me. The same goes for the wimpy kid and the bully in a school hallway. Disputes between them are resolved unilaterally, as the bully dictates.
But if we go back to the original problem of a random dispute among two individuals chosen at random this situation of disproportionate advantage rarely holds. It is an exception, not the rule. Most people have about as many advantages in a dispute as most of the other people with whom they might end up in a dispute.
If both people involved in a dispute have about the same advantage as the other, then the outcome of a martial (or legal) contest becomes uncertain. In the case of myself getting in a dispute with the DA or a 6’6" 275lb. private security guard, the outcome of a contest is not uncertain at all, it is perfectly certain. I will be destroyed, either legally or physically depending on who I’m involved in a dispute with. The strong party has no possible incentive to come to arbitration or negotiation with the weak party.
In disputes in which there is some level of parity between the disputants, the uncertainty of the outcome of a contest provides an incentive for both disputants to come to the bargaining table and hammer out a legal resolution to the dispute. As soon as we are talking about law, we are talking about rights, since a legal resolution entails an argument over who was right.
Now, where you are right is that sometimes the lippier members of the population who get involved in a dispute with a disproportionately powerful party falsely imagine that they can alter the outcome of a dispute by asserting “rights.” This is, of course, meaningless jabber. If I walk into my home and you are waiting there to ambush me with a firearm trained on me, there is no use in me waxing eloquent on my right to life and how you’re violating it. You’ve already got the drop on me and the outcome of any contest is certain… I will die. Protester-libertarians are an example of this vis-a-vis the State. What’s the point of protesting how the State is violating your rights when you get into a dispute with the State? You cannot fight them because any contest has a certain outcome. If you need a visual reminder, watch a documentary on Waco (“Rules of Engagement”). If you fight, it’s Game Over. So, you have no choice but to cooperate with the State’s expropriation or other violations of your liberty. Well, you do have some choice since you can always commit suicide.
Rights are not nonsense on stilts, though they’re a lot more complicated than natural rights theory can account for.
Clayton -
I consider a right to be a claim (to a right). Whether or not it exists depends exclusively on other people respecting that claim. If they don’t respect it however, they’re less likely to have their own claim respected (estopell and all that).
So it is on people’s self-interest to both respect and claim rights to the extent that it protects their property, and at the same time enables free trade.
I agree with yuberries. Individuals can make claims and choose to respect or not respect the claims of others. Attempting to make rights out to be something more, such as something inherent in human beings, is to put it in the realm of the supernatural.
This forum has come a long way. It hasn’t been easy.
Interesting post, Clayton
Essentially, I think you are saying that an appeal to you right is only realistically meaningful when the two disputing parties in question are more or less equal as far as power is concerned.
If the ability to retaliate against transgressions is not at least somewhat equitable, than the stronger party will likely just subjugate the weaker party.
Am I getting the jist, or am I oversimplifying?
It’s funny, this reminds me of the fall of Rome and the beginning of the middle ages. Local strongmen and petty tyrants subjugated and terrorized the local peasants. Over the centuries, each smaller holding was eventually absorbed by stronger and larger rival warlords, until we end up at the current nation state.
This may be a topic for another thread, but does history consistently demonstrate that tribalism and petty despotism eventually develop into kingdoms and empires?
If so, what can be done to prevent this progression from occuring?
Is this the problem in the anarchistic society that Libertarian property rights theories were designed meant to check?
Could it be possible instead to lean on technological advances (guns, cheap steel) to prevent the peasants (us) from being brutalized into submission by warlords and gangs in an anarchistic future?