This is going in circles. Ego, the point is that noone has a right to force anyone into associating with your “fallback court”.
Market anarchists don’t supporting forcing anyone into any association or organization, including some kind of “fallback court”. The moment that you establish a monopolistic “fallback court” that people are forced to turn to, you have established the seed of a state and we are not longer talking about pure free competition or association. It starts to be closer to minarchism.
Mysteriously, the principles that you would apply to any other court magically doesn’t apply to your “fallback court”, which according to you somehow has a special right to compel people to patronize it while the others don’t. A defining feature of a state (and remember, we’re supposed to oppose states) is its claim to such special and exclusive rights.
No one would ever be forced to use a court under pure market governance. The final recourse is taking restitution by force, not dragging the offender into court.
But assuming that between two parties who have a dispute that one of them violated the rights of the other, why doesn’t the victim have a right to exact restitution? Now, it is certainly preferable for many reasons for him to take recourse to a formal legal system, and I think this adds up to a moral obligation to do so, but I don’t see why employing defensive force to end a rights-violation, which includes exacting restitution, and might also include restraining the criminal if he’s a serious ongoing threat, is not a right.
This is misleading, because you just say ‘forced’ without specifying whether there is ‘initiation of force’ aka ‘rights-violating’ going on. Force as such is not what we as libertarians are worried about here; it’s the initiation of force that we’re worried about. So it is trivial to point out that both our proposed systems involve force. The question is, does one or both of our systems involve the initiation of force?
As I pointed out, vigilantism suffers from various kinds of human error and is thus far more likely to result in an innocent party B being forced to pay restitution or the actual criminal B being forced to pay disproportionate resitution or being punished in a way he doesn’t deserve, etc. In such cases B’s rights are violated by A because A is initiating force against him. However, as I pointed out, vigilantism does not necessarily involve rights-violations - it can result in a just outcome.
Now let’s look at your system. It seems to me that you’ve essentially conceded that your proposed system won’t really be voluntary. Correct me if I’m wrong on this. Are you picturing everyone essentially and explicitly signing on to this system voluntarily, say through contract, in advance? Or is it somehow going to be imposed on them against their will? Because if your system is not really voluntary, if they don’t essentially and explicitly contract with it, then your system will indeed involve rights-violations as a matter of certainty. It will institutionalize aggression, rights-violations, against all innocent parties forced to use the system. For example, A and B have a dispute involving a rights-violation, B is in actuality the aggressor/rights-violator, so we could say that your system doesn’t violate B’s rights to force him to use it but we would have to say that your system does violate the rights of A, who is innocent, in forcing A to use it.
So we can already see that your system is far worse than vigilantism as it institutionalizes rights-violations, making them systematic. Once we realize that vigilantism is not actually a part of my proposed system, but merely what happens when one or more parties choose not to make use of my system, then your system is shown to be all the more worse in comparison. Vigilantism is not a part of my proposed system. By definition vigilantism takes place outside of a legal system. You may see it as a flaw that people might occasionally resort to vigilantism under my system, but I’ll note that people will still do so under your system too (as they have done in the US and probably in every legal system ever known to man). So while your system will institutionalize rights-violations, mine will not.
I’m glad you worded it that way: either forcing an individual to use particular court is a rights-violation, or it isn’t. It can’t be both.
In the chance that it is a rights-violation, both of our systems are unfair. In the chance it isn’t a rights-violation, both of our systems are fair.
In situations where both individuals can’t agree upon a court, one or both of the two will be forced into using a particular court against his/her will – both under your system and under my system. The difference is that under my system, you aren’t allowed to force anyone to use any court except the fallback court, while under your system, you can force anyone to use any court.
In other words, neither of us can avoid “the state” when it comes to law. The difference is that while I propose one state, you propose several.
I was being serious; it is the first libertarian text I’ve ever read! Up until fairly recently, I had no idea that there was any real number of people with views remotely similar to mine. I then stumbled upon the entry for “anarcho-capitalist” while on Wikipedia; that’s when I found out I wasn’t alone!
I had read Economics in One Lesson, but I don’t think that counts as libertarian.
edit: It’s getting too late; I can’t type. 'Night!
Wrong. Your system sets up a double standard for justice that says that “only institution X (your ‘default court’) may force people to patronize it”, while I keep emphasizing that no institution at all may legitimately do so. What is being proposed as an alternative to your statist, monopolistic model is that the total lack of the initiation of force or coercion, while you continually propose a singular institution with the exclusive right to initiate force or coercion - I.E. a state. Your position is hardly distinguishable from Rand’s, and Rand was not a market anarchist.
Wrong. You propose a state, we don’t. A state is a monopolistic institution, a coercive territorial monopoly which enjoys the exclusive right to be a final arbiter. In contrast, we oppose the state and propose free competition in the provision of arbiters. Free competition between organizations does not constitute a “state”, for the very definition of a “state” would exclude the possibility of free competition in the field within a given territory. It is absolutely absurd to argue that market anarchism is “several competing states” - that was Rand’s straw man argument against market anarchism. You’re taking a very Randian position here.
Please do not confuse the idea of a coercive territorial monopoly that happens to not impose taxation with market anarchism. You are still thinking in terms of a singular monopolist “system” to be imposed onto everyone within a given territory. Market anarchists have done away with such a notion because such an institution constitutes a state and therefore must violate the NAP in order to come into existance and maintain that existance. You cannot restrict competition legally in this area without essentially threatening force on those trying to enter the market in this area. Anarchism is not about singular imposed systems, it’s about spontaneous order resulting from freedom of association and competition - an alien concept to most people.
I don’t know much about Rand’s specific views so I can’t respond to that comment.
I will say this: you’re applying an eye-bleedingly obvious double-standard to your system and mine regarding force, and I’m more than confident Geoffrey will pick up on it.
I’d also like to point out the reductio ad absurdum resulting from the Randian position that there must be a territorial monopolist in order for there to be an “objective standard of justice”. If there is a need for a monopolist on final decision-making within a given territory, and there are multiple institutions like this controlling different territories, then they would be in a state of anarchy with respect to eachother and we would therefore require an even higher monopolistic institution to keep them in check. Hence, the logic of the Randian position naturally should lead one to propose a global government, a territorial monopolist on final decision-making over the entire world, as to avoid the anarchic relations between each respective nation-state.
Plauche’s article on the persistance of anarchy touches on this.
There is no double standard. You are the one proposing a double standard: only institution X (your “default court”) may initiate or threaten to initiate force to make people patronize it. I am repeatedly merely consistantly applying the NAP and stating that no institution may do so. You mischaracterize my position by saying that it would amount to a multitude of institutions enjoying the right to initiate or threaten to initiate force to make people patronize it. Furthermore, assuming that there will be different territories each with their own coercive territorial monopolist on final decision-making, that is actually what your position is - unless of course you wish to propose a global government, as I pointed out in my last post.
You’re brazenly lying about your system: in the case that neither party can agree upon a court system, at least one individual will be forced into using a particular court system against his/her will. Otherwise, the (allegedly) guilty party can’t punished.
That’s obviously wrong. The actual legal system I am proposing does not institutionalize rights-violations; yours does. That makes yours not simply unfair but unjust (and this is leaving aside other arguments I’ve made against systems such as yours).
Or no court at all. You do know the difference between vigilantism and one party forcing the other into court, don’t you? Why do you keep ignoring the distinction?
This is misleading and again ignores the fact that your system institutionalizes rights-violations. You actually propose imposing a default court on all parties; this necessarily constitutes aggression, aka rights-violations, against all innocent parties. An organization in your legal system will actually be actively violating rights as a matter of institutional policy.
In my system, anyone who refuses to use any part of the polycentric legal system will probably be branded an outlaw. That’s his choice. He’s not forced to use any particular security provider or judicial service provider. He doesn’t have a right to have one provided for him against the will of others either (legal socialism is not compatible with libertarianism). There are two possibilities if both parties can’t agree on a third-party arbiter:
One party attempts to carry out vigilante justice on the other party. This may or may not result in justice. I’ve already noted that vigilantism will be present in your system too. Vigilantism by definition bypasses the formal legal system. Vigilantism takes place outside the law. Anyone who makes a habit of doing this will probably face severe social and economic pressure and may be blacklisted or branded an outlaw.
One party refuses to take part in the formal legal system but the other party chooses to plead his case within the formal legal system anyway instead of taking the vigilante route. Note that the party who refuses to take part in the formal legal system doesn’t have to be forced to take part by the other party. By refusing to take part he is essentially branding himself an outlaw. The party that does the right thing and pleads his case in the formal legal system, on the other hand, is fulfilling his obligation in doing his best to prove his case to the rest of society in order to get a legal sanction to use force to exact restitution from the outlaw.
Given that nobody will want to lose the protection of the law, all parties will have a very strong incentive to find a way to agree on a third-party arbiter. Maybe they won’t be able to agree directly but they can each find an agent and the agents can negotiate an agreed upon third-party arbiter. (Or: As in the “Wild Wild West,” I’ve read that often what would happen is that each party to a dispute would choose an arbiter and each of these arbiters would then agree on a third person to join them in deciding the case.) Given that most people will probably have contracts with security providers already anyway, said security providers will probably already have made arrangements among themselves which third-party arbiters they will use in the event of a dispute between their clients, so the immediate parties to a dispute won’t have to worry about agreeing upon a third-party arbiter.
(Update: Make that three possibilities, the third being one that Brainpolice has mentioned, namely that both parties may drop the dispute.)
I don’t think you understand what a state is. See the definition I gave several posts back. Even while what you say here is completely wrong, I’ll note that having several states is better than having only one (i.e., an international system of states is preferrable to one world government).
Then I would suggest reading a mountian of material before getting heavily involved in discussions in this forum. There are reading lists posted. There are also several threads dealing with anarchism and the law in which I’ve posted necessary reading materials.
Actually, no, I agree with Brainpolice. We’re both libertarian anarchists well-read on this subject. (Check out my profile here and my website for info about me and some of my writings.)
From what I have seen I don’t think you have a firm grasp of what the nature of the state is or of how a libertarian anarchist legal system might work. There is a fairly large literature on both subjects, much (but not all) of it available online for free. It really is better to read a good bit of it first.
Firstly, your assumption does not logically follow. You ignore the possibility that no trial will occur at all and the case will not be further persued. It does not logically follow from a stalemate that initiating force is the only possibility. Secondly, you’re still dancing around the fact that what you propose is no different than the status quo of any state and that your position is not market anarchism but a form of minarchism, since you support the exclusive right of a territorial monopoly to initiate force in the name of restricting competition. Thirdly, I don’t propose a singular “system” - I propose spontaneous order.
While you make a large step in the right direction by opposing taxation, there is significantly more to a market anarchist society than the lack of taxation. Even if a given institution does not have the power of taxation but still initiates force in order to maintain a territorial monopoly, hence restricting competition by blocking entry to the market, it is still a state. This is the fundamental problem I have with the so-called “voluntary government” model proposed by many Objectivists. While you may not be an Objectivist yourself, the position that you are advocating is essentially the same thing as theirs.
Right. My paper shows that we can never really get out of anarchy.
This also raises an important question for Ego. Ego, what happens if someone has a dispute with your default court itself? What, if any, third-party arbiter can he and the default court turn to in order to resolve their dispute? Is the default court the final arbiter of last resort, in which case there is no third-party arbiter to whom they can turn and the default court will have to decide its own case (in which it can’t possibly be impartial)? Or can they turn to one of the other competing service providers? But if they can do this, what if they can’t agree on a third-party arbiter for their dispute? Who can they turn to? Surely not the default court for it is a party to the dispute and we’ve already noted a problem with it deciding its own case. But if not the default court, then it looks like we’ve back to the alleged problem you see with a polycentric legal system. The only difference is that the alleged problem has been pushed back a step, but you’ve added an organization that actively violates rights as a matter of institutional policy, not to speak of all the other problems we’ve noted with it being a monopolist.
Right, that’s a problem with all states. Even if one concedes that it’s necessary to resolve conflicts between all external parties (which I don’t, but let’s assume so for the sake of argument), we run into the problem that in all conflicts between external parties and the institution itself, the institution is a judge in it’s own case and therefore the very rationale for its existance as a 3rd party final arbiter would apply to itself. Hence, there would need to be another institution external to it that judges in conflicts between itself and external parties. And then that institution would run into the same problem. And so on, and so on. This leads to an infinite regress. Obviously then, a state cannot possibly be a solution to the problem, as it is prone to the very same criticism leveled against anarchism - only it arguably makes things worse by institutionalizing rights violations.
This is false and a mode of argumentation that should be avoided in this forum. It’s not civil. There are other possibilities that should be assumed first.
I’m sure we agree that the only way to solve the impartial third-party arbiter problem is a polycentric legal system. A monocentric legal system is simply incapable of solving the problem because by its very nature it sets up a monopolistic final arbiter who will inevitably have to decide its own case in disputes between itself and others and so can’t be impartial. A polycentric legal system may have no institutionalized final arbiter, but it will have no systematic problem with finding an impartial third-arbiter for any given case and in practice one of these will end up being the final arbiter in a given case (i.e., in practice there won’t be endless appeals).