Something that I’ve been thinking about:
Is it a crime (ie; a violation of the NAP) to infect someone with a disease? How about intentionally infecting someone? Since, as far as I can tell, intent does not matter in a libertarian legal system, is this an exception or what?
Block has referred to it before as a form of aggression, in his videos.
-Jon
You seem to be referring to bioterrorism. Is that a crime? The answer seems amply evident to me. Perhaps you could elaborate if my conclusion does not appropriately touch on your question.
Was there a legal system where intent mattered not?
Why would that matter?
Because the assumption of the irrelevancy of intent should not go unchallenged.
Not nessicarily. The situation I had in mind is the unintentional (but still damaging) spread of disease vs. the intentional spread. Since I posted, I think I’ve solved it myself [:)]. All of the methods of disease spread that I could think of (stabbing someone with a needle, coughing/vomiting/what-have-you on someone or their property, etc.) are themselves violations of the non-aggression principle.
But why does intent matter? If I accidentally crash my car into your house, you have just as good a claim against me as if I had done it intentionally. Does the nature of various crimes/torts change this? (honest questions, no hostility intended)
If someone intentionally infects you they are employing a means to achieve an end, so it would be no different than physical battery.
Steven Kinsella makes a distinction between action and non-action.
http://www.stephankinsella.com/archive/2006_07_01_archive.php#115402771731407116#115402771731407116
My question was not about the intent part, but about the legal system part. I’m asking, why does the content of a legal system matter to the question?