I don’t believe in moral subjectivism. I just reject deontology and deontological-like justifications for libertarianism.
I’m curious to know how you support the NAP which is by it’s nature, deontological.
Brainpolice,
I agree with you that AJ is right on the money, as usual.
But, what’s wrong with moral subjectivism?
You, like AJ, zefreak and other members of the subjectivist church, ultimately don’t get it, n’est-ce pas ?
When it is considered as being a stand-alone axiom, or apart from the rest of ethics, yes. When it is thought of as being a constitutive part of eudaimonia, then no. Virtue ethics in general transcends the consequentialism-deontology dualism.
The question is, what’s wrong with crime ? Why is it non justifiable ? Or maybe it is ?
It doesn’t matter if you call your argument consequentialist, deontological, geometric or pink.
This is why I had to take a break from this thread & got a little impatient (unfairly towards wilderness; I apologize) with the discussion when at some point I could no longer clearly decipher what’s being said.
Oh well, I suppose the Internet can wait :\
Isn’t virtue ethics just the third leg of the normative theory tripod though (with the other two being deontology and consequentialism)?
I’m not familiar with the reference? Is this a classification system of different normative theories? In that case, yes, but it doesn’t mean that the theories are “equal” in any sense. I’m arguing from the position of virtue ethics, so I see virtue ethics being the dialectical synthesis of deontology and consequentialism, an example of the Randian trichomoty; it takes the best of both positions and puts them in their proper context. Long’s “Why Does Justice Have Good Consequences?” contains a more in-depth explanation of this position.
Yep. Virtue ethics rejects the hard divide between consequentialism and deontology, relegating it to a distinction at best.
The NAP is not inherently deontological by its nature. Deontology would be only one approach to it.
Morality defined as a way a man should act is not subjective. Given a man and his goals the way he should act is completely objective. Where his goal choice is subjective or objective is kind of undecided, I think it has elements of both. I believe implicit goals due do the nature of man or reality are objective, and everything else is probably subjective. But the subjective goals to me are completely unimportant things like “should i have a tuna or salami sandwhich?”
Yeah and when he ends up choosing, his actions are objective and clear. He valued the tuna sandwhich more than the salami, or vice versa.
Seems you two are saying the same thing as Lilburne.
Under the consequentialist moral framework implied by Twisted’s “Given a man and his goals the way he should act is completely objective,” there seems to be no difference between moral individualism and moral subjectivism, nor between moral universalism and moral objectivism.
In other words, in that consequentialist moral framework, the way each man should act is in theory objectively ascertainable (given his goals), and I don’t think Lilburne would dispute that (please correct me if I’m wrong). However, in the sense that the way a man should act may differ from person to person (due to their divergent goals) we may call it a “subjective” choice - perhaps less ambiguous to call it an individual choice (Lilburne: do you have a reason for using the word subjectivism instead of individualism?).
To recap, the consequentialist ought is “objective” in the sense that the goal is deemed objectively ascertainable, but “subjective” in the sense that each man’s goals (and hence ways of achieving them) are his own. So why not replace subjective with individual for clarity?
[center] Natural Law;
or
The Science of Justice:
A TREATISE ON NATURAL LAW, NATURAL JUSTICE, NATURAL RIGHTS, NATURAL LIBERTY, AND NATURAL SOCIETY; SHOWING THAT ALL LEGISLATION WHATSOEVER IS AN ABSURDITY, A USURPATION, AND A CRIME (1882)
[/center]
That’s not morality.
Actually, the only important problem is whether ‘subjective’ ends, such as butchering your neighbor if you feel like it, are morally justified or not. Morality as far as I can tell is not concerned with food tastes or cooking, cooking being a metaphor for the utilitarian formula
“Given a man and his goals the way he should act is completely objective.”
Agent-relative is a term I like in relation to this.
That does seem a lot clearer than “subjective.”
Jason:
I’m not entirely clear on the above. When we say that the ought is objective in the sense that the goal is deemed objectively ascertainable, I assume we do not mean, merely objectively ascertainable by the actor himself.
If this is right, then objectively ascertainable means something like “publicly” ascertainable; ascertainable by a number of others besides the actor himself.
Then, when we say that this goal is objectively ascertainable by a group of people besides the actor himself, does this mean “perceptible” by them?
What constitutes a goal of an individual actor that is objectively ascertainable by a group of other people? Does this mean they must all be able to perceive this goal? Or what is the definition or conception of this type of objectivity?
Adam, the above was intended only as my interpretation of Lilburne and other’s positions, so I would turn your questions over to them. I was trying to demonstrate that a charitable interpretation of both sides (in those particular posts) would not necessarily result in any disagreement.
To give my own take, the consequentialist ought, being a mere prescription to “do X if you want Y results,” can in theory be logically and/or scientifically demonstrated (praxeology?). If I were stating my own position, I wouldn’t want to bring in a word like objective, which I feel is ambiguous exactly where precision is needed. My point above was simply that posters using the words objective and subjective could actually be in agreement, because the definitions of those two words are so malleable that one can nearly mean the other. The part you quoted was meant to show a way to resolve the disagreement (or encourage clarification from the other parties).