It doesn’t matter: you need an actual substantive argument for non-aggression. Appealing to the fact that someone is debating you peacefully rather than bludgeoning you over the head with an axe is not a substantive argument for non-aggression.
Someone could concivably engage in “rational argumentation” in favor of violence against innocents. In order to prove them wrong, you need a substantive argument of your own, not an appeal to the fact that they aren’t currently aggressing.
I think it does matter. rather a lot whether rational argument and violence against innocents can or cannot co-exist simultaneously.
the substantive argument for non-aggression is that it cant be argued for without contradicting the presuppostions of argument. of course these are presuppositions you are ignorant of… as KoB said, your problem…
Wrong. The person needs a substantive argument for aggression. Otherwise the person will (most likely) special plead. And you DO know what special pleading is, RIGHT? RIGHT?
To prove his theory, Hoppe may have to address intentions, because in observable physical reality there are no contradictions as we typically conceive things. As Hoppe has written elsewhere: “…there are only bodily movements to be observed but no such thing as actions..”
(Economic Science and the Austrian Method, p.22)
This is an acknowledgment that what constitute one’s actions are one’s intentions, and the intentions/actions are not observed.
There is no contradiction between the observed person’s vocal utterances and his other physical movements. A performative contradiction would seem to refer to what the observed person means, as compared to “the words that are coming out of his mouth.” Then Hoppe would be saying something like:
When actor A means “xyz,” but the words that are coming out of his mouth are “abc,” then…
But a problem will be that the words coming out of A’s mouth will have to be given a meaning by someone, otherwise they are brute physical facts.
If the meaning is supplied by observing person B, then there is no contradiction as envisioned by the AE, since the AE refers to a contradiction occurring for A, not a contradiction between the divergent views of A and B.
If the meaning of A’s words are supplied by A, then we have a contradiction of meanings, and maybe here, a logical contradiction. But this is no longer a performative contradiction, but a contradiction between two meanings; is something like a contradiction between ideas; is something like a standard logical contradiction. But now, the standard for establishing a logical contradiction is fairly rigorous. There is less wiggle room here than with the ambiguous concept of performative contradiction…
If we’re to go with Searle’s distinction between “brute facts” and “insitutional facts”, it seems quite obvious that the meaning of terms are “institutional facts”. While words can contextually be used to refer to “brute facts”, words do not have intrinsic meanings. The meaning of words are contextual to what has been agreed upon by people. In either case, it seems to me that it is not sensible to tell someone “this is what you really mean by your terms”. Only they can tell you want they mean by their terms, and hopefully through the course of discourse you can come to a better understanding of eachother’s position by clarifying one’s terms. But I’m having trouble seeing how this linguistic issue connects to the “argumentation ethics” proof of libertarianism.
Anyone, making any argument (for aggression, against aggression, for reptilian jewish bankers from outerspace, whatever it may be) has to have a substantive case for their position. You aren’t inherently correct in a debate simply because you’re a libertarian; libertarianism, like everything else, has to be argued for with a subtantive argument. It cannot just be assumed to be true and then we simply dismiss people who disagree with us without any regard for the substance of their arguments.
That is the sense in which I consider “argumentation ethics” to be sophistry, since it functions to give libertarians an excuse to avoid having to actually make any sort of positive case for libertarianism, while they can dismiss their opponent’s arguments out of hand without addressing their content. Ironically, it’s actually me putting foreward the more rigorous standards for argumentation here: the shocking notion that you have to have a positive, substantive argument for your position.
Brainpolice:
I didn’t intend my argument to be linguistic. The idea is to locate the precise contradiction that the AE claims exists. My point was that the contradiction can’t be found in physics. As actor A observes the things around him, the observable movements, sounds, smells, and tactile experiences do not contradict one another. These things obey the law of conservation and the other physical laws. This fact is not changed by assuming that some of the things A observes moving about and making sounds include person B.
Thus, the contradiction the AE refers to must lie elsewhere than between the various phisical movements and sounds of the arguor.
If what the arguor is saying (the physical word sounds) is part of his contradiction, then the thing that his sounds contradict seems to be his intended meaning.
To me this isn’t a linguistic issue. It simply means that actor A is claiming that actor B is contradicting himself. It isn’t a “physical” contradiction, and it isn’t a purely logical contradiction. Here, I’m assuming we are in agreement.
Then it must be some other sort of contradiction; a performative contradiction. This seems to mean a contradiction between B’s physical movements, sounds, etc.., and his intentions. That is my main point, and I don’t believe it is a linguistic one.
Adam
Nope. Only the positive claimant/the one adding more than is justified.
And you’ve yet to address the fact of the special plead. Do address it, for I grow weary of your sophistry.
I’m interested, what are these interpersonal norms that are demonstrated by the mere act of argumentation?
Can the performative contradiction of rejecting the right of self ownership be put into the form of a syllogism?
The non-aggression principle, self-ownership and neo-lockean private property rights are all positive claims - all “ought” statements are positive claims. In either case, all claims have to actually be justified with subtance. The idea that you don’t have to substantively justify your claims, which effectively means that they can just be assumed to be true, is what is true sophistry. Your correctness is not a metaphysical given, and such an approach to debate is pompous idiocy.
The argument tends to go (roughly) something like this: “you must make use of your body in order to argue against self-ownership, therefore you implicitly prove it in the attempt to argue against it”. Of course, I’ve already explained ad nauseum that this is dependant on a conflation between “the right of self-ownership” and “the fact of physiological control”. The fact that someone has physiological control of their body is not a proof of “the right of self-ownership”. I painstakingly tried to point this out to Stefan Molyneux in a voice debate to no avail, since he insists on using “self-ownership” to refer to physiological control (a fact that hardly anyone who argues against “self-ownership” actually denies).
Initiating force is a positive claim. Having someone refrain from initiating force isn’t. Enough of your sophistry and pompous idiocy.
Yep, and you deny it. Thus, you refuse to acknowledge that argumentation requires some basics, just like addition requires the concept of unit. You fail at arguing. You fail at debate. You fail at logical thought. You fail at philosophy.
I wonder, though: if physiological control of your body doesn’t show self-ownership–by what authority are you even engaging in this debate? OOOOOPS! That requires some backstory and prerequisites, whcih you deny. Looks like you do believe that argumentation exists in a vacuum, little sophist.
What’s your justification for non-aggression Brainpolice ?
A consequentialist appeal to self-interest, grounded in a humanistic respect for individuals, grounded in a realist epistemology. Most certainly not an attempt to argue that it is a metaphysical given or to treat it as a contextless axoim.
And yet you treat argumentation in a vacuum. How…hypocritical of you.
This is false. Both the initiation of force and the obligation to refrain from initiating force are positive claims, and both must be justified.
Sounds a bit vague. Why should individuals be respected ?
What do you mean, justified ?
This is false.