I wondering if anyone can point me to an article that offers criticism on the Austrians’ deductive system? The root of my question is why so much emphasis is placed on deduction? For example, Geometry, the most celebrated system of deduction, is deduced from a system of terms like plane, point, line…none of which can be defined–only described
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Deduction, per se, isn’t where the heart of a criticism would lie–even the standard approach of empirical science is called the “hypothetico-deductive method.”
But you’re right to question the axioms themselves: are they self-evident? are they a priori? is rationalism an epistemically justified enterprise?
So far as I’m concerned, praxeology has empirical roots that are theory-laden with folk psychology (folk psychology qua theory is being increasingly explored now by philosophers of economics like Don Ross).
Mises, UFES:
Before Bolyai and Lobachevsky, geometry was, in the eyes of the philosophers, the paragon of perfect science; it was assumed that it provided unshakable certainty forever and for everybody. To proceed also in other branches of knowledge more geometrico was the great ideal of truth-seekers. All traditional epistemological concepts began to totter when the attempts to construct non-Euclidian geometries succeeded.
Yet praxeology is not geometry. It is the worst of all superstitions to assume that the epistemological characteristics of one branch of knowledge must necessarily be applicable to any other branch. In dealing with the epistemology of the sciences of human action, one must not take one’s cue from geometry, mechanics, or any other science.
The assumptions of Euclid were once considered as self-evidently true. Present-day epistemology looks upon them as freely chosen postulates, the starting point of a hypothetical chain of reasoning. Whatever this may mean, it has no reference at all to the problems of praxeology.
The starting point of praxeology is a self-evident truth, the cognition of action, that is, the cognition of the fact that there is such a thing as consciously aiming at ends. There is no use cavilling about these words by referring to philosophical problems that have no bearing upon our problem. The truth of this cognition is as self-evident and as indispensable for the human mind as is the distinction between A and non-A.
Never trust a man selling you self-evident truths.
If they are self-evident, no selling is required 
Just one problem: it’s self-evident that I attempt to better my state of affairs. It is not self-evident that “man” or all human beings do. It is a reasonable assumption perhaps, but self-evident states it too strongly. Whether this matters for praxeological theory I’ll leave to the praxeology experts.
It is just like the problem of induction. We can’t prove it, but it works to treat it as if we can.
Yes. That’s why I say *“*self-evident” is too strong a term to apply to all people from the individual perspective. Better to reserve the term for the individual’s case of his or her own self: it’s self-evident, to everyone who hears the theory, that they themselves act.