“Statements should be falsifiable.”
Is the above statement falsifiable?
I should clarify this. The supposed logical infallibility of praxeology is not the reason I am.
I think it’s a testament to what a great book Human Action is that it had me totally convinced that the Austrians are the only credible economists, even as I was rolling my eyes at all of Mises’ assertions of utter certainty.
Pardon me if I’m wrong, but I truly believe that “determinism” is just about single-way causation, no two-way causation.
For example, if we know that A brigs about B, and that F also bring about B, if I tell you “today is A”, you’ll know with certainty that tomorrow shall be B. Hence the future is totally and absolutely determined, and cannot “shift” or “branch away” from being B.
On the other hand if I tell you: today is B, you can’t say whether yesterday was A or F. thus, in this second occasion, according to your interpretation, the yesterday-today link wouldn’t be “deterministic” and would be liable to “branching away” and “parallel universes” and such quantum fairy-tales. Yet, I believe we both agree that if today is B yesterday has been either A or F, not some probabilistic median, but either A or F. The link “yesterday-today” is fully determined. We just can’t know what yesterday was.
Assuming that there can be such a thing as “branching away” and “parallel universes” as most enthusiast do nowadays is to reject single-way causality outright. I believe that is a major mistake.
Not if “should” is taken in the normative sense.
No, Mises dealt with this in the first 100 or so pages of HA. Read it.
Or perhaps you should stop the rolling motion of your eyes and properly read it. He says if the axioms are known and the deductions properly followed, then the theory is logically incontestable. Which is true. He never claims to be utterly certain of everything.
Um, wrong. He asserts it like hell. Provide proofs he does not. Perhaps you are the one who should read it.
He does say this. But that’s about as far as he goes with it. For a pan-skeptical truth seeker like me, this is unsatisfactory.
Asserts what, pray tell? What proofs of anything do you provide? I’ve read it, you seem to have read whatever you felt like. He discusses determinism in the context of praxeology (Hoppe elaborates in TEEOPP) and not once claims to be absolutely certain of everything. Rather, he makes the claim I mentioned. A rather different one. He is sure we can be certain of some things, but not all things. And also that revisions in logical deductions are possible if errors are made (where does he claim one is infallible, pray tell, by dint of being a praxeologist?) Some Austrians go further and say the axioms might be revised and allow for their misspecification leading to corrections subsequently.
Do I really care? Do you exist? Does this post exist? No? Oh well, nothing to respond to then.
Nandor:
When you write:
“if the world is deterministic, then at least theoretically, positivist modelling of the system is possible”
…I believe this contains a subtle tautology. If the world is deterministic, then positivistic modeling of consciousness is possible (because the supposition of this conception of determinism is that a completely mechanistic modeling of consciousness is possible.)
That is, as you write things, determinism (A) is the supposition that a completely mechanistic account of consciousness is possible (B).
So if A, as you write, then B.
The problem of this kind of determinism can be seen more clearly if we phrased your passage like this:
It is possible that a completely deterministic account of consciousness can be attained in the future, if now, in theory, a non-contradictory account of such a system can be given in which consciousness is described entirely in terms of particles in fields of force.
Instead of the tautological criterion: If determinism is possible, then that which constitutes determinism is possible…
We might instead say: Determinism is possible if a non-contradictory account can now be given of its theoretical aims…
Here is what I mean by this.
John Searle is a proponent of the kind of determinism you write about.
Here is a succinct statement of his theory in 14 pages (see the document “Biological Naturalism”).
In this short article, on page 3, you will find the following definition:
“Some things, such as pains and tickles and itches, only exist when experienced by a human or animal subject, and they have a subjective or first person ontology.”
And on page 11, you will find Searle’s own account of the theoretical aims of his theory:
"Well, why could we not do that with consciousness – carve off the surface features of what conscious states feel like and redefine them in terms of their micro-causes? We could, and if we knew enough, for certain purposes, say medical purposes, we might. We could then say, “This guy is in pain, even though he does not feel it yet. The thalamocortical system definitely shows the presence of pain, though it is unfelt”
So Searle provides a definition where pain only exists when experienced by a subject, but yet he says that if his program were successful, we could then say that a subject is in pain even though he doesn’t experience it.
Thus, it seems obvious that Searle’s account of the theoretical aims of his program are in direct contradiction to one of the primary definitions of his system. In other words, in theory, his system does not work. Even if we grant that what he says on page 11 can be attained, this is inconsistent with what he says on page 3, so that one of them must be relinquished for his system to give a consistent account of the phenomena.
But if he relinquishes one or the other of these mutually exclusive accounts, his system most likely will not provide the information he was hoping it would.
This is a problem inherent in the program of metaphysical or dogmatic determinism, what Heisenberg refers to as metaphysical or dogmatic realism.
(See: Physics and Philosophy, chapters V and VI)
The question is not, granted that determinism is possible, whether that which constitutes determinism is possible.
The question is whether a non-contradictory theoretical account of the very program of metaphsical determinism can be given.
As far as I’m aware, and apparently as far as Searle is aware, no such non-contradictory account of this program has so far been given.
This is ridiculous. The only possible “proof he does not” would be to paste the entire content of the book. If you have a quote, then please quote it for us. Otherwise, we have no reason to believe you over our knowledge of the book to the contrary.
As a follow-up to this idea, I would like to provide a short sketch that further outlines the problem of non-praxeological, naturalistic approaches to consciousness.
We imagine that there is a human subject in a medical setting. As Searle indicates on page 11 of his summary of his theory of biological naturalism (see above link), the goal is to establish a correlation between the subjective state the subject is in (e.g., pain), and some constellation of physical phenomena.
From the very beginning, as far as I can tell, the goal cannot be to establish merely that A = A, i.e., that X physical arrangement = X physical arrangement. The goal would seem to have to be to establish a correlation between two phenomena that are in some sense non-identical.
This accords with Searle’s usage, since he clearly refers to two non-identical phenomena: 1) the subject’s experience of pain, and 2) some aspect of the subject’s thalamocortical system.
I will argue, against Searle, and against the naturalistic program generally, that the following situation cannot be overcome:
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If we say merely that X physical phenomena is followed by or co-present with Y physical phenomena, then we have not said anything about consciousness. We have merely observed two sets of physical phenomena. Here, consciousness is not “present,” and only sets of physical phenomena are present.
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If we try to correlate physical phenomena with the reported experiences of the subject, this will not suffice as the rigorous scientific account of the phenomena sought by the naturalist. If the scientist-observer applies some electrical signal to the subject, and the subject says something such as “right now, I’m feeling a tingling in my finger” or some similar such reportage, this introduces a “subjective interpretation” of the experience into the scientific account which ultimately I believe defeats the naturalist’s hope for an objective account of the phenomena.
(this is why, in my opinion, Searle doesn’t go this route in his own account of his theory. This is why he tries to account for the pain felt by the subject without having the subject report his experience of pain to the scientist-observer)
- If the scientist-observer applies some electrical signal to the subject, and every time he does so, the subject says “pain,” and this happens every time without fail, I assert this will not overcome the naturalist’s dilemma. The reason is, if it can be arranged that a subject utters the sound “pain” upon the administering of a specific electrical signal, this will----precisely to the extent such a correlation becomes absolutely mechanical [i.e., to the extent it becomes a physical law]----have eliminated the connection to, or the presence of, the subjectivity of the subject’s experience. That is, the utterance of the sound “pain” will now have become simply a physical phenomenon, absent the presence of a “subjective consciousness”. This would be similar to having a tape recorder, and every time the scientist-observer presses the “start” button, the sound “pain” emanates from the recording machine.
In other words, in the asymptotic approach, as the subject’s response to the stimulus becomes mechanical, to this extent is the “subjectivity” of the subject (the presence of the subject’s consciousness) eliminated (as opposed to correlated with the stimulus).
This is why, unless I’m overlooking something or not understanding something in Searle’s account of his own theory, his theory contains a blatant inconsistency (see above referenced inconsistency between what he writes on page 3 and on page 11 of his own summary of his theory).
Searle is attempting to overcome the epistemological or ontological constraints of naturalism, and he completely fails. (unless there is some explanation for the abovementioned contradiction)
As objective ethicists have not overcome the is-ought gap, naturalists have not overcome the gap between consciousness and the account of nature in terms of particles in fields of force.
As objective ethicists confidently asserted that Hume’s is-ought gap could be overcome, dogmatic and metaphysical naturalists such as Searle confidently assert that consciousness can be explained in physical-causal terms. (the term dogmatic and metaphysical naturalism is a parallel to what Heisenberg refers to as dogmatic or metaphysical realism, pages 81/82 Physics and Philosophy)
These attempts, when closely examined, fail.
The point I’m making is that, as opposed to the question whether physical science may one day succeed in explaining consciousness in physical terms, there is the question----equally if not more important----of whether a non-contradictory account can even be given of the theoretical aims of a naturalistic account of consciousness.
That is, disregarding for a moment, the idea of a naturalistic account of consciousness that may one day emerge or materialize, is it possible in the present, to give a consistent theoretical account of what such a naturalistic account could possibly be ??
If they answer is no, then we obviously would want to know why such an account cannot be given, and this would obviously imply at least the possibility that the very undertaking in question is contradictory in some sense. At least this possibility would seem deserving of serious consideration.
Searle’s own account of what his theory would accomplish, even if successful, and even by his own standards, is (to employ a common expression) “incoherent,” for the reasons given above.
The simple question is: Is it possible to give a non-contradictory account of the naturalists program that seeks to explain consciousness in physical terms?
The problem is one of the same magnitude as Hume’s is-ought gap, and is succinctly stated by Heisenberg:
“We would never doubt that the brain acts as a physico-chemical mechanism if treated as such; but for an understanding of psychic phenomena we would start from the fact that the human mind enters as object and subject into the scientific process of psychology.” (Physics and Philosophy, p.106)
(emphasis added)
This is the naturalist’s “is-ought” gap, and one the “overcommance” of which I’m unaware.
I think it is possible to describe the situation in an alternate form, which may help to clarify the essential problem:
The naturalist as scientist-observer is seeking to explain the phenomenon of consciousness of which he is privy to by direct experience, by means of objects that appear in the field of his own consciousness. He is trying to “locate” something called consciousness among the objects of his own consciousness----in various subjects, as combinations of various particles and biological structures, etc. But these objects are, in the end, still objects of his—the scientific observer’s----consciousness. The naturalist seems to make the initial assumption that he will be able to “find” consciousness among the objects of his own consciousness, as opposed to the (at least equally plausible) opposite assumption that his own consciousness is not locatable in identical duplicate form among that which appears in/for his consciousness.
A loose analogy might be that of actors in a play, who while acting in a play, both acknowledge that they are actors in a play, and seek to interpret members of the audience as actors in a play.
In acknowledging that they are actors in a play, they seem to imply that the audience is an audience. But nonetheless, they continue to pursue a theory that would demonstrate how the audience members are actors in a play, not realizing that their own acceptance that they themselves are actors in a play (their initial premise or theory), applied to the objects of their experience (those four hundred people sitting down in the dark over there) is the acceptance of a premise that sets epistemological limits on, or that fixes the epistemological form of, further theoretical inquiry…
Why you assume that the universe has a beginning? Humbles law was refuted by quasars, there is no reason to think there is a start state you can use to deterministically model the universe to this point. You also cant try to get a snapshot of the state of the universe because even light has a speed limit, making it impossible to gather the data simultaneously.
That was my point. What justification do you have for telling people their theories should be falsifiable, if your theory that “theories should be falsifiable” is not falsifiable?
The same justification I have for telling people that Occam’s Razor is a heuristic they should adopt. Whim, nothing more 
You can’t force an epistemology on people. So long as people are intellectually honest and share certain experiences (critical thinking helps too), I think they will gravitate towards similar positions.
I don’t think anyone skeptical enough to reject intelligent design or eastern (woo-woo) spiritual healing can consistently believe in ‘moral facts’ once applying similar methods of critique. My critiques in any of these threads only holds water within a given epistemological framework (albeit a very popular one).
If by “very popular” you mean accepted by a tiny fraction of a percent of people, I guess it is popular. If you mean popular within the relevant community you should really check your premises. Very few epistemologists are Critical Rationalists. Far more scientists believe they are Critical Rationalists, but don’t really act as if they are Critical Rationalists when they are doing science. Normal science is very dogmatic, but as Kuhn pointed out, this might be a feature and not a bug.
Personally, I take certain things like murder and theft as a partial definition of immorality. These are basic to ethics. I will talk about certain actions as being immoral and others will understand what I am talking about. Part of the meaning of 2 is that it is 1+1. This is basic and doesn’t need to be justified from other underlying principles. Part of the meaning of moral is pulling a drowning child out of a pond. If you don’t care about morality, that doesn’t mean that it doesn’t exist or is meaningless. It is meaningful to me and those in my language community (almost everyone I have ever met).
P. S.
BTW, Occam’s Razor probably has more going for it then mere “whim” or aesthetics, but you might be just selling it short to make a point.
And before you ask, yes, I believe that the degree of falsifiability is a virtue of theories.
Occam’s Razor is a normative heuristic, not a logical principle. Everyone adopts it because it makes sense intuitively and people recognize that they live by the principle every day of their lives in normal decision making. As a purely normative principle, expressing what is ‘within one’s rights to believe’, it is either accepted or not. If accepted, certain results follow. If not, critiques hinging on Occam’s Razor fall flat. The vast majority of intellectually honest people on this earth understand that by recognizing the benefits of applying the principle in their lives they are implicitly accepting it as valuable, and won’t reject it just to ‘win an argument’.
If you define morality to mean actions and ends that are accepted as disagreeable to the majority of people within your ‘language community’, then fine. Some philosophers and contemporaries use it in that manner (moral fictionalists, cultural relativists, etc). The majority mean something very different when it comes to morality, and that is what is often discussed on this forum.
This is basically the position I hold, but there are some pretty sophisticated arguments that attempt to justify it on information theory, physics, and probability grounds, but I’m in over my head in terms of evaluating the specific claims asserted in the arguments. Just throwing that out there.
This is why I usually avoid these kinds of threads. They turn into something analogous to Dr. Pepper vs. Pepsi. Of course we all know it is a law of nature that Dr. Pepper is the greatest soda of all time.
I understand how probability (not sure about physics or information theory) might explicate the principle and make it more persuasive, but I don’t see how either of those fields could possibly offer a logical, epistemic justification. I am interested in reading more on the subject, however. I find Occam’s Razor fascinating, and central to my philosophy.
If “should” is taken in the consequential sense, i.e., “Statements should be falsifiable if you want them to serve X purpose.” is falsifiable.
I think that even if determinism could be so scientifically developed as to mechanically map out every human behavior, it wouldn’t negate praxeology and perhaps would even relate back to it. Praxeology, leaving consciousness aside, does assert a certain mechanical quality to men in the sense that it always chooses that which he finds best for himself. I think it could be possible to prove that the human mind does work that exact way, so in a sense, praxeology would be mechanically correct even when broken down to chemical reactions and neuron interactions in the brain.
More specifically, I think I’m right to say that, mechanically speaking, the mind works by associating correlative data from the senses. I don’t know much after that, but I assume it would be extremely compatible with praxeology if each set of data were strongly or weakly associated with a set of action… the action that is performed is that which has the strongest correlation with the data being inputted. Which means, by experience, we collect and assemble data-action pairs to some sort of criteria, which could be instinctive and part of the brain structure or certain areas… but I’m already babbling too much for having thought and studied about it so little.
Anyway, determinism doesn’t disprove praxeology at all, for sure. And for all I know, praxeology could very well be merely applied neuropsychology
I know you are making a joke, but this happens to be the type of thing that we can objectively reason about. We can refute such a proposition by pointing out that the existence of Dr. Pepper (let alone having a Dr. Pepper) is not something inherent to the nature of man, and therefore is no part of natural law. Indeed many men lived prior to the existence of Dr. Pepper. By the same sort of reasoning we can conclude objectively that there is no such thing as a natural right to a polio vaccination.