Does praxeology imply that there is no free will?

[czelaya]

To hyp3rvigi1ant, as a practitioner in experimental physics who studies quantum theory, I don’t know of any other constructions of quantum mechanics that is not bound to the uncertainty principle. Yes, there are various interpretations on the rational of quantum mechanics, like Hugh Everett’s Many Worlds Interpretation, but to my knowledge all of quantum mechanics is governed by operators and wavefunctions and this foundation forces non deterministic evolution. Jim Al Khalili, a brilliant theoretical and nuclear physicist, has studied alternatives to quantum theory exhaustively, and no matter how you construct the world of the atom, the strangeness of quantum theory creeps in. The same has been stated by other great physicist such as, Leonard Susskind, Ed Witten, and so forth.

You are correct that the quantum theory cannot account for the source of mass, and the origins for the messenger particle of mass, the graviton. However, that doesn’t make the hierarchy of quantum theories (non-relativistic quantum mechanics, quantum field theory, quantum electrodynamics, electro-weak theory, and quantum chronodynamics) not closed. Reformulation of quantum mechanics is not necessary because the present theories don’t need to account for gravity. Just as quantum theory doesn’t have to be employed in electrodynamics, because gravity is out of the spectrum of the electromagnetic force. Gravity is far too incredibly small and irrelevant when compared to the other forces of nature to be taken into consideration. Thus, electrodynamics doesn’t need reformulation. Of all the theories in existence, quantum field theory is the most successful and most precise theory ever developed. While very mathematically challenging, it is complete in the sense that every prediction the theory has put forth has been verified. Not one prediction of QFT, has every been disproven. Quantum mechanics is a complete set of physical laws. However, the boundaries of Quantum mechanics cease, like you have said, inside black holes, the big bang, and exchange particle interactions. These are the realms that quantum mechanics breakdown into none nonsensical physics.

It’s the wave-particle duality of quantum mechanics that is at the heart of the non deterministic nature of the universe. Matter exist as waves. It’s a difficult set postulates to accept but when you observe matter interacting in the manner that it does at the atomic and sub atomic level it becomes an established fact. Till this day, I’m perplexed by the power of quantum theory. Everyday, I see bound electrons overcoming impossible barriers simply because quantum mechanics predicts that this a probable state.

I’m just a graduate student in chemical physics and theoretical chemistry. So I don’t consider myself an expert also. Any insight would be welcomed.

[nirgrahamUK]

To czelaya, I read your arguments about uncertainty principle and the probabilistic functions, and fail to see how this escapes the determinism paradigm. It is not as though the things that happen do not have causes. It is precisely because you can pump masses of energy into a small space and ‘raise the probability’ of detecting an exotic particle that particle accelerators exists. In other words, if there was no determination, there would be no purpose to particle accelerators. So I suppose I am saying that your argument, at least given my limited knowledge of fundamental physics and filtered through my interpretation and biases is in favour of a ‘qualified’ determinism. But its almost besides the point, as others have stated, for those with false/confused notions of what ‘free will’ means (at least from my perspective) indeterminism is no ‘better’ for them philosophically than determinism.

[I_Ryan]

@z1235

Indeed, there’s no will (or anything for that matter) free (or outside) of physical laws.

Which probably is just metaphysical speculation, again. But, because, in the last thread in which I saw that you expressed your opinion on the subject, I said the same thing, but didn’t respond to your response, I will use this thread as an opportunity to continue that conversation.

@z1235

@I. Ryan

@z1235

[O]ur ‘self’ emerges from the complex chemical/physical patterns in ours brains.

Which probably is just metaphysical speculation, again.

There is empirical evidence (electrical shocks, drugs, brain surgery, etc.) that support a ‘self as a pattern’ hypothesis. Of course, it’s far from proven but, to me, it’s the best explanation I’ve seen.

To us (humans), an emergent phenomenon would be meta-(beyond-)physical, by definition; a whole that language and reason recognize as something more than a mere sum of its parts – but physical/material nevertheless. We find it useful to acknowledge certain states of matter/energy existence and like to give them names: ‘wave’, when matter/energy moves a certain way (oscillates), and ‘self’ when chemical/physical patterns fire in our brains a certain way.

So your argument is this: “There is empirical evidence” that patterns found in the external world can affect those found in the internal world. So what follows from that is that the “self emerges from the complex[…] patterns in our brains” and that “there’s no[thing…] outside of[…] physical laws”. But, “of course”, it’s far from proven" but nonetheless is “the best explanation” that we have up until now.

But that doesn’t follow at all. By contrast, we also have evidence that patterns in the internal world can affect those in the external world. They are no less common. But does that imply, for instance, that gravity “emerges from the complex[…] patterns in our” minds, and that “there’s no[thing] outside of” mental laws? Of course not. Drawing such a conclusion would be ridiculous not only to me but also to you. Yet it uses the same reasoning that you are using to try to establish your conclusion.

To make my point clearer.

[quote=“From “The Philosophy of David Hume” by Norman Kemp-Smith”]

Causal action, Hume points out, exhibits its effects on three different levels: in the purely physical sphere, as in the action of one billiard ball on another; in the pyschophysical sphere, in the action of body on mind, and of mind on body, as when changes in the body give rise to sensations in the mind, and when volition in the mind gives rise to movements in the limbs of the body; and thirdly, in the psychical domain, when the mind operates on itself, as when at will it raises a new idea in the imagination, or when some one passion operates on another.[…] In all three cases, on all three levels, Hume is careful to point out, we can observe in any one instance only sequence in time, and on the repetition of similar instances at most only invariableness in the sequence. Nor, Hume argues, is the nature of necessitation any more evident in the mental than in the physical realm. Thus when ‘at will’ we move a limb, though the movement comes as a fulfilment of the volition, it is not on that account, for us, more than a sequence of detached events. For what immediately follows upon the volition is not what is willed, the movement of the limb, but something not willed at all, viz. changes in the animal spirits, and in certain muscles and nerves.

[/quote]

So, to summarize, “necessary connections”, “causal connections”, exist (a) among things in the external world, like some waves on a shore, (b) among things in the internal world, like an idea on an emotion, (b) from things in the external world to those in the internal world, like some light of the senses, or (d) from things in the internal world to those in the external world, like the volition on the limbs.

So, in light of that, why are you raising the importance of the instances of the third kind above those of the second kind, why, when what we can observe of each of them is “at most only” an “invariableness in the sequence”, are you claiming that the former is more fundamental or more decisive than the latter?

[The_Late_Andrew_Ryan]

@ Jesse

“However, I don’t think that it is necessarily true. Just because every event has a cause doesn’t mean that ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ are meaningless concepts.”

True, but they are meaningless because value is subjective.

@smiling dave

“2. Similarly, the assumption of free will explains so much, [which the opposite assumption does not], that it has the same force of “it works” supporting it.”

My entire first statement was totally based off of the idea of praxeology, what you just said didn’t adress anything and how does free will make any sense whatsoever? How is it that human action can be unrelated to causality and human value preference not based off of the buildup of the brain and past events. The idea that there is no free will and that all actions are based off of these things explains this almost perfectly, please tell me how the idea of free wil does and how it is anything but nonesensical.

I still haven’t seen anyone really get down to the meat of the issue and move on from the deterministic/non deterministic debate and stated how it is that free will is even possible or what it would entail, nor has anyone adressed the original thought of the thread, that praxeology inherently means that free will as such cannot exist.

[Physiocrat]

@The Late Andrew Ryan

I still haven’t seen anyone really get down to the meat of the issue and move on from the deterministic/non deterministic debate and stated how it is that free will is even possible or what it would entail, nor has anyone adressed the original thought of the thread, that praxeology inherently means that free will as such cannot exist.

In essence all praxeology states is that choice demonstrates preference. It does not follow that a desire is causally related to the action, it could merely justify it; if this was the case it would sidestep Mises’ argument that all action is based on felt uneasiness. So free will and praxeology are compatible. Now the question is free will true and coherent? Here’s a revised version of an argument I gave in the thread I linked.

Libertarian free will (as opposed to compatibilism) is defined as the ability to choose A or non-A.

Is libertarian free will (LFW) true?

It is necessarily true since otherwise one couldn’t evaluate the truth value of the question “Is LFW true?” because you could only conclude what you were determined to do which gives no foundation for truth

There is one exception which would be if one were epistemologically infallible. This would then give a solid foundation for truth under determinism.

Yet this is obviously false since it is possible for me to argue, and believe to be true, that 2+2=3 which demonstrates that I must have varying degrees of determined fallibility (assuming determinism). And since fallible determinism gives no foundation for truth we must again reject determinism.

Therefore LFW is true.

What does this imply? (Or how can we metaphysically justify the existence of LFW)

We cannot be purely material beings since we would be determined by our neurological pathways or other laws of nature.

If we were then you are either stuck with cast iron laws of nature which results in cast ironly determined “choices”, or accept quantum randomness which implies a complete scatter gun type “choice”.

And as above this gives no foundation for truth and therefore must be rejected.

This implies then a substance dualism (trichotomy or more) of man since can provide a foundation for real choices as it can be neither random nor subject cast iron laws. At present I can’t elaborate on what this non-material substance is apart from the fact it provides the necessary metaphysical foundation for LFW.

Finally it implies that the will is basic and as such causes itself.

[nirgrahamUK]

It is necessarily true since otherwise one couldn’t evaluate the truth value of the question “Is LFW true?” because you could only conclude what you >>were determined to do which gives no foundation for truth

This is a non- sequitur…

You are in cast iron laws, do you say that a robot cannot have access to a ‘correct fact’ labelled as such in its databank simply because it is a program run on silicon ?

since fallible determinism gives no foundation for truth we must again reject determinism.

a persons knowing some truth is dependant on

1. the existance of some knowable truth
2. their ‘recognising/’ ‘appreciating’ /understanding’ ‘accepting’ of that truth (through what ever process of evidence and argument that they are determined to require

There is no need for a 3) they have a self-causing will outside of the nexus of cause and effect

3. has literally no-bearing on the matter, and the way it has been described is entirely spooky.

Similarly this stuff about the incompatablism between determinism and ‘choice’ is mistaken. Being determined creatures in a deterministic universe does not make it impossible to adopt an intentional or teleological stance, we can be determined to do so ! hence choice/agency are still accessible to us.

What is your relationship with ‘your’ basic and self-causing will ?

.

[Smiling_Dave]

Here are a few points I wish to raise.

A. Why do you ask me questions implying that I erred in writing what I wrote? I had no free will in the matter [by your lights], that’s why I wrote it.

B. Your original question in your OP is, correct me if I’m wrong, that what I want is determined by my heredity and by events that happened to me in the past. So that a computer that had the input of that would be able to predict exactly what I would do. meaning I have no free will.

If that is your original q, then you are of course hiding an assumption. Let me restate your argument in the form of a sylllogysm.

1. Man decides what to do based on his genes and his past AND NOTHING ELSE.

2. Therfore, Man decides what to do based on his genes and his past and nothing else.

The hidden assumption is in caps in line 1.

So although you make the assertion that nothing else influences a man’s decision, I fail to see how you have proved it.

C. OK, on to your q’s in this last post. You ask how what I wrote addresses your original post. I confess I was lax and without careful reading, thought you were using a different argument against free will.

You ask how does free will make any sense whatsoever. Let us use an analogy. You are saying “The game of chess can be played without queens on the board. Therfore queens do not exist.” Sure, if man had no free will, his past and genes would determine his next move. But he has free will as well, so that although his past and genes may exert pressure in one direction or another, there is a King sitting on the throne [man’s free will] who decides whether to listen to them, or to strike out on a new path.

You may say, “Sorry David, Occam’s razor has chopped own free will. Once we explain away man’s behavior by appeal to genes and past, no need for free will.”

To which I reply: Not quite. We all FEEL we are in charge of our decisions. How do you account for that?

Also, right down to the very last one of us ever to walk the earth, we all behave in the real world as if the other guy has free will. If he does something we do not like, we are offended and ask “Why did you do that?” How do you account for that?

So Ocamm’s razor, by trying to eliminate free will, has not just cut the hair and beard, but sliced into the very brain as well. In other words, it fails here.

Really to deny free will is as egregious an error as Aristotle DEDUCING how many teeth people have [as opposed to actually counting them]. Get out into the field and see what’s going on. You will stumble all over free will at every step.

[z1235]

@I. Ryan

But that doesn’t follow at all. By contrast, we also have evidence that patterns in the internal world can affect those in the external world.

The internal/external and mind/body dichotomies are false and unnecessary. EVERYTHING is bound by (and not free from) the same physical laws governing the universe. The ‘self’ with ‘free will’ is an emergent process/entity within this physical realm just like a wave is, only far more complex.

@I. Ryan

So, to summarize, “necessary connections”, “causal connections”, exist (a) among things in the external world, like some waves on a shore, (b) among things in the internal world, like an idea on an emotion, (b) from things in the external world to those in the internal world, like some light of the senses, or (d) from things in the internal world to those in the external world, like the volition on the limbs.

So, in light of that, why are you raising the importance of the instances of the third kind above those of the second kind, why, when what we can observe of each of them is “at most only” an “invariableness in the sequence”, are you claiming that the former is more fundamental or more decisive than the latter?

There are no TWO worlds (internal/external), hence no FOUR connections, hence no ‘raising of importance’ to speak of. The (internal) ‘self’ is wholly a part of ‘everything’, and the concept/model of ‘everything’ can only exist in a ‘self’ complex enough to comprehend it.

Z.

[K.C_Farmer]

Action based on a subjective value preference sounds a whole lot like free will to me.

[The_Late_Andrew_Ryan]

“A. Why do you ask me questions implying that I erred in writing what I wrote? I had no free will in the matter [by your lights], that’s why I wrote it.”

In effect this is our discussion according to my view.

1. I valued the idea of having the current idea in question debated and discussed, therefore I posted it on Mises.org because according to my perspective such was that the action of the posting would fulfill the above value preference. The value preference was either motivated by percieved past experiences and

2. You responded because of whatever value preference you held, but you valued the end of responding to me and your perspective, developed by the physical buildup of your brain and your past experiences which helped your preferences to develop

3. I responded because I was unsatisfied with your answer and felt that it overlooked the basic issue. I responded because I believe that by this response you will percieve my response and then respond to it because you value discussion and I would value your response. I simply responded to my pre-set value preferences, as did you. Neither of us had a choice upon the matter, simply responded to our environment based upon our perspectives all of which are based upon our past experiences as percieved by the way in which our brain is and was built up, in short, because of the physical universe.

4. You responded for similar reason as 2.

5. I responded for the same reason as 3.

Simply because I do not have a choice doesn’t mean that the brain does not respond to the physical universe.

“B. Your original question in your OP is, correct me if I’m wrong, that what I want is determined by my heredity and by events that happened to me in the past. So that a computer that had the input of that would be able to predict exactly what I would do. meaning I have no free will.”

Yes, in some ways my argument exists upon two levels. The first level consists of the fact that according to praxeology man acts according to his value preferences, which denies that there is a chioce per se, merely options the decision making process of which can never be overcome, denying freedom of will. The second level of the argument relies upon the way that value preferences are formed, which I cannot understand a world in which they are not based off of the physical universe both in the buildup of the brain itself, and the brain’s response to the physical universe. Buildup of the mind, and outside physical environment.

“So although you make the assertion that nothing else influences a man’s decision, I fail to see how you have proved it.”

I fail to see anything else that CAN effect it… Because in effect by encompassing the mind and the physical universe I have encompassed the universe… Have I forgotten something?

“But he has free will as well,”

How do you know?

“there is a King sitting on the throne [man’s free will] who decides whether to listen to them, or to strike out on a new path.”

And it must make this decision based off of its perspective and value preferences which are based off of the buildup of the mind and past events, it does not choose, it simply reacts based upon the above.

“Not quite. We all FEEL we are in charge of our decisions. How do you account for that?”

Because humans act in the only way that they consider sensible, which is the way that I have defined. They have a perspective and they have value preferences, because this is the way that the mind works how could one consider action in any other way? It is a sensible way to act and the only way that the mind CAN act, therefore why would we feel as though we are acting differently?

“we all behave in the real world as if the other guy has free will. If he does something we do not like, we are offended and ask “Why did you do that?” How do you account for that?”

I don’t and I daresay a fair number of people don’t. I act as though others react to their environment based upon value preferences determined by the buildup of their mind and percieved past events. If you reproach someone for say, swearing in an unfit circumstance, then you assume that they will percieve it and either give an appropriate explination or feel ashamed (respond to their environment blah blah blah you understand my argument by now) and in future act upon this new perspective and have change value preferences. Because he responds to his environment, as do you, you you’re compelled to perform this action based upon your values.

“Really to deny free will is as egregious an error as Aristotle DEDUCING how many teeth people have [as opposed to actually counting them]”

I would consider that to accept free will and deny my proposition would be exceedingly foolish and nonsensical, and would imply the utterly random man and defy praxeology itself. Furthermore what happened to your suspicion of inductive reasoning in your first statement?

[Smiling_Dave]

OK. I get the impression I do understand you. We are like trained monkeys, reacting to the world based on our previous training and initial makeup. We respond to stimuli, and in fact the stimuli are part of the never ending process of training we go through. But it’s all predictable. Someone who could crack our genetic code and has our past life on video would know exactly how we would respond to all future events that come our way.

Like I say, I just don’t buy it. You haven’t proven that we don’t have some leeway. You just assert it.

If you say that I haven’t proven my case either, I’m good with that. But I think I can do better.

“Not quite. We all FEEL we are in charge of our decisions. How do you account for that?”

Because humans act in the only way that they consider sensible, which is the way that I have defined. They have a perspective and they have value preferences, because this is the way that the mind works how could one consider action in any other way? It is a sensible way to act and the only way that the mind CAN act, therefore why would we feel as though we are acting differently?

Ah, but sometimes we are torn by internal conflict. Look at Hamlet. And plenty of others.

1. Do they consider it sensible to be torn? To suffer from indecision?

2. Also, why are they undecided at all? There is only one sensible way [in their opinion], right? And in fact, to quote you, there is only one way their mind CAN act. So what’s all the drama about?

If, however, we assume free will, it all makes sense suddenly. They have free will, and are exercising it. Their freedom gives them a few choices, and they don’t know which to choose.

I don’t and I daresay a fair number of people don’t. I act as though others react to their environment based upon value preferences determined by the buildup of their mind and percieved past events. If you reproach someone for say, swearing in an unfit circumstance, then you assume that they will percieve it and either give an appropriate explination or feel ashamed (respond to their environment blah blah blah you understand my argument by now) and in future act upon this new perspective and have change value preferences. Because he responds to his environment, as do you, you you’re compelled to perform this action based upon your values.

What you are saying is that you respond to others who offend you as one would to a dog who needs training, and you go ahead and train him.

But there is a lot more to it than that. Plenty of people make a MORAL JUDGEMENT about a person who, for example, keys their car, or does some other bit of harm to them unprovoked [or even provoked]. Where did that come from? Where did we get this ridiculous [according to you] idea that people are responsible for their acts, and that if they harm us for no reason, they are BAD or EVIL?

But if we accept what we all feel inside [not believe, feel] to be true, that we are in charge of our actions, and not puppets being pulled by the strings of our past and our genes, then we extrapolate and assume the other fellow is like that too. So if he had a choice and chose to zap us for no reason, we make a judgement about him. So that the assumption of free will explains that too.

Well, there ya go. Two bits of evidence that we have free will, indecision and moral judgements

One last point, not part of the main line of the argument. My suspicion of inductive reasoning is not mine, but me quoting Mises. Of course I agree with him, as it happens. Is there anybody who has a better argument for inductive reasoning but that “it works”?

There are plenty if problems with inductive reasoning, just saying. I’ve been seeing so called economists who see patterns that repeat themselves in some economic statistic or other, and inductively deduce that the pattern will repeat itself again. That’s besides the classical objections to it.

[zefreak]

Why not just read one of the several other threads on praxeology and free will that are on this forum? It’s a discussion I am interested in, but not several times in a row when much of your questions have already been answered previously.

Short answer: the question itself is confused

[Smiling_Dave]

It’s a discussion I am interested in, but not several times in a row when much of your questions have already been answered previously.

I just released the gun I held to your head forcing you to follow this thread. You may go now.

[Zeddicus]

That you will always choose what you value most doesn’t mean you don’t choose what you value…

[zefreak]

“That you will always choose what you value most doesn’t mean you don’t choose what you value…”

Any value that you can ‘choose’ is an instrumental value contingent on its satisfying some more fundamental value. How do you ‘choose’ between values? By what standards do you choose one value over another? Are your values determined by some set of meta-values? Can you choose those? Your argument is obviously circular.

[The_Late_Andrew_Ryan]

“We are like trained monkeys, reacting to the world based on our previous training and initial makeup. We respond to stimuli, and in fact the stimuli are part of the never ending process of training we go through.”

Basically although you seem to be intentionally using degrading language for a reason that I cannot understand.

“Someone who could crack our genetic code and has our past life on video would know exactly how we would respond to all future events that come our way.”

Possibly. If someone could understand the direct perspective that someone has at all times, then they would be able to predict all actions, but such is almost certianly impossible if you understand me.

"Ah, but sometimes we are torn by internal conflict. Look at Hamlet. And plenty of others.

1. Do they consider it sensible to be torn? To suffer from indecision?

2. Also, why are they undecided at all? There is only one sensible way [in their opinion], right? And in fact, to quote you, there is only one way their mind CAN act. So what’s all the drama about?"

A case of indecision simply means that the human mind values neither option over another enough to perform an action. They may or may not consider it sensible but it is the only option possible under those conditions… Indeed why do you believe that people are indecisive? Please tell me how you answer this question and how it doesn’t return to the question of value preference and the inability to determine which value preference is greater at any one time. There is also another possibility which runs like this: I have the option of either spending time with my mother or going and spending time with a friend. Immiediatly I may consider that the valueof spending time with the friend greater than that of spending time with my mother, however I may consider that there is a possibility that I may be misjudging my own value preferences, I value not making a mistake counteractive to my values, therefore I act (and must do so) according to my value preferences and do not act.

“If, however, we assume free will, it all makes sense suddenly. They have free will, and are exercising it. Their freedom gives them a few choices, and they don’t know which to choose.”

Above I explain further, the mind according to my theory has choices, but all of its actions are determined by inset preferences.

“But there is a lot more to it than that. Plenty of people make a MORAL JUDGEMENT about a person who, for example, keys their car, or does some other bit of harm to them unprovoked [or even provoked]. Where did that come from? Where did we get this ridiculous [according to you] idea that people are responsible for their acts, and that if they harm us for no reason, they are BAD or EVIL?”

Because people have value preferences, that’s all that morality is. I value my life and the lives and property of others to the point where I advocate violence to defend it. Also, people aren’t necessarily “responsible” depending upon your definition, but the fact is that these people who act in an “evil” manner have value preferences perspectives which directly result in a way that other people consider negative, they therefore consider these actions morally incorrect, it all comes down to value preference, but anyway this is also assuming that they have similar ideas that I do, the fact is that most people believe in free will and therefore act accordingly.

I’m not going to adress inductive V. deductive reasoning, this thing is bogged down enough as it is.

Please answer me three questions: How is free will compatable with praxeology? What determins decisions if not my given reasons? And what does free will entail according to your definition of the term?

[The_Late_Andrew_Ryan]

“That you will always choose what you value most doesn’t mean you don’t choose what you value…”

Please elaborate.

[I_Ryan]

@z1235

The internal/external and mind/body dichotomies are false and unnecessary.[…] There are no TWO worlds (internal/external), hence no FOUR connections, hence no ‘raising of importance’ to speak of.

Do you plan to try to substantiate that?

@z1235

EVERYTHING is bound by (and not free from) the same physical laws governing the universe.

But you said that “the internal/external[…] dichotom[y is] false”. Why are you saying that everything “is bound by the same physical laws” if you think that “the internal/external[…] dichotom[y is] false”? Why are you drawing a distinction between “physical” things and other things? Do you not realize that most people see the word “physical” as to contrast with “mental”, which is the same as the dichotomy between the external world and the internal, which you rejected? Why don’t you just say that “everything is bound by” the laws of everything? The only problem with that is that it wouldn’t be very interesting.

@z1235

The (internal) ‘self’ is wholly a part of ‘everything’, and the concept/model of ‘everything’ can only exist in a ‘self’ complex enough to comprehend it.

Why is that relevant? When did I assume that the “self” is not “a part of everything”? How does establishing that a “model of everything can only exist in a self complex enough to comprehend it” helpful in establishing your point?

[Smiling_Dave]

Basically although you seem to be intentionally using degrading language for a reason that I cannot understand.

The reason is to point out that the human race considers itself dignified and important, and asserting we have no free will detracts from that dignity. And although that is not a logical argument for free will, it is something worth hinting at.

Indeed why do you believe that people are indecisive? Please tell me how you answer this question and how it doesn’t return to the question of value preference and the inability to determine which value preference is greater at any one time.

The vision that comes to mind when I think of indecision is when a person feels a tremendous instinctual urge for his friend’s hot willing wife, but he also feels it’s wrong to betray his friend. He feels both these feelings incredibly strongly. I get the impression that in many instances there is some third party in him, the King on his throne as mentioned in an earlier post, that freely and willingly makes up his mind what to do. That’s free will. Why does he decide what he decides? By weighing the pros and cons in some balance, with a little finger on that side of the scale that he really wants. And what I’m claiming, and I don’t think can be disproven, and that many people FEEL inside them, is that this decision is unpredictable. It is not made by his genes and his past. It is made by him at the spur of the moment. That’s free will.

but the fact is that these people who act in an “evil” manner have value preferences perspectives which directly result in a way that other people consider negative, they therefore consider these actions morally incorrect,

True as far as it goes, but it goes further than that. Many people not only consider the ACTIONS morally incorrect, but also consider THE PERSON WHO DID THE DEED to be an evil person. But they don’t consider the dog who tries to hump their leg evil. People think humans are different, that THEY HAVE FREE WILL. Why? Because as I mentioned, they feel that they are like that, and that therfor every human is like that. Where did this feeling come from? It’s something we just KNOW. Like we know many things by introspection.

OK, the three q’s:

Free will is compatible because prax just says people do things as means to an end. It doesn’t say they are doomed by genes and past to choose one particular means and end. That is your extra layer of cream on the cake.

What determines decisions is our power of decision making, that we all sense we have. Just as what solves a math problem is our problem solving ability. Both are gifts we are born with potentially, and blossom as we mature.

Free will entails the power of a human being to rise above his genes and past and decide for himself what he wants to do.

[z1235]

@I. Ryan

Do you plan to try to substantiate that?

You want me to substantiate that the physical laws INSIDE your head are the SAME as the physical laws OUTSIDE your head? Wouldn’t it be easier for you to substantiate the opposite?

@I. Ryan

Do you not realize that most people see the word “physical” as to contrast with “mental”, which is the same as the dichotomy between the external world and the internal, which you rejected?

“Mental” and “internal” are merely complex physical patterns, nothing more. They both can’t and needn’t be anything more than that.

@I. Ryan

Why don’t you just say that “everything is bound by” the laws of everything? The only problem with that is that it wouldn’t be very interesting.

Here: “Everything is bound by the laws of everything.” And you’re right, as others have already pointed out, this “problem” is not very interesting. Feels like we’re moving away from a productive exchange.