Estoppel - Argumentation Ethics - Aggression

[Harry_Felker]

@liberty student

an aggressor cannot coherently object to being punished for the act of aggression, by the victim or the victim’s agents or heirs,

I understand that the aggressor cannot claim a right to non-aggression, but I’m not sure that validates aggression against the aggressor. I am not referring to self-defense, but punishment.

If I understand this correctly, Let us say I am a criminal and I beat you up and take your money…

You are justified in fighting back and taking the money, acquiring assistance to do such, and in the event you are killed in the crime or the derivative condition there of, your heirs are justified similarly.

Estoppel is the theory that keeps me from legitimately retaliating against justified aggression towards me

@liberty student

The problem I have (and could be totally wrong on) is that a particular action can transmute or nullify a principle.

I see this with anti-capitalists/mutualists sometimes, when people claim that you can steal from WalMart because WalMart is a state fiction (corporation) and because the state is illegit, then WalMart technically has no ownership.

But it seems to me that just because the state licenses something, doesn’t invalidate the contract or the title to the property being licensed. If that was so, it would be an internal contradiction, because if the state is illegit, then how can it legitimately transmute property titles from one form to another? Surely they revert to their original form (if they ever left their original form at all).

I’m having trouble explaining this with regards to estoppel, but that if someone can create exception to the NAP by aggression, then does aggression invalidate non-aggression?

Anyone with me?

Tell me if I got this right

Someone proposes the Corporation of Walmart cannot own property X because it is a state creation (Corp) and the state is illegitamate…

Then who owns property X?

Is the original owner of property X being paid by these theives?

And would the theory of state illegitamacy then revert Walmart to a business owned by a group of people (unlicensed), therefore it is still stealing from them, who are laying out the capital for property X to reach the market?

I am thinking, and I could be wrong, despite my having a corp license from the state, I am in business to sell property, capital was used by me to generate this property and bring it to the market for trade, the license is irrelevant to the fact that I am in business, aside from protecting me from the state using its aggressive powers against me for being unlicensed. So it would still be stealing from me if you stole my product, despite the state license

@liberty student

I’m having trouble explaining this with regards to estoppel, but that if someone can create exception to the NAP by aggression, then does aggression invalidate non-aggression?

Would it not make sense that NA is the rule but when it is violated by aggression it is answered and succinctly forgotten, without the right od self defense and estoppel you have the issue where those that do not respect NAP will constantly either: bring aggression against you because NAP will not let you retaliate/seek retribution, or a vendetta scenario, where NAP is thrown out the window…

I could be wrong, but I am trying to understand…

[liberty_student]

@Harry Felker

Estoppel is the theory that keeps me from legitimately retaliating against justified aggression towards me

That’s actually pretty good Harry.

@Harry Felker

Tell me if I got this right

Someone proposes the Corporation of Walmart cannot own property X because it is a state creation (Corp) and the state is illegitamate…

It’s nonsense, I just used it for illustrative purposes because I knew at least NSK would know what I was talking about. This sort of anti-capitalist stuff comes from people who have never operated a lemonade stand.

@Harry Felker

I could be wrong, but I am trying to understand…

You and me both.

[hayekianxyz]

@liberty student

This sort of anti-capitalist stuff comes from people who have never operated a lemonade stand.

When we abolish capitalism, the rivers will turn to lemonade and we will have no use for lemonade stands. How did you not hear about this comrade?

[Stephen_Forde]

@JackCuyler

@Brainpolice

In fact, such a line of argument is little more than a rhetoric trick. It purposefully ignores any argument I may present and ends up being a nice driveby “I win” sort of thing. “You did bad thing X, therefore you cannot have a rational argument against anyone in the world doing bad thing X to you”.

But that is not the case at all. It’s not, “You did bad thing X, therefore you cannot have a rational argument against anyone in the world doing bad thing X to you,” but rather, “You did bad thing X, therefore you cannot have a rational argument against the victim of bad thing X doing bad thing X to you.”

Actually, he has it right.

[Stephen_Forde]

@Thedesolateone

@Stephen Forde

@Thedesolateone

The key problem for me with regards to action vs. previously occurred (and not ongoing) aggression is of knowledge/uncertainty.

Every judicial judgement is subjective not only in its terms, but also in its verdict (i.e. guilty or not guilty). There is no objective proof that one can provide that an individual is an aggressor. Thus, while there me be some situations where it would be moral to aggress against an “aggressor” after the event; we can never practically experience any of these situations because we will be unable to say someone is indubitably guilty.

What if someone mugs you? Innocent unless absolutely proven guilty. You would still want to error on the side of caution?

If I say no, then unlimited pre-emptive violence is judged morally right.

You have to reject aggressive initiatory violence totally or accept it - otherwise you’re drawing arbitrary lines.

EDIT: Sorry for posting without catching up, I wasn’t thinking.

The point is that if we adopt your standard, your hands are tied and there’s nothing you can do after the fact, retribution or otherwise.

[JackCuyler]

@Stephen Forde

@JackCuyler

But that is not the case at all. It’s not, “You did bad thing X, therefore you cannot have a rational argument against anyone in the world doing bad thing X to you,” but rather, “You did bad thing X, therefore you cannot have a rational argument against the victim of bad thing X doing bad thing X to you.”

Actually, he has it right.

From the original post: “Kinsella argues that an aggressor cannot coherently object to being punished for the act of aggression, by the victim or the victim’s agents or heirs…”

[Stephen_Forde]

It’s not like negative proofs are a new thing. For example there’s Cantor’s diagonal argument, Godel’s incompleteness theorem. Within the Special Theory of Relativity, Einstein prooves negatively that there is no arbitrary frame of reference for measuring the passage of time or the distance between two objects.

So,

Is the correctness presupposed in these cases as well?

Is actual justification absent here as well?

Are these negative proofs also not really proofs as well?

Maybe Godel is also blocked by natural end ethics.

What’s the difference between Hoppe or Kinsella style negative proofs and anybody elses? They seem just as good to me.

[Stephen_Forde]

@JackCuyler

@Stephen Forde

@JackCuyler

But that is not the case at all. It’s not, “You did bad thing X, therefore you cannot have a rational argument against anyone in the world doing bad thing X to you,” but rather, “You did bad thing X, therefore you cannot have a rational argument against the victim of bad thing X doing bad thing X to you.”

Actually, he has it right.

From the original post: “Kinsella argues that an aggressor cannot coherently object to being punished for the act of aggression, by the victim or the victim’s agents or heirs…”

I know what Kinsella says. His proof is more general though. He is also estopped from objecting to any third party because he has already demonstrated that he thinks aggression is an acceptable norm. There is nothing about his inability to object that is victim-specific.

[Harry_Felker]

@GilesStratton

@liberty student

This sort of anti-capitalist stuff comes from people who have never operated a lemonade stand.

When we abolish capitalism, the rivers will turn to lemonade and we will have no use for lemonade stands. How did you not hear about this comrade?

No Giles, that is just urine, it is from all the people realizing that with the death of capitalism comes the death of freedom…

[Knight_of_BAAWA]

I find some similarities between Kinsella’s estoppel approach and Narveson’s “being able to complain” in his writings on contractarianism. Specifically, pages 146-7 (ppb) of The Libertarian Idea, where Narveson writes:

Now if morality is an artificial construct, a rational convention, then those who have refused to make any deals acceptable to others are in the condition of rulelessness–in the Hobbesian “state of nature”. Hobbes himself characterizes this condition in an unfortunate way: that everyone has a “right of nature” to do whatever he or she thinks is best, no matter what it is. As we noted back in Part One, that is a useless, nonsensical employment of the term “right” and should be dropped. Much less misleading, as we have seen, is to say that in the Hobbesian state of nature nobody has any rights, period. And therefore nobody has the protections inherent in a moral system where people accept rules that limit what they may do to others. These are rules that those others have reason to accept on if they likewise extendbenefits to them. And whoever has not made the deal is someone with respect to whom no bets are on, no limitations authorized; and therefore people may do whatever they wish with them. Note that the ‘may’ here is normative. The person who signs no agreements is a person such that anyone else, willing to sign an agreement of mutual advantage, does have the moral right to deal with that person as he may. No one may blame him for doing so.

[nskinsella]

but aggression means the initiation of force. if you use force in response to aggression, this is not aggression. So estoppel shows why responsive force–not aggression–is justified.

[nskinsella]

“I find some similarities between Kinsella’s estoppel approach and Narveson’s “being able to complain” in his writings on contractarianism”

There are lots of similarities – I have collected a bunch of them at "
[Quotes on the Logic of Liberty]
(http://blog.mises.org/archives/007967.asp)"

[Amanojack]

The estoppel theory assumes all argumentation concerning punishment must be based on objective ethics. Why? A murderer could easily “argue” against the death penalty on utilitarian grounds, just as anyone could. He just (perhaps) cannot consistently say, “You objectively ought not hang me!” But so what?

[nskinsella]

Agreed, he could “say” it, just like he could disregard the most Perfect Proof of Rights Imaginable. This just means that it’s possible for injustice to occur. Not a very eye-opening insight.

[scineram]

You cannot coherently object to your girlfriend being seduced because you did that previously yourself.

This will sell well.

[Knight_of_BAAWA]

It’s about consistency.

[nskinsella]

@scineram

You cannot coherently object to your girlfriend being seduced because you did that previously yourself.

This will sell well.

Wel–“selling well”–persuasion–is what modern libertarianism is about, no? Not about truth.

[wilderness]

@nskinsella

Wel–“selling well”–persuasion–is what modern libertarianism is about, no? Not about truth.

ain’t that the truth[Y]

[Amanojack]

@nskinsella

Agreed, he could “say” it, just like he could disregard the most Perfect Proof of Rights Imaginable. This just means that it’s possible for injustice to occur. Not a very eye-opening insight.

You responded as if my point was that he could say something, but it wasn’t. I made three separate points, but the above addresses none of them. I don’t expect a reply, but if you’re going to reply you may as well address what I asked:

1. The estoppel theory assumes all argumentation concerning punishment must be based on objective ethics. Why?
2. A murderer could easily “argue” against the death penalty on utilitarian grounds, just as anyone could.
3. He just (perhaps) cannot consistently say, “You objectively ought not hang me!” But so what?

[nskinsella]

@AJ

@nskinsella

Agreed, he could “say” it, just like he could disregard the most Perfect Proof of Rights Imaginable. This just means that it’s possible for injustice to occur. Not a very eye-opening insight.

You responded as if my point was that he could say something, but it wasn’t. I made three separate points, but the above addresses none of them. I don’t expect a reply, but if you’re going to reply you may as well address what I asked:

1. The estoppel theory assumes all argumentation concerning punishment must be based on objective ethics. Why?
2. A murderer could easily “argue” against the death penalty on utilitarian grounds, just as anyone could.
3. He just (perhaps) cannot consistently say, “You objectively ought not hang me!” But so what?

Re 1: can you explain what you mean? I do not recall having said or implied that “all argumentation concerning punishment must be based on objective ethics”.

re 2: what is the question?

re 3: so then the people desiring to hang him feel justified in proceeding, since he has failed to mount a coherent objection to their prima facie case that they may treat him as he treated his victim.