Estoppel - Argumentation Ethics - Aggression

[nskinsella]

Update: Another interesting thread is the anti-state.com forum The Great Hoppe Debate, which discussed Defending Argumentation Ethics: Reply to Murphy & Callahan; see also Hülsmann on Argumentation Ethics; Revisiting Argumentation Ethics, Mises and Argumentation Ethics.

[Angurse]

@AJ

The estoppel theory assumes all argumentation concerning punishment must be based on objective ethics.

Why? Couldn’t it just be a basis of some common law?

[wilderness]

AJ has that objective/subjective, monopoly/not-monopoly so stuck in his mind i don’t think he has been able to understand the strawman and red herrings it ensues.

[Amanojack]

@nskinsella

@AJ

1. The estoppel theory assumes all argumentation concerning punishment must be based on objective ethics. Why?
2. A murderer could easily “argue” against the death penalty on utilitarian grounds, just as anyone could.
3. He just (perhaps) cannot consistently say, “You objectively ought not hang me!” But so what?

Re 1: can you explain what you mean? I do not recall having said or implied that “all argumentation concerning punishment must be based on objective ethics”.

Your argument states, [emphasis mine] “It makes no sense for him to object to punishment, because this requires that he maintain that the infliction of force is wrong, which is contradictory because he intentionally initiated force himself.”

The notions of object (verb) and wrong apparently mean “object on the basis of objective ethical principles” and “objectively wrong,” respectively. If this were not the case, the above statement, “It makes no sense for him to…” wouldn’t hold.

In particular:

@AJ

A murderer could easily “argue” against the death penalty on utilitarian grounds, just as anyone could.

Why does it “make no sense for him to object to punishment” in this way? Your argument seems to implicitly assume that neither a subjective objection, nor one based on consequences, really count as an objection. Hence it seems, to be clear, that you’re in fact talking about the concept of objective ethical objection.

@nskinsella

re 3: so then the people desiring to hang him feel justified in proceeding, since he has failed to mount a coherent objection to their prima facie case that they may treat him as he treated his victim.

To summarize, we posit that the man cannot consistently say, “You objectively ought not hang me!” You conclude, “so then the people desiring to hang him feel justified in proceeding.” It seems clear, then, that justified here in fact means objectively justified. You go on to state, “he has failed to mount a coherent objection…” It seems clear, again, that objection means objection on the basis of objective ethical principles.

The argument then carries no force for anyone who rejects the concept of objective ethics (as being incoherent, flawed, etc.). Perhaps that was your intention (i.e., anyone who doesn’t feel ethics are objective need not be considered), but I feel this needs to be pointed out. I also wonder why, in the first place, you presuppose objective ethics as a meaningful concept.

[Amanojack]

Re: Hoppe’s argumentation ethics, I still haven’t seen a convincing response to this:

@Hoppe

Arguing is an activity and requires a person’s exclusive control over scarce resources (one’s brain, vocal chords, etc.).

So far so good.

@Hoppe

More specifically, as long as there is argumentation, there is a mutual recognition of each other’s exclusive control over such resources.

Here Hoppe can charitably be interpreted in one of two ways:

• Interpretation 1: Recognition = acknowledgment of the fact of “each other’s exclusive control over such resources.”
• Interpretation 2: Recognition = acknowledgment of each other’s right of exclusive control over such resources.

@Hoppe

It is this which explains the unique feature of communication: that while one may disagree about what has been said, it is still possible to independently agree at least on the fact that there is disagreement.

Note that this implies Interpretation (1) above, and does not imply Interpretation (2). So far he consistently means (1); no equivocation yet.

@Hoppe

(Lomasky does not seem to dispute this. He claims, however, that it merely proves the fact of mutually exclusive domains of control, not the right of self-ownership. He errs: Whatever - such as the law of contradiction, for instance - must be presupposed insofar as one argues, cannot be meaningfully disputed, because it is the very precondition of meaningful doubt, and hence must be regarded as indisputable, or a priori valid.

This still implies Interpretation (1), and not (2), because at best only the fact of “each other’s exclusive control over such resources” need be presupposed, and only that fact cannot be meaningfully disputed. One could of course meaningfully dispute the right of exclusive control without pressupposing such a right. All that is actually required is presupposition of the fact, not the right. Lomasky may be wrong (or not), but in any case Hoppe must still intend Interpretation (1) here if Hoppe is to be interpreted charitably.

Note that switching to Interpretation (2) without explicit reference to that switch would be a bald equivocation. So far, Hoppe is in the clear.

@Hoppe

In the same vein, the fact of self-ownership is a praxeological precondition of argumentation. Anyone trying to prove or disprove anything must in fact be a self-owner.

If his argument is to coherently follow from what he wrote above, Hoppe must here define “the fact of self-ownership” as “the fact of ‘each other’s exclusive control over such resources’.” And he must define “self-owner” as “one who has ‘exclusive control over such resources’.”

Hoppe still clearly means Interpretation (1) above. Still no equivocation.

@Hoppe

It is a self-contradictory absurdity then to ask for any further-reaching justification for this fact. Required, of necessity, by all meaningful argumentation, self-ownership is an absolutely and ultimately justified fact.)

From above, all Hoppe is saying here is, “each other’s exclusive control over such resources” is an absolutely and ultimately justified fact. But the dear reader will note that this statement - taken at face value - does not imply Hoppe’s argumentation ethics (right to exclusive control), only argumentation facts (fact of exclusive control).

No, for Hoppe’s purposes, the sentence will have to carry the implication that “the right of self-ownership is an absolutely and ultimately justified fact.”

Unfortunately, Hoppe can only achieve this by equivocating between Interpretation (1) and Interpretation (2).

[twistedbydsign99]

@Hoppe

(Lomasky does not seem to dispute this. He claims, however, that it merely proves the fact of mutually exclusive domains of control, not the right of self-ownership. He errs: Whatever - such as the law of contradiction, for instance - must be presupposed insofar as one argues, cannot be meaningfully disputed, because it is the very precondition of meaningful doubt, and hence must be regarded as indisputable, or a priori valid.

Hoppe is arguing that the right of self ownership cannot be meaningfully disputed. I think that is the only way to read this, not interpretation 1.

[Angurse]

@AJ

Your argument states, [emphasis mine] “It makes no sense for him to object to punishment, because this requires that he maintain that the infliction of force is wrong, which is contradictory because he intentionally initiated force himself.”

The notions of object (verb) and wrong apparently mean “object on the basis of objective ethical principles” and “objectively wrong,” respectively. If this were not the case, the above statement, “It makes no sense for him to…” wouldn’t hold.

Not to speak for Kinsella’s approach theory of estoppel, but I don’t think your critique is that damning.

In a situation where there were were no rules at all - no wrong, no right - you would have absolutely no ground to complain at all… about anything..ever. So in a situation where right and wrong are artificially constructed or arrived at, someone who ignored said contract could be treated quite fairly…as being in the first situation. In a non-objectionable state of nature.

[Amanojack]

@Angurse

In a situation where there were were no rules at all - no wrong, no right - you would have absolutely no ground to complain at all… about anything..ever.

This is circular.

Also note that what I wrote wasn’t meant to be “damning” but simply to demonstrate the underlying assumption of objective ethics in Kinsella’s argument.

[Angurse]

@AJ

This is circular.

Without rules how can one object?

@AJ

Also note that what I wrote wasn’t meant to be “damning” but simply to demonstrate the underlying assumption of objective ethics in Kinsella’s argument.

I have yet to see it.

[Juan]

This is circular.

Can you please define the words :

1. this
2. is
3. circular

[Stephen_Forde]

@AJ

@Angurse

In a situation where there were were no rules at all - no wrong, no right - you would have absolutely no ground to complain at all… about anything..ever.

This is circular.

Also note that what I wrote wasn’t meant to be “damning” but simply to demonstrate the underlying assumption of objective ethics in Kinsella’s argument.

Hey AJ

There is an underlying assumption of objective meaning in the words you are using. I haven’t seen you demonstrate it though. Can you do that for us please, in a way that is non-circular?

[Amanojack]

@Angurse

@AJ

This is circular.

Without rules how can one object?

You implied rules meant right and wrong, which implies that the concept of objection (or as you said, “ground to complain”) is about right and wrong. I am asking why, but you are essentially saying, “Because.”

[Amanojack]

@Stephen

There is an underlying assumption of objective meaning in the words you are using. I haven’t seen you demonstrate it though. Can you do that for us please, in a way that is non-circular?

Conflating objective factual meaning with objective ethical meaning is a red herring.

[wilderness]

AJ, and you going on and on about objective/subjective is a red herring. logical fallacy of tu quoque

[Stephen_Forde]

@AJ

@Stephen

There is an underlying assumption of objective meaning in the words you are using. I haven’t seen you demonstrate it though. Can you do that for us please, in a way that is non-circular?

Conflating objective factual meaning with objective ethical meaning is a red herring.

No AJ,

Your main criticism is that Kinsella is assuming that ethics are objective without demonstrating it, even though he has already pointed out that one must assume a framework of interpersonally meaningful rights framework, to even argue over rights. So, I’m just applying your argument, more generally, to your argument. Can you prove that the words you are using, to criticize Kinsella, have an objective meaning?

Can you give an actual answer this time. k thanx.

[twistedbydsign99]

@Stephen

No AJ,

Your main criticism is that Kinsella is assuming that ethics are objective without demonstrating it, even though he has already pointed out that one must assume a framework of interpersonally meaningful rights framework, to even argue over rights. So, I’m just applying your argument, more generally, to your argument. Can you prove that the words you are using, to criticize Kinsella, have an objective meaning?

Can you give an actual answer this time. k thanx.

I’m not sure thats fair, to prove his words have objective meaning, he would have to show that other people can understand his words the same way. A proof that involves other people like that is sorta mean to ask for

[wilderness]

@Stephen

Your main criticism is that Kinsella is assuming that ethics are objective without demonstrating it, even though he has already pointed out that one must assume a framework of interpersonally meaningful rights framework, to even argue over rights. So, I’m just applying your argument, more generally, to your argument. Can you prove that the words you are using, to criticize Kinsella, have an objective meaning?

good point. so my tu quoque was in haste. i apologize. it’s more of AJ’s alone straw man that i got caught up in.

[wilderness]

@twistedbydsign99

I’m not sure thats fair, to prove his words have objective meaning, he would have to show that other people can understand his words the same way. A proof that involves other people like that is sorta mean to ask for

I wouldn’t say it’s mean. It’s how any dialogue happens in the first place. If what AJ is saying has no meaning for anybody else, then AJ isn’t saying anything of value to anybody else. It’s a valid inquiry.

[Amanojack]

@Stephen

Your main criticism is that Kinsella is assuming that ethics are objective without demonstrating it, even though he has already pointed out that one must assume a framework of interpersonally meaningful rights framework, to even argue over rights. So, I’m just applying your argument, more generally, to your argument. Can you prove that the words you are using, to criticize Kinsella, have an objective meaning?

Let’s not get ahead of ourselves. I never said Kinsella’s words don’t have objective meaning, and never asked him to prove they do, so why ask me to prove my words have objective meaning?

What I did say was, he presupposes objective ethics as a meaningful concept. If you accept objective ethics and see it as a meaningful concept, how can you see that as a criticism? It seems to me you would say, “Yes, he does, and you should, too.” And maybe, “Here’s why:” In other words, you could lament the fact that I don’t see the meaning of this concept, and you could try to convince me. But I have not attempted to disprove objective ethics. I have simply pointed this out and asked why.

[wilderness]

i don’t see any meaning/value in what you, AJ, say.