Thats the point. Objection is implied within the rules. Rules are guides/principles that govern behaviour - a manner of defining whats right and wrong - Again I ask, how exactly can one complain (raise a formal objection) without first referring to the rules?
I think by using the word “formal” before objection you may be trying to emphasize that the definition of objection has to be about right and wrong (maybe objective right and wrong). It’s this curious definitional structure that I’m trying to understand the reason for.
Again, I’m basically saying, why define objection in this way? What is wrong with an objection based on consequences (for example)?
Maybe I can save time by pointing out that if the answer is, “An objection based on consequences isn’t a real objection,” then it starts to seem as if this whole notion of estopping oneself from objecting is conceived in a very narrow context of what constitutes an objection. And to that, I would again want to ask why.
I’m using “formal” to make the type of complaint consistent with the theory. For instance, if you were currently at the gallows and you exclaimed that you ought not to be hanged because “dying looks like a drag” that could be considered a colloquial objection, but it isn’t an actual (formal) objection as it only contains a personal bias and ignores the legality (and morality) of what is transpiring (which is the purpose of estoppel).
As estoppel is a legal (narrow) doctrine, why shouldn’t it use specialised (narrow) terms and concepts? Nobody is saying that you cannot claim that you shouldn’t be hanged because, say, you’ll “make an ugly corpse.” Simply, that you cannot object on within terms of the rules (right/wrong).
I thought it was an ethical doctrine, like Hoppe’s AE. (I realize estoppel in its common meaning originated as a purely legal concept…) Edit to your edit: If it’s about right and wrong, isn’t it ethical, not legal? We may end up having to define these terms more precisely.
Otherwise it seems we’re perilously close to legal central planning (never mind that the other way would be akin to ethical central planning, but at least I’ve heard the argument against that: natural rights).
No. The original point of contention I made was that it, at the very least, could be a legal doctrine. But Legal doctrines still cover ethical subjects such as murder.
Again, as I said before, it could just be a common law system. Common law isn’t centrally planned.
Ah, I see - so we’re not talking about Kinsella’s position per se. Now if it’s a legal doctrine, I gather you agree that someone could object to the whole system (noting of course that that wouldn’t carry any legal force as an objection)? If your answer is yes there, then we may be in agreement. And I concur it could still cover ethical subjects like murder, but it seems the estoppel argument then wouldn’t strictly be saying anything ethical about those subjects, but only saying something legal about them.
Fair enough. But just to be clear, doesn’t that relegate the (legal) estoppel theory to the status of either “suggestion” or “prediction” for common law?
Can you explain to me why the individual should behave morally?
Because you can’t. Or can you? - Fancy giving it a shot?
Also do you believe in absolute truth?
Who determines whether the consequences are good or bad? What does that have to do with justice and the law?
Are you able to explain why an individual should behave morally? What are your objections to stealing, murder, rape?
K, fine. I’ll bite.
Objectivity and subjectivity arise insofar as statements are agent relative (applying to some) and agent neutral (applying to all). Ethical statements are imperative/normative instead of descriptive or causal/logical. Because certain rules/modes/conventions must be followed for someone to even demand that someone else follow a certain rule or convention, those rules/modes/conventions are agent neutral and objective a priori.
Now, can you give me an answer to my question?
An objection is an imperative statement. You’re demand that a person not act in a certain manner.
An objection based on consequences isn’t a real objection, at least within Kinsella’s context. Appealing to consequences is also appealling to the preference of the individual about to enguage in the action that you prefer them not to. It is an attempt to show them that they are in error and that the end result of the action, contrary to their beliefs, will result in a state of affairs which would reduce their present state of satisefaction relative to a state of affairs in which they abstained. It is a desciptive argument, not an imperative one.
Yes AJ,
As I’ve already said, I’m not speaking for Kinsella:
I’ve just been showing how the Estoppel Theory can be applied without it having to be based of objective ethics. I actually think that one of the major benefits behind the estoppel theory is that it doesn’t say anything about ethics, which is a far cry from being based on them. I think the estoppel theory of Kinsella draws the same approach as Hoppe’s AE, from what I’ve read he proposes it as a legal theory of punishment, not necessarily a strict ethical theory. (To be fair, I haven’t read in detail much about Kinsella’s Estoppel or Hoppe’s AE)
Sure. Is there a problem with making suggestions?
Unlike Kinsella, I’m not proposing any moral, ethical, or legal standards. Why would I be interested in this question?
I would love to give it a shot, if anyone could define it as a meaningful concept.
For example? If you mean, do I believe statements like, “Something can’t be both green and not green at the same time,” then definitely yes.
If I say, “If you hang me, you’ll feel guilty” (for instance), and the listener agrees and decides that he doesn’t want to feel guilty, he may refrain. The net consequences would be “good or bad,” meaning here desirable or undesirable for him.
Depends on a lot of things - how we define justice, what the legal system is, what we deem to be the purview of a legal system, etc. In the end, people who make the law will decide to make it to suit whatever interests they have, even if their interests are - for example - to implement Kinsella’s estoppel.
I don’t see any role for ethical central planning or central judgment. My personal objections matter only insofar as I personally get to decide the law, no? My personal “objections” to such acts would just consist of explanations as to why those things are contrary to my interests as well as what I can only presume to be the interests of others (can’t say for sure because I’m not them). If I can get people to see why doing such things is not in their interests, and why punishing those things is in their interest, that seems to me the most likely way to convince them to refrain from and/or punish such acts.
Thank you for the clear statement. I do see what you mean. However, this seems to apply only, as you say, to those who wish to “demand that someone else follow a certain rule or convention.” There are two modes of arguing on one’s own behalf that make sense to me: 1. Trying to convince others that their self-interests may align with mine (ex: “Don’t hang me or this bad thing may result for you”), and 2. Working within others’ moral or legal frameworks to convince them that their law or their morality is consistent with some result that I want. What you seem to be getting at with “demand that someone else follow a certain rule or convention” just seems a subset of mode 1. To put a finer point on it, I don’t see the purpose of trying to convince others to follow an entire rule or convention when all you really need or want is for others to give you a specific result (which could be the product of a theoretically infinite set of possible rules or conventions that happen to agree on that result).
The one about proving my words have objective meaning? I already covered that one - if it’s a different one let me know.
I agree with this. From that angle, I guess my point would be, again not be blunt, but so what? What do I lose by not being able to make an imperative statement? (Or not being able to consistently make an imperative statement.) What negative consequence do I experience?
Sorry that I missed that.
OK, so I’m saying that if it’s a legal doctrine, I gather you agree that someone could object to the whole system (noting of course that that wouldn’t carry any legal force as an objection)? If yes, we agree.
Not at all [Y]
Of course.
See AJ. This is why the subjective/objective is a red herring. Thanks Angurse for guiding him through this.
AJ. If you agree with Conza that rape is wrong, because it is your personal objection - then - no point in arguing with Conza seeing that you both agree on that issue. Unless of course you don’t object to rape.
I do expect we all agree, in the end. It’s just the words that need clarifying. [Edit: This comment was meant in the deepest sense, not an off-hand or surface-level observation.]
No. It’s not the words that need clarified. It’s that you need to understand that Conza is talking about the same thing you are. Don’t you see the irony. you go on and on about how you don’t like words but then you nit-pick and focus on words - WHEN - you even admit you are talking about the same thing as Conza. You are stuck and waste energy on divide and conquer - when - you are dividing and conquering the very thing you agree with.
edit: ALL posts are hopefully of the deepest sense. None more necessarily special than any other.
You’re unable to justify yourself. Something which normal civilized people care about. Something which you care about as well, as is illistrated by your attacks on objective ethical theories.
Since I’m a consequentialist I have to respond to this 
Couldn’t it be that the appeal to consequence is an appeal to the other persons preference? Like “I know you really prefer libertarianism, so don’t you think that causing force to be initiated would be immoral?” In other words one could object that the consequences would show a self contradiction.