The NAP or some other subjective morality must already exist for belief or disbelief in the lifeboat lie to even be applicable, because the lifeboat lie is the notion that the state must commit necessary evils or else society will self-destruct.
Just because a notion can be defined, doesn’t mean it’s real.
Being an ethical subjectivist does not make me an “everything-subjectivist”. I believe in objective facts. I just don’t believe moral valuations qualify as objective facts.
So, who cares about anything you believe, morality-wise ? I’m not saying that in a confrontational manner, only trying to point out that your subjective ethics are in practice meaningless, except as a personal ‘preference’.
So the NAP is an illusion and there is nothing that can be called the NAP even in practice?
So there isn’t an act called the NAP that can be pointed out and defined?
So from what I gather since the NAP, as you lead on, is only an illusion and can’t be pointed out in practice and defined, that’s the case the ethical subjectivists are making as to how the NAP isn’t applicable? But give an example of how the NAP isn’t applicable in such a case? Not how it can be violated, but how the NAP isn’t applicable in a certain situation and can actually cause harm to a person/property.
Rothbard said he hated the state “from his belly”. And I suspect most here do too. But like I think Rothbard did, I think many libertarians worry that without an objective, universal purely rationalistic ethical doctrine, people won’t adhere to libertarian principles. So they are trying to concoct, or convince themselves to believe in, incoherent ethical theories basically on practical strategic grounds. I’m arguing that that is not necessary: that we don’t have perform embarrassingly awkward philosophical back-flips to convince mankind that assault, plunder, and enslavement are wrong. In fact, if anything, such doctrines will open up libertarianism itself to being “refuted” like AJ so insightfully pointed out, or to being dismissed as being based on ridiculous over-cooked syllogistic nonsense. Also, such doctrines could potentially lead to monstrous results, like the justification of child-torture.
My arguments about how morality arises are objective statements ABOUT the origins of subjective valuations. As they are objective statements, it would be inappropriate to dismiss them as “mere” subjective valuations.
Also, my following response to nirgraham is apropos…
nirgrahamUK:
yes, but maybe they arent evil since evil is just relative to whoevers opinion of evil you are asking.
if you should ask the statist… how owuld he respond…
I wouldn’t ask a statist such a useless question, or try to prove him wrong by trying to derive “ought” from “is”.
I might, however, ask him whether he feels stealing, assault, and enslavement are wrong. If he answers affirmitavely, I would then prove him incoherent by deriving “ought” from “ought” and showing him that he is actually promoting stealing, assault, and enslavement.
If he then objects that state stealing, state assault, and state enslavement are necessary evils, I would introduce him to Austrian economics to show him that they are not in fact necessary.
Again, you’re basically asking, “Is it true that one ought not to aggress against others?” That is akin to asking, “Is it true that roses are beautiful?” Whether the NAP is true is a subjective question. It is true according to my valuation. It might not be true according to the valuation of a psychotic. I think, at bottom, it is true according to the valuations of most everybody, but they, in practice, abrogate their own principles by making exceptions because they believe in the lifeboat lie.
well - you’re wrong - “purely”. I think you’re overanalyzing all of this.
They aren’t wrong or right. It’s all ethically subjective as you say.
stramman on the child torture. You said that in that one thread and privately with me when I asked who advocates child-torture but you never did answer this. You are plain-out lying.
No. As you said above it’s ethically subjective. You are being dishonest. But in neo-Aristotlian being able to make objective statements about subjective valuations is called agent-relative. Yet in your ethically subjective there is nothing objectively factual about you’re feelings - they are only subjective as you said.
You’re shifting the goal-posts. Is the NAP an illusion or what? And no it doesn’t depend on what I mean by “illusion” - for you said the NAP isn’t real and the opposite of real (reality) is illusion. So what is it? I didn’t say beauty that’s your strawman.
The NAP isn’t real, but you just told me in the previous post it is true according to your valuation. So which is it?
Whether they are wise or foolish in strategy is not an ethical question.
Spidey argued that a parent has the right to torture his child. (Although let me say that Spidey seems like a perfectly decent fellow, so I highly doubt he would actually advocate such a thing if his advocacy might make a practical difference.) You know this, because you objected to his argument directly…
Regarding whatever may follow in this debate, let it be known that, by calling me a liar, you took the gloves off first.
This is interesting. An idea struck me as I was reading the responses. One of the outlooks of Austrianism is that voluntary exchange is a postive sum transaction and better either through consquencialism or deontology. Meaning if I trade my watch for your tie, then i value the tie more then my watch and you value the watch more then my tie. However, for such a transaction to be possible certain ‘environments’ must be established beforehand. Namely that the transaction must be voluntary and purposeful action. Does that not mean that the NAP must be in effect for voluntary exchange to occur? What transaction could be carried out voluntarily and have a positive sum during coercion?
What did you do that was dishonest? I’ll have to check and edit this.
edit: yeah, you were lying. You were saying NR objectivists advocate child-torture. I asked why conflate me with Spidey and you never answered that question, but continue to conflate NR objectivists with that comment of his. It’s disingenuous to say the least, maybe lying was too harsh, but disingenuous - yes.
I don’t see it as argumentation ethics. I think it is a serious question though. What transaction could be carried out voluntarily and have a positive sum during coercion? The very meaning of coercion means involuntary. So I guess I answered my own question.