I’ll try to make this short as I am sure this question has been asked before. Any links t threads/articles/books you can point me to would be helpful.
I am reading Molyneux’s Universally Preferred Ethics. In it, he sets the following ground rules for ascertaining a good code of ethics.
I fully accept the Humean distinction between “is” and “ought.” Valid moral rules cannot be directly derived from the existence of anything in reality. The fact that human beings in general prefer to live, and must successfully interact with reality in order to do so, cannot be the basis for any valid theory of ethics. Some people clearly do not prefer to live, and steadfastly reject reality, so this definition of ethics remains subjective and conditional.
Ethics cannot be objectively defined as “that which is good for man’s survival.” Certain individuals can survive very well by preying on others, so this definition of ethics does not overcome the problem of subjectivism. In biological terms, this would be analogous to describing evolutionary tendencies as “that which is good for life’s survival” – this would make no sense. Human society is an ecosystem of competing interests, just as the rainforest is, and what is “good” for one man so often comes at the expense of another.
I do not believe in any “higher realm” of Ideal Forms. Morality cannot be conceived of as existing in any “other universe,” either material or immaterial. If morality exists in some “other realm,” it cannot then be subjected to a rigorous rational or empirical analysis – and, as Plato himself noted in “The Republic,” society would thus require an elite cadre of Philosopher-Kings to communicate – or, more accurately, enforce – the incomprehensible edicts of this “other realm” upon everyone else. This also does not solve the problem of subjectivism, since that which is inaccessible to reason and evidence is by definition subjective.
I do not believe that morality can be defined or determined with reference to “arguments from effect,” or the predicted consequences of ethical propositions. Utilitarianism, or “the greatest good for the greatest number,” does not solve the problem of subjectivism, since the odds of any central planner knowing what is objectively good for everyone else are about the same as any central economic planner knowing how to efficiently allocate resources in the absence of price – effectively zero. Also, that which is considered “the greatest good for the greatest number” changes according to culture, knowledge, time and circumstances, which also fails to overcome the problem of subjectivism. We do not judge the value of scientific experiments according to some Platonic higher realm, or some utilitarian optimisation – they are judged in accordance with the scientific method. I will take the same approach in this book.
I also refuse to define ethics as a “positive law doctrine.” Although it is generally accepted that legal systems are founded upon systems of ethics, no one could argue that every law within every legal system is a perfect reflection of an ideal morality. Laws cannot directly mirror any objective theory of ethics, since laws are in a continual state of flux, constantly being overturned, abandoned and invented – and legal systems the world over are often in direct opposition to one another, even at the theoretical level. Sharia law is often directly opposed to Anglo-Saxon common-law, and the modern democratic “mob rule” process often seems more akin to a Mafia shootout than a sober implementation of ethical ideals.
I am fully open to the proposition that there is no such thing as ethics at all, and that all systems of “morality” are mere instruments of control, as Nietzsche argued so insistently. In this book, I start from the assumption that there is no such thing as ethics, and build a framework from there.
I do have great respect for the ethical instincts of mankind. The near-universal social prohibitions on murder, rape, assault and theft are facts that any rational ethicist discards at his peril. Aristotle argued that any ethical theory that can be used to prove that rape is moral must have something wrong with it, to say the least. Thus, after I have developed a framework for validating ethical theories, I run these generally accepted moral premises through that framework, to see whether or not they hold true.
I respect your intelligence enough to refrain from defining words like “reality,” “reason,” “integrity” and so on. We have enough work to do without having to reinvent the wheel.
Finally, I believe that any theory – especially one as fundamental as a theory of ethics – does little good if it merely confirms what everybody already knows instinctively. I have not spent years of my life working on a theory of ethics in order to run around proving that “murder is wrong.” In my view, the best theories are those which verify the truths that we all intuitively understand – and then use those principles to reveal new truths that may be completely counterintuitive.
So far, so good.
Earlier today I emailed Molyneux this:
You illustrate a universal ethic in your book by saying that it is similar to the claim “if you want to survive, you must eat.” While true, doesn’t using this statement as a proof of your argument nullify one of the rules you set earlier; namely that no proper code of ethics can be got based on pragmatism (ie good for the survival of the species) and that to say that eating is good or universally preferred behavior is just a value judgment? After all, eating is not universally regarded as “good” as in the case of an anorexic person, or am I over complicating your point?
My point is, your statement can only be regarded as valid if, and only if, every person agrees with your premise that living is good, which clearly there are some that do not (ie those who commit suicide). That said, your premise could only be justified if you claimed that what is good is what the majority deems to be good, which would directly contradict your (and my) outrage against democracy.
I don’t know if this pins down my question or not. Basically, how can we argue that the NAP is valid as an objective ethic without appealing to its being pragmatic, such as from the perspective of evolution, or that it is “largely agreed upon” such as in a democracy?
I think perhaps the most important question we, as Libertarians, must have a good answer for is this question:
“What makes the NAP the universal ethic/moral which is the only one that society must enforce?”
Put another way, how come I can’t use force to steal from you, but I can use force when you steal from me?
I understand the difference between these two occurrences intellectually, but not from a philosophical standpoint.
Put most simply, if someone just says, “You are wrong. Values, ethics, and morals are subjective, so it cannot be said that it is wrong to coerce you. You can only say that to you it is wrong to do so. I don’t think it is. Therefore, when I try to coerce you, you have no more right to stop me than I do to coerce you.” How can you refute this claim absent an almighty, all powerful God who enacts laws that are above any of man’s?
Note: While many of you probably know that I believe in the “God argument” just stated, I know that many don’t (both on these forums and off, libertarian and statist), and so I wonder how else this could be answered. I never try to witness or mission in debates like these, so It would be helpful to me to hear the atheist’s perspective on the NAP as a universal ethic.
When it comes right down to it, I think we place all bets on the NAP, and for good pragmatic reasons. Again, though, what I cannot answer is the question above and I’d love some help on it.