Maybe it’s a semantics game, cause I really didn’t try to bring up ethics. I think ethics and morals are different, but how and to what degree, I think morals are more basic than ethics, yet, I’m personally not going to say I’m completely proficient in using and defining between the two. I’m reading Geoffery Plauche dissertation at the moment and I find this:
"It is fundamentally erroneous to assume that abstract ethical principles alone can
determine the proper course of conduct for any particular individual. Such ethical
rationalism fails to grasp that ethics is practical and concerned with particular and
contingent facts – facts that abstract ethical principles cannot explicitly capture.
Such facts are crucial to determining what ought to be done. Thus, contrary to
much modern and contemporary ethics, not all morally proper conduct need be
something everybody should do."
I think ethics are more socially recognized if I go by this definition. Morals are more individually concerned and morals therefore are more universal and the ultimate moral question is beyond ethics cause that’s dealing with ‘What is good for human nature?’ or ‘What is good for the nature of a maple tree?’ or even to such questions that are sometimes answerable 'What is good for the nature of all biological life?" and ‘What is good for the nature of the universe as is?’. These are questions that fall in line with Aristotle’s thinking. Natural Law which has particulars such as the nature of humans or the nature of a river, etc…
More quotes that might help:
"Flourishing as the ultimate good must be understood in a biocentric context. It is both a way of living and, because flourishing is more than mere survival, a way of living. As Philippa Foot points out: ‘The structure of the derivation is the same whether we derive an evaluation of the roots of a particular tree or the action of a particular human being. The meaning of the words ‘good’ and ‘bad’ is not different when used in features of plants on the one hand and humans on the other, but is rather the same applied, in judgments of natural goodness and defect, in the case of all living things.’” (p. 30)