I ran into this in another thread recently, would you mind providing your definition of “moral” since it seems that the majority on this forum don’t define it the same way I do.
Moral nihilists don’t believe in the existence of moral facts and hold that ethics is an exercise in futility for that reason, and that includes consequentialism. Consequentialists believe the attainment (and perhaps maximisation) of certain consequences is moral. That’s why they don’t do very well in each other’s company.
When I classify myself as a moral nihilist I mean that in the sense that I don’t believe in a metaphysical objective right/wrong/good/evil. I make value judgments all day long based on what I predict will bring the most favorable consquences. If you, as others here, define this as a set of “morals” then I am not a moral nihilist by that definition.
It just means you don’t believe in moral properties “out there” in the world.
It is also my understanding that deontological libertarianism is based on the assumption that initiation of force is objectively wrong. Since I don’t believe in an objective right/wrong I cannot therefore be a deontological libertarian. If you have a different definition of deontological libertarianism then I might be one.
There’s many ways you can arrive at something being objectively wrong. Deontology tends to argue for particular modes of action based on whether they can be coherently proposed or not (i.e. formulated without lapsing into contradiction.) An example of this would be the Kantian system. The actions it proscribes against end up being objectively wrong because to argue for them forces one into contradiction, or so the Kantians argue. Argumentation ethics and some other epistemologically based ethical arguments take similar approaches. The difference between Kantianism and the latter type of approach is that Kantianism tends to focus on perfect duties (e.g. not to murder) and imperfect duties (e.g. to be charitable), the former of which are categorical imperatives (of the form “Do X”… because it is your duty as a rational being.) In general, deontology focuses on one’s “duty”, which can stem from a variety of sources (in Kant’s system, it is one’s rational mind.) The reason the NAP and deontology tend to be associated is because a lot of libertarians take a Kantian approach to justifying natural rights. Kantian deontology isn’t based on the objective existence of moral properties “out there” so much as it is what is your duty as a rational being. This should give you an understanding of it as my own is a bit rusty atm. Kantian deontology tends to focus on the intentions behind an agent’s actions (one’s actions, to be good, must be motivated by their reason), but strictly speaking deontology doesn’t require it.
Consequentialist libertarianism, as I understand it, only sees libertarianism as a means to an end. That is, I believe my net utility will be higher in a libertarian society so I champion it and given the opportunity I would participate in it. I don’t do this because it is objectively right but rather because I believe it will result in more favorable consequences than the current system (state). If you have a different definition of consequentialist libertarianism then I might not be one. Note: By “favorable” I mean higher net utility.
The objective right in question here is: my utility ought to be maximised. I’m willing to grant that this mode of argument might actually succeed because it can take the form of an assertoric hypothetical, i.e. Since you value your “happiness” (utility), you should do X. You can arrive at the NAP via this system precisely because of the impossibility of interpersonal utility comparisons. Still, it is as much based on a moral fact as any other ethical system. Otherwise you’re just talking about ordinary human action, i.e. the tendency to avert non-satiation of one’s preferences. Consequentialism is more than that. The problem moral systems tend to have is relating a goal (in this case adherence to a moral form of behaviour) to one’s interests. Consequentialism enjoys an advantage in that it can link the two in the form of the assertoric hypothetical I mentioned. However, in and of itself I think its an approach that needs refinement. The best exposition of it I’ve seen is the neo-Aristotelianism of Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas den Uyl, which is a blend of teleology/consequentialism and deontology. It’s also very protracted and lengthy and requires the audience hearing the argument to have a good grip of moral and epistemological theory.
The NAP, as I understand it, is similar to deontological libertarianism in that it is based on the assumption that initiation of force is objectively wrong. The same personal argument as above applies here. If your definition of the NAP is not dependent on objective right/wrong then I might be a NAP beiever.
The NAP can be argued for from a multiplicity of moral perspectives ranging from consequentialism to deontology to epistemologically motivated arguments to Aristotelianism (agent-based/teleological ethical theories.)
TLDR: Deontology and consequentialism are both moral systems (the former based on one’s duty stemming from their nature/external authority etc., the latter based on the desirability of the attainment of certain consequences), and the NAP can be justified using a variety of approaches.