So taxation is not theft.
lol… That’s an ethical question and I wasn’t talking about ethics (as my posts in this thread say word for word). [sorry I took that humorous, don’t take offense, as it wasn’t that I’m laughing at you personally, but laughing about the fact, in good spirit, that I’ve said word for word throughout this thread that I am not talking about ethics.]
It’s more than that, it’s the legal right to possession.
So again, to assume an understanding of property, one has to assume understanding of the concept of ownership, therefore rights. I don’t think all this conceptualization is necessary to become upset when something is taken from you.
Own=rightful, or legal control
possession=control
Small, but important distinction.
Not entirely. We are all limited by our physical aspects.
The word denotes a completely different concept, like the difference between “theft” and “donation”
Then you are missing my point, at least.
I don’t buy into the concept of rights, so as I understand the meaning of the word “property”, I don’t buy into that concept either.
By Budda! You might have gotten it.
But not fully. A thief can own a watch, but that doesn’t mean the watch is rightfully the thief’s. How would anybody know otherwise, unless, somebody thinks ethically about it the conclusion as to who’s watch it rightfully is will not be resolved.
There is a distinction between choice and power. There is a point at which its no longer a choice but rather about power. I can choose to fly, but it’s not within my power to do so. But technology (being power related) can get me flying, but when it comes to my physical person solely (without the technology, biological attributes, ie. no wings, and power) I can’t fly even if I choose too.
So, I disagree in the normative and ethical connotations of words like “ownership”, and “property”
You have to assume that theft is a valid concept first, for that statement to apply.
Or, if either party has a gun.
So our choices are already somewhat limited. Not only that, but the determinist theories about not being able to choose what you think about entirely, that sort of thing.
Those connotations are of your making, not mine, I think that is clear. And if you disagree with those connotations of your making then that’s your own mind sharing the disagreements with itself. Because the ethical connotations are not principles inherent in the words, connotations are semantics, not principles.
true. A thief (ethical) owns (not ethical) a watch. I only pointed out the thief to portray how a person can own something and nobody would even know if in fact it was rightfully theirs. Yet since I named the person a thief it is obvious that what a person owns might not really be theirs, but how would one truly know this unless they introduce ethics into the inquiry.
A person can own something, but unless ethics is used then nobody will know if that something is rightfully theirs or not. The person simply owns it because they have it. Own and possession are the same in this context.
Yes, because humans are not all-powerful, though, some may choose to be but just as it is logically impossible to do some things, it is always biologically impossible to some things no matter how much chooses otherwise. I choose to fly and jump off a ten story building. It’s not going to happen. I don’t have that kind of power, but I still made the choice.
I’m not well-understood on any determinist theories.
Here’s some quotes to point out that I’m not the only one thinking this way:
Rothbard Ethics of Liberty:
A - “The key to the theory of liberty is the establishment of the rights of private property for each individual’s justified sphere of free action can only be set forth if his rights of property are analyzed and established. “Crime” can then be defined and properly analyzed as a violent invasion or aggression against the just property of another individual (including his property in his own person).”
B - "We may define anyone who aggresses against the person or other produced property of another as a criminal. A criminal is anyone who initiates violence against another man and his property: anyone who uses the coercive “political means” for the acquisition of goods and services.’
Now, however, critical problems arise; we are now indeed at the very heart of the entire problem of liberty, property, and violence in society. A crucial question-and one which has unfortunately been almost totally neglected by libertarian theorists-may be illustrated by the following examples:
Suppose we are walking down the street and we see a man, A, seizing B by the wrist and grabbing B’s wristwatch. There is no question that A is here violating both the person and the property of B. Can we then simply infer from this scene that A is a criminal aggressor, and B his innocent victim?
Certainly not-for we don’t know simply from our observation whether A is indeed a thief, or whether A is merely repossessing his own watch from B who had previously stolen it from him. In short, while the watch had undoubtedly been B’s property until the moment of A’s attack, we don’t know whether or not A had been the legitimate owner at some earlier time, and had been robbed by B. Therefore, we do not yet know which one of the two men is the legitimate or just property owner. We can only find the answer through investigating the concrete data of the particular case, i.e., through “historical” inquiry.
Thus, we cannot simply say that the great axiomatic moral rule of the libertarian society is the protection of property rights, period. For the criminal has no natural right whatever to the retention of property that he has stolen; the aggressor has no right to claim any property that he has acquired by aggression. Therefore, we must modify or rather clarify the basic rule of the libertarian society to say that no one has the right to aggress against the legitimate or just property of another.
In short, we cannot simply talk of defense of “property rights” or of “private property” per se. For if we do so, we are in grave danger of defending the “property right” of a criminal aggressor-in fact, we logically must do so. We may therefore only speak of just property or legitimate property or perhaps "natural property.“And this means that, in concrete cases, we must decide whether any single given act of violence is aggressive or defensive: e.g., whether it is a case of a criminal robbing a victim, or of a victim trying to repossess his property.”
[Rothbard’s emphasis (the bolding) not mine]
He has made a distinction between (1) property and owner AND (2) legitimate and just.
(1) is NOT p**er se ethical as legitimate and just are the adjectives to these nouns to qualify the nouns because the nouns property and owner can also can have the adjectives illegitimate and unjust placed in front of them.
(2) are ethical connotations
C- “It should be clear that for the libertarians to refute this stratagem they must take their stand on a theory of just versus unjust property.” [again Rothbard’s emphasis not mine]
And he spends more than one chapter emphasizing this point so it is not minor, indeed, he even states above this is the heart of the problem of qualifying property and says it is critical to understand this distinction.
[I don’t know if you edited this after I had already responded to your post, so, I’ll do that here.]
I said “who’s watch it rightfully is… not… resolved”, so no, unless each party has a gun and it has been decided which one is the attacker and defender, having a gun is not an ethical consideration. But as I said above, who’s watch it is rightfully, for that to be resolved, is an ethical consideration.
I would say we are using two different definitions of the word “own” to frame our points. If by you “own” you are simply saying “physically posses”, than I would agree that the use is non-ethical. That seems like a limited definition of “own” because the term seems to imply that it is possible to “own” something, even though I am not currently “physically possessing” it.
That could be your interpretation, but I would disagree that “ownership” and “possession” are entirely analogous.
A choice to me implies a decision between (at least) two actions. If an action is impossible to actuate, I don’t see how that would be considered a choice.
From what I understand (which is also quite limited), I’m more of a compatibilist than strictly determinist.
I would contend the use of the word “property” here, by my understanding of the word.
(emphasis added)
Here, the question (as I’m sure you agree) turns into an ethical one. I highlighted where I think Rothbard shows that “owning” and “possessing” are distinct. Since the phrase implies that A can “own” the watch without “possessing” it. Therefore, it can also be said that the watch was never B’s property at all, regardless of whether or not he managed to posses it for a while. This is why I feel the term “ownership” is so pregnant with ethical connotations.
As far as the rest goes, I understand what Rothbard is saying, I just tend to disagree with his use of the word “property” in much of the passage.
Arbitrary legal positivism has nothing to do with it.
Ownership: possession: the act of having and controlling property
Again rights have nothing to do with it.
That’s what I told you awhile ago, and I’m glad we both have been able to achieve this understanding together.
That’s what I mean. Great. We agree.
Example: I have (possess) a rake that is in the shed. I’m cooking lunch right now, but if somebody needs to borrow it, then I can run out back and get it.
Example: I have (own) a rake… (same example)
That’s fine, I mean this is semantics after all, but here’s a dictionary definition to show I’m not the only one thinking this way:
own (
n)
owned, own·ing, owns
1.
a. To have or possess as property
b. To have control over
I jump off the roof choosing to fly or I choose not to fly and stay on the roof. Each one involves an action of choice.
I’ll check out the links. Thanks.
Until you no longer posses it. By your definition (as I understand it) you have (albeit voluntarily) ceded ownership when the rake left your control (when you let the somebody take possession of it).
The 1.a. definition seems to vibe with my preferred understanding of the term, while the 1.b. seems to be more to your liking.
But you cannot make the choice to fly. You are prevented outside of your control from doing so.
I most certainly can make the choice to fly. Whether it pans out as I expect or not is a different issue. But even if we conceded your point it does not invalidate Wilderness’s point of self control and self ownership.
Your body is a tangible object, if it was not owned I should be allowed to chop off your arm, claim it as mine and homestead it. And you would have no care otherwise, since it is not yours, and is apparently up for grabs.
I would argue that you can make the choice to desire to fly, but the execution of the action is out of your control.
This is were I disagree with the Hoppean logic. True, my body is a tangible object, and if I had no regard for it, nothing would stop you from chopping my arm off. It is only my concern for maintaining the body in question’s integrity that makes me stop you from doing it. I don’t have to consider whether or not I own my body or not. I also disagree that I would necessarily have to own something to have any regard for it. I like whales, and it bothers me when dolphins are rounded up in coves and slaughtered, but it doesn’t mean I feel I own the dolphins.
That’s what I’m pointing out to you. If you are going to understand natural law paradigms, then first it would be helpful to understand their culture/language.
For the sake of argument let’s assume I meet a Mexican who doesn’t know a word of American-English. I ask him in Spanish “Can I borrow that pencil?” BUT I say everything in Spanish except the word “pencil”. I only say it in A-English. He stares at me baffled. I don’t understand why he won’t give me the pencil or respond. Communicate level breaks down. I need to talk in their language to understand their worldview.
In the case of property here, it’s only semantics and this is the definition of property in natural law theory. Love or it or leave it, but one will not understand natural law but at the same time one will not be able to argue effectively against it because the argument is only boiling down to semantics and not actual concepts and theories.
Yes.
Yes. I understand your point. And also because somebody possesses a watch doesn’t mean such a person owns the watch. But if somebody owns a watch it also doesn’t mean it is legitimately their watch. To highlight “own” in the absolute sense of ‘who’s watch it really is’ that is an ethical question. But in another light, if somebody possesses, uses, controls, and owns something it doesn’t mean it is rightfully of their possession, control, use, and ownership. Ethically speaking, “own” can be used both ways without controversy: (A) just owner (B) unjust owner; and both ways make perfect sense when read.
Semantics or aesthetic, that’s your choice, but it says nothing of the theory and conceptual nature of property used in such a manner, ie. person, object, thereby your argument is a semantic one and not one that can dealt with intellectually concerning theory and principle. It would therefore only come down to what color you want to paint the room but doesn’t change the fact of the theory of property and what that means, entails, etc… It’s not detrimental to use property to define a person because ethically speaking an individual owning his person as property is the core of what liberty and freedom means. To attack property in the person is to attack liberty and freedom in natural law theory. And logically that only leads to special pleading, performative contradictions, and hypocrisy. But we really are not having a discussion on the theory itself. Just semantics.
The consequences of any action is out of your control. You can only expect the likelihood of those consequences. For example you may be used to safely walking to work everyday. It is within your power to do so, however today a meteorite may fall from the sky, land on you, and kill you. As such walking to work that day successfully was out of your control. That did not deter you from making the choice to do so.
In the same respect you can choose to fly, ignoring the likelihood of the consequences of that action. You will likely fall to your death, but the consequences do not deter you from choosing the desired action, or attempted action.
You have just described property again.
This isn’t the conclusion we would come to either. Still everything you have described is property, you just choose not to use the word when applying it to your own person. It doesn’t change the fundamental principles however by ignoring it’s name. A rose by any other name would smell as sweet.
I would contend that description of property.
But what I’m saying is that the definition of property includes the concept of ownership, which is derived from a concept of rights, which I feel is unnecessary, or rather, not intrinsic to the objects I describe.