I think rights are metaphysical.
ithink life is descriptive of tendency, and not descriptive of construction or constitution. especially not when it comes to something like specific consciousness. evolution doesn’t work like that, and complex objects are not coherently interpretable as being ontologically singular, they are complex objects
methdological singularism of praxeology focuses strictly on what is necessarily true of action, not that which may be true of particular psychologies and constructions. anything which is no strictly implied within the category of action is not part of praxeology.
you’re confusing recursiveness and integration with the particularity of action in a given instant. the psychological courses of mind are recursive and variably integrated in their cognitive and emotive aspects, but it is only the highest value which actually impels action which is relevant for the purposes of action and, therefor, praxeology.
that’s true, but i think Mises was basically correct. for one, because no one can be in a position to critique the values of another; that is an epistemic block on intersubjective normatives. even if they existed, it would be impossible to demonstrate them
but the same contrast is possible between two given human beings. all humans are physically, metaphysically and cognitively unique and singular in their relationship to their perceptions.
not at all - i am saying ultimate ends are beyond rational examination, exactly what mises said
your statement presupposes that it is my pen. i would say that we would, if we had a claim which we took to arbitration, have to prove which of us had a prior (finders, keepers/first come, first serve) connection which allowed one of us to prevent access to the other. the presumption of liberty entails the liberty to use property, and to prevent access to property requires (either before or afterword) a proof of a claim prior to those we were prohibiting.