I get how self-ownership is axiomatic. I don’t get how homesteading is axiomatic, yet I often hear it referred to as the “homesteading axiom” rather than the “homesteading principle.” Is this it an axiom, or are some libertarians trying to prove too much?
its a method. its shorthand for “coming to own something previously unowned by anyone else, in a way for which there is evidence such that latecomers can be identified as such in relation to you and what has become your property.”
In my view, neither self-ownership or homesteading or non-aggression are axioms, as an axiom is supposed to be something that is self-evident or an irredicible principle. They are normative concepts that are part of a system containing other concepts, and could be construed as either depending on other concepts heirarchically or more as part of a web of coherance.
I know what it is, and I see the utility in using it as a principle by which to assign property without infringing upon liberty. I’m wondering why it’s often referred to as an axiom. Is it an irreducible truth?
Self-ownership is axiomatic - it is proved when one tries to disprove it.
I see that you’re a fan of the performative contradiction or self-detonation argument. But that I rightfully own my body or that noone else may rightfully control me is not proved by the fact that I purposefully act. Those are two separate things.
Brainpolice: Not sure I follow what you’re saying.
This. I also prefer to call them principles, even if they are first principles.
Well, that seems to depend on how you define “own” and/or “control”. 
Rights have nothing to do with it. How are you not a self-owner exactly? How are you not in possession of your body and not acting as the controlling director of your physical person? The rest is semantics regarding the word ownership.
Sorry but I kind of want to play a little devils advocate here.
P.S. I agree with Nir on how he explains Homesteading. People call too many things axioms.
Then is nothing axiomatic?
Humans Act.
Well then for starters, you’ve shifted to a definition of “self-ownership” that robs it of all normative connotations, and hence by itself it does not support libertarianism over any other political philosophy. If this is what “self-ownership” means, then most non-libertarians believe in it too and it proves too little. Furthermore, if we are to define “self-ownership” this way, it would then seem that what one is claiming is that the mind owns the body, and this is by no means self-evident and begs questions related to the philosophy of mind and metaphysics in general.
I’m saying that the argument from performative contradiction relies on switching between a normative and descriptive sense of ownership (the right to control vs. the fact of possession), becoming a non-sequitor. The fact that I currently control something doesn’t prove that I ought to. But if one is only using “self-ownership” to refer to the fact of possession, then it is much more trivial of a concept that isn’t exclusive to libertarian philosophy. At such a point, it is unclear whether “self-ownership” is meant to be a principle of personal autonomy, a replacement word for free will, or some kind of metaphysical notion.
Hence why I put the term in scare quotes, as I no longer find it useful.
In your own humble opinion what is the normative definition of ownership?
Wikipedia: "Self-ownership (or sovereignty of the individual, individual sovereignty or individual autonomy) is the concept of property in one’s own person, expressed as the moral or natural right of a person to be the exclusive controller of her or his own body and life."
Bold emphasis mine. Rothbard uses such a definition in his works as well. The wikipedia article also lists two specific arguments against self-ownership that I have made myself, the first of which I’ve already hinted at:
"The first and most serious one revolves around the point that the concept of self-ownership implies a cartesian mind-body dualism. Mainly that there needs to be something external to one’s body that controls the body itself. There are serious contentions against dualism however that attack the basis of this position. Furthermore, even if one accepts a mind-body dualism, then if one accepts that it is immoral for one to own another’s body, the self-ownership proposition becomes inconsistent as the act of the mind controlling the body become immoral in turn. Another contention, again based on accepting mind-body dualism, is that it would imply that an intangible entity (the mind) would own a tangible entity (the body) that is metaphysically impossible in reality (a thing without a tangible existence cannot act on a thing with a tangible existence).
When self-ownership is not based on cartesian dualism it creates an arbitrary separation within one human, i.e. within yourself and yourself. It implies that an entity can be owned by itself, which is impossible given the definition of “ownership,” which explains the relation between two different entities, a subject and an object. Thus it would mean that one human is both the owner and the owned at once and therefore turning self-ownership into an oxymoron.
Another vector of attack is the chicken/egg issue. Specifically self-ownership manifests a property rights concept and then defines self-ownership on the basis of those property rights. However it simulataneously the case that self-ownership tries to justify the existence of property rights as if they are stemming from it. This in effect creates a circular argument fallacy. To put it short, if property rights justify self-ownership, then the latter cannot be used to justify the former on the basis of someone owning the result of their actions. If self-ownership is used to justify property rights on the other hand, then a different justification must be found for the concept of self-ownership itself that does not rest of people owning themselves (thus presupposing property rights)."
For some reason I thought I asked for the definition of ownership. Not self-ownership.
And not that it matters, more of a nit-pick, but how can we derive a “normative” definition of “Self-Ownerhsip” when it’s concept is something that is not widely known of outside the libertarian circles? Kind of a biased “normative” definition wouldn’t you say?
Sorry, you’re right, although we’ve been talking about self-ownership. Quite simply, normative definitions of ownership inherently involve some notion of property rights which determine someone’s rightful title to possession. But if you’re specifically asking what my own normative position is, I think that’s not relevant to this topic.
@BP
So would you claim that ownership is its self an irrelavant term? There is simply resource control, not ownership?
What is it called when you are in permanent physical possession of something?
Rights are a claim on human action(Often a claim involving the action over some scarce object). The term “Property-Right” is technically redundant. But again I am nit-picking.
I don’t think ownership is irrelevant, but that these particular arguments fail horribly at establishing a case for any particular normative position on ownership and that the concept of self-ownership as it is often used by libertarians is either unecessary or hopelessly confused.
Filc: This will almost certainly end up in a dualism/materialism debate. Technically your statement begs the question in favor of dualism.
Brainpolice:
I don’t think that’s quite proper. You’e assuming, in order to prove that it’s wrong to own another’s body, that the mind and the body are two separate and distinct persons.
I’ve heard of these types of criticisms before, but I’ve never had the opportunity to dialog with someone who held this position. So I’m glad that you’re here.
I don’t think you’ve successfully shown–other than just asserting it–that abstract causation is metaphysically impossible. I agree, but with certain caveats. I don’t believe that a mind falls into the same intangible category as do other abstract objects like numbers, ideas, etc.
I think you carry the burden of proof if you are to make such an assertion.