Homesteading: Axiom or Principle?

I agree, but that particular point of contention is not the thrust of what I’ve been argueing about in this thread. But the semantic issue here is not completely irrelevant, in that it is certainly confusion-creating to use a term we normally use in the context of original appropriation to refer to scenarios that are far from original appropriation. Talk of “the state of nature” and “product of my labor” makes no sense here.

homesteading refers to bringing the physical object under the umbrella of private property.

an owned thing that is abandoned is no longer under that umbrella, hence it is proper to speak of homesteading it a second time

The action axiom seems somewhat vague. Do humans act all of the time? Some of the time? All humans, or only most humans? In its strongest sense, it seems questionable:

For all x, if x is human, then x acts at all points in time.

Is that really self-evident? What would Mises say is wrong with this formulation or would he agree?

No Solidchoke, dead humans don’t act at all

If that is the case, then “humans act” isn’t strictly true (unless you define “human” so that dead people don’t apply).

Some libertarians are trying to prove too much. They are accepting the burden of proof, when they should not. This is why they get into these pointless debates about axioms and first principles. Why should someone NOT acquire new property? Does it violate a convention against torts? No. Unless someone provides a good answer to that first question, there is no point in trying to “justify” acquiring property.

We don’t need a justification for breathing in air. We don’t need the permission of some axiom in order to breath in the air around us. The burden is on those who would deny that it is just for us to breath in air to demonstrate why we should not.

You can read the book ‘Human Action’ if you want to know all about it.

Mises doesn’t say in it the phrase ‘Humans Act’…

He explains that praxeology is the study of / science of human action.

If you don’t think that this maps to anything in reality then you are wrong.

I do think that human action maps to reality, but there is reality outside of action. If this is true, then a complete social science would eventually have to go beyond praxeology. Praxeology would have to become a subset of social science which would be a subset of biology.

Incorrect, because the things that don’t have to do with human action have nothing to do with economics, catallactics, or praxeology. So it’s not worth mentioning in the context of an economic/philosophical debate.

Well, again, you’re using a different definition of “homesteading”. The thing is, all definitions are arbitrary. I can define “homesteading” to mean “the color of the sky”, for example. Your definition of “homesteading” isn’t right or wrong compared to mine – it’s just different.

That said, “homesteading” is perhaps not the best term to use, given its derivation from “homestead”, which (etymologically speaking) has a strong connotation with “land”. I guess it’s a question of how easily/well one can recognize and appreciate the metaphoric use with non-land objects.

I would imagine that Rothbard’s examples were set up that way because the concept is simpler to understand that way. Maybe he should’ve also elucidated how his concept of “homesteading” applies to a modern urban(e) environment.

Regarding your comment about the “legitimacy test”, I think the point is still to explain the initial process by which something can be legitimately owned (according to Rothbard’s own ethical system). Does this make sense? If not, are you familiar with either recursion or mathematical induction?

To be honest, I don’t think any of that is/was intended by Rothbardian libertarians or Rothbard himself. Again, I think the point was to take the readily understood process of turning a piece of virgin land into a homestead (colloquial usage of “homesteading”) and extending it to cover the process of coming to legitimately own something that was previously unowned.