The assertion “right and wrong are value-judgments” can be interpreted in many ways:
“Right and wrong are not value-judgments” in the sense that determining if an action constitutes as either ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ requires human thought and reasoning.
“Right and wrong are value-judgments” in the sense that humans feel positively if they hear the word “right” and react negatively if they hear he word “wrong.”
“Right and wrong are not value-judgments” in the sense that ‘value-judgments’ (in the sense of aesthetics) are unnecessary for the judgment whether if an action confirms or violates the anarchist moral code.
“Right and wrong are value-judgments” in the sense that it requires empathy, which you classify as a ‘value-judgment’, to determine if an action constitutes ‘right’ or ‘wrong’.
The assertion that “value-judgments are subjective” can also be interpreted in many ways:
“Value-judgments are subjective” in the sense that those judgements require human emotional perception.
“Value-judgments are not subjective” in the sense that emotional perceptions, which you identify as ‘subjective’, can be identified by ‘independently’ from the personal feelings itself, such as the assumption that humans feel empathy from evolutionary biology.
“Value-judgments are neither subjective nor objective” in the sense that they we cannot decide the epistemological properties of a judgment.
“Value-judgments are subjective” in the sense that human preferences differ at many times and differ at all contexts.
“Morality is emotive” in the sense that we experience a gut-feeling of grief when Bush had ‘murdered’ over one million Iraqis.
“Morality is not emotive” in the sense that we do not feel any ‘emotions’ when some person lied to anther.
“Morality is not emotive” in the sense that we should develop ethical systems based on human reason and science, with accurate standards and sound criteria, rather than develop it from the biased gut-feelings of some random person.
“Morality is emotive” in the sense that the basic fundamental for grounding a moral system stem from human ‘intuitions’, ‘preferences’, and ‘emotions’.
“Defining ‘aggression’ is circular” in the sense that the definition of ‘aggression’ depends on the definition of ‘property rights’, which, in turn, we define as the “absence of aggression against property.”
“Defining ‘aggression’ is not circular” in the sense that we do not need to define ‘aggression’ in every case because it takes too much time.
“Defining ‘aggression’ is not circular” in the sense that ‘natural law’ based on ‘human nature’ can deduce an adequate amount cases in which we can accurately determine if an action constitutes as ‘aggression’.
“Defining ‘aggression’ is circular” in the sense that the definition of ‘aggression’ can be interpreted in too many ways that people have different conceptions about punishment and parenting.
“In the sense that people who adhere to it do it voluntarily, no.”
"In the sense that other busyboddys out there might seek out people to convert & force the NAP unto others (physically) & thus contradicting the NAP: yes. This is less clear if the NAP being “forced” is a reaction against a violated contract by another person to adhere to the NAP, though. "
"In the sense that other busyboddys out there might seek out people to convert & “force” the NAP unto other’s socially: maybe, because social coercion does not always translate into physical coercion. "
I just have discovered that most of the controversey stem from the differences in interpretations.