well, thats why i disagree with Ryan, since he wants to have morality without all the messy morality stuff messing it up.
morality is distincitve, it is peculiur in that way. the mistake is to assume that its oughts are want orientated as other more common oughts are .the oughts are not want orientated they are morally orientated. im arguing in a circle similar to how i would argue that tic tac toe is a game played over 9 spaces filled in turn by distinctive marks with the winner making a line of 3.
It’s illusionary in the manner that neither really have anything to do with each other. And neither function the same way. It’s like have two parts from the same machine, which don’t directly influence or alter the other’s functionality, but that both are essential to the operation of that machine. It’s ignorant to say because these parts not influencing each other that the machine can operate one without the other, and it’s illusionary to say that neither influence the successful operation of that machine. You need both parts, period and end of story, to have the machine work. You need ought to direct actions in moral considerations, as you need is to connect these actions to the moral considerations so you can form logical arguments about them (as to optimize future moral judgments). Neither alters the function of the other, neither bridges to the other, but both are part of the same human “ethical engine.”
That definition is absolutely inadequate. If I were to use that definition, then starving myself would be a moral action merely because it “involves possible choices which might be selected with full knowledge that it is likely to be to the detriment of the moral actor’s material well-being”.
Or, did you mean to imply that such an action must benefit an other person? In that case: If you want to claim that altruism exists and forms the basis of morality, then you will have to form an evolutionary argument that proves that altruism exists or your argument will remain unconvincing.
I do not recognize a difference between those two things. The necessary deductions of an axiomatic system (such as a possible set of “natural laws”) are the foundation and the foundation is the necessary deductions. The only reason that they seem separate to us is because our mind is imperfect.
As Mises said:
“Logic and mathematics deal with an ideal system of thought. The relations and implications of their system are coexistent and interdependent. We may say as well that they are synchronous or that they are out of time. A perfect mind could grasp them all in one thought. Man’s inability to accomplish this makes thinking itself an action, proceeding step by step from the less satisfactory state of insufficient cognition to the more satisfactory state of better insight. But the temporal order in which knowledge is acquired must not be confused with the logical simultaneity of all parts of an aprioristic deductive system. Within such a system the notions of anteriority and consequence are metaphorical only.”[“Human Action”; p. 99 of the Scholar’s Edition; emphasis mine]
I do not believe that if one understands the evolution of “romance” and “love”, one must “eschew” it because of such knowledge. And, similarly, I do not believe that if one understands the evolution of “morality”, one must “eschew” it because of such knowledge.
And, if you want to claim that such explicitization lies outside the ability of the human mind, then you will need to substantiate that claim.
Universal or “objective” ethics requires, according to whoever it was I quoted, a universal purpose. From whence does this purpose come, if not from the supernatural? To say that man’s purpose is to fulfill his nature is an unfounded assertion that cannot be deduced from observation.
I can do a simple slippery slope argument against this.
I must eat to live.
I must eat proteins to live.
I must eat healthy to live.
I must exercise to live.
I must stay warm to live.
If one refuses to eat, he will decrease his lifespan. If one refuses to exercise, he will decrease his lifespan. All those actions listed above can increase one’s lifespan, but it comes at an expense of his or her other priorities in life. What delineates acting within one’s ‘nature’ with mere action itself?
I will do a separate argument below:
Suppose that we believe in the proposition “living beings must behave within his or her ‘nature’” is true. However, that does not in any way imply that the living being must act to maximize his lifespan. As long as he stays alive, he will not contradict himself if behaves within his ‘nature’. That does not depend on how long or short he lives, as long as he is currently living and able to make decisions. Therefore, increasing the being’s lifespan is unnecessary to stay consistent with ‘natural law’.
Remember when we deduced ‘natural law’ as a package deal with unnecessary values shoved down our throats? We will now classify the “maximization of lifespan” as an ‘unnecessary value’. One can choose to die early and have a short life—without contradicting the third proposition—in that argument.
The evolutionary process cannot explain morality. It can’t explain the existence or intricate arrangement of matter, let alone that of personality and that it that entails (like genuine choices, undetermined by biochemical make-ups). Mud doesn’t start suddenly “wanting” any more than does a rock. (Then there’s that pesky little “law” called entropy.)
If we’re talking is/ought and morality, we at least must have the possiblity of choosing between options. A Darwinian naturalism only gives you bio-chemically controlled determinism. You cannot eat your cake (have free choice, and morality) and have it too (claim an impersonal, naturalistic origin of the universe). “Water cannot rise above its source.”
True that the majority of people don’t think it’s “fun” to murder people (though some, like the Darwinian Hitler, did). But the evolutionary process simply cannot account for that; there’s no directing ‘mind’ or ‘will’ in the naturalistic worldview.
Then knowledge isn’t possible, neither is science or logic. There is no basis for predication, and we have no basis for the uniformity of nature (see David Hume). Is an ought are distinct, but they involve each other and cannot be divorced. And ought is something different than a “preferred course of action.” Ought, in the moral sphere, means the “good” “right” or “virtuous” course of action. And that can only be “set” by an authority who is above all of us and can communicate it effectively.
And, after reading your last sentence I’m not sure what you’re objecting to - the division or the non-division of the “is” and the “ought”.
…and if I really want to kill my neighbor and steal his speedboat? Is it “totalitarian” for the policeman to stop me – or for my neighbor to? Is the system of courts and prisons to incarcerate criminals “totalitarian”?
Furthermore, starving oneself would only be a moral act if it is for the sake of someone (a fellow castaway or an imagined god) or something (an indoctrinated ideal) else, as opposed to starving oneself in order to avoid living for years in agony or dying an even more painful death. The latter two scenarios would involve, not morality, but a peculiar kind of self-promotion that can occur in situations of extremity. I did forget to include this reference to this particular kind of selflessness in my definition, which I usually include, as I did elsewhere in this thread…
Lilburne, then how do you propose to avoid turning morality/ethics into Grand Central Station that’s full of people who are blindfolded without hope of knowing who they’ll bump into next?
I’m going to ignore the rest of your rediculous assertions and merely ask you to clarify this. How are “is” reliant on “ought”? "Ought implies valuation, either of the ends or the means, whereas “is” is what exists, free of value.
This is not the first time such an assertion was made in this thread. Can you explain in what way and to what extent “is” is dependant on “ought”?
First, knowledge wouldn’t be possible because we could only know something certainly if we had experienced it universally. Otherwise we might one day encounter a fact that alters (or even reverses) everything we’ve believed up to that point. We would be continually searching, never truly knowing. We just simply don’t know enough nor have we experienced enough on our own, as finite, historical, mortal beings, to make universal truth claims. In a universe “governed” (for lack of a better word) by chaos, nothing is permanent - not nature, not even our own selves.
Second, science wouldn’t be possible because there would be no reason to believe the universe would continue to behave in the future as it has in the past. Science is based on probability, and probability has no place in a universe of chaos. Logic is the same way - there is no basis for rationality if the universe is ultimately impersonal and irrational (chaos again). The very law of contradiction cannot be accounted for if chaos is ultimate; logic is only possible if the universe is ultimately rational.
The topic of this thread is “how do natural rights theories cross the is/ought divide?” This question involves metaphysics (is), and ethics (ought). it also includes epistemology - and I would submit that the only valid epistemology is a revelational epistemology. That is, true knowledge is only possible if the absolute personal God reveals it to us. I know most won’t like this answer, and I’m sure I haven’t shared it as eloquently or clearly as it could be shared. Nevertheless, I have offered an example of how the is/ought divide is crossed in the Christian-theistic version of the natural rights discussion.
I’m not sure I agree here, unless you are simply describing common themes that can be found in commonsense “morality”. What are the implications of egoism or the position (that I won’t get into here) that altruism is nonsensical and that seemingly altruistic actions are merely satisfying more roundabout or immaterial desires?