I believe that nirgraham has used ‘ought’ in a different sense than AJ. I believe AJ has defined ‘ought’ as an ‘end’ grounded by ‘values’, ‘passions’, ‘preferences,’ and ‘desires’. Nirgraham has defined ‘ought’ as a ‘means’ to reach a goal.
Any being having a nature ought to act in accordance with its nature.
Man has a nature.
Hence, man ought to act in accordance with his nature.
But why should one act in accordance with one’s nature? Because…
All beings must act in accordance with their nature in order to survive.
Survival (life) is a prerequisite for action.
Thus, any action taken against one’s own survival is logically contradictory.
Thus, any being having a nature ought to act in accordance with its nature.
That is, of course, my own summary. Rassmusen proves natural law more formally:
1.Y is an object of choice.
2.X is necessary for the existence of Y as a value." X makes Y’s
existence as a value possible.
3.If P chooses (values) Y, P must choose (value) what is necessary for
P’s valuation of Y.
4.P chooses (values) Y.
5.Thus, P chooses (values) X.
6.X is man’s life qua man, man’s natural end.
7.Thus, P chooses (values) man’s life qua man in choosing (valuing) Y.
In the above, “Y” is any action you take and “X” is your life, which is necessary for you in order to take any action “Y.” “P” is essentially any living being, who must act to preserve their own life in order to act. One must act in accordance with natural law in order to survive.
I have discovered a flaw in Rasmussen’s argument here. Note that my argument represents Rasmussen’s, but explicates his implicit ‘ought-assumptions’. Rasmussen still has not bridged the ‘is-ought gap’ in a sense.
…only to some degree. Of course a complete revolt against ones own nature would generally lead to self-destruction. But obviously a complete accordance is not necessary for survival. Natural laws regarding man are Aristotelean laws of tendency, not Keplerian laws of necessity.
This ignores the time-structure of action. Action taken against one’s own survival precludes future action, but the anti-survival action is not contradictory to itself.
Even if (3) were established (which it is not), its assertion of logical contradiction would prove that all beings necessarily act in accordance with their natures, not that they ought to.
I haven’t defined “ought,” but merely ask for a definition of “ought” and other ambiguous terms like “right” and “wrong” if natural law and natural rights proponents claim their theories to be logically proven. There can be no logical proof until all the terms used therein are unambiguously defined.
How can a reader even be expected to proceed beyond the very first premise without a precise the definition of the highly ill-defined word “ought”? [Edit: I missed that that was just your summary. I take on Rasmussen below.]
First of all, as above, how does Rasmussen expect to be taken seriously without defining the vague notion “man’s life qua man”? If, as you say it simply means “staying alive,” then all that has been even conceivably been proven here is
“If P values a particular action or choice, P must also value staying alive.”
Secondly, I must question with Lilburne when P values the choice/action vs. when P values staying alive. At any given point in time, P may not be valuing staying alive over another particular end - such as getting to work on time by running a red light.
how could you get that from what i wrote. oughts are not ends , oughts are not ‘means’ . rather they are obligations.
right and wrong can’t be reduced down. they are atomic concepts. im pretty sure you understand perfectly well the difference between right and wrong, and just find yourself forgetting when you slip on your philosophers slippers.
in my opinion looking for a ‘pure airtight proof’ of the justification of the moral project will be just as elusive as would be the search for a ‘pure airtight proof’ of the justification for the science project. science advances justifications (not certain ones, just ones of growing confidence) and its benefits are clear to see. similarly those engaged in moral discource and studying morality, can refine their thinking and grow in confidence with regards to it, and I claim that libertarian morality has benefits as clear to see as those of science.
Then there is no proof, but you do concede the same below.
And this is pure consequentialism, which natural right proponents seem opposed to.
At the end of the day, all this natural rights business is persuasion, and persuasion can be eloquent and useful, can possibly be supported by scientific findings, can be almost universally appealing. However, the foray into the realm of propositional logic to add weight to the persuasive argument seems to have been an overstep. Logic is unforgiving: it’s a “pure airtight proof” or it’s nothing. In putting his toe in the water but failing to take the plunge, Rothbard has unwittingly given opponents of liberty an easy target to “prove liberty wrong.” A horrendous misstep in my opinion, and Long, Rasmussen and others only multiply the error.
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Also, there are a lot of other words I’d like you to define (so that I really understand what you are saying) but I don’t wont to overwhelm you right now.
If I was attempting to make formal logical statements, I would precisely define each term. However, I am merely attempting to persuade. It is those who claim to have formally proven something who need to define their terms with precision.