See, this just doesn’t make sense to me. Basically what’s being said here is…
“A man’s nature is to excercise free will. Therefore another man ought not to violate a man’s free will.” Within that argument is a hidden assumption that “a man ought not to frustrate the nature of another man”. So then we have the syllogism…
“(A) A man’s nature is to excercise free will. (B) Another man ought not to frustrate the nature of a man. (C) Therefore another man ought not to violate a man’s free will.”
…the premise (A) is fair enough, but the premise (B) is totally unfounded, so the conclusion (C) simply does not follow.
I think in Rothbard’s formulation it only seems to make sense prima facie because he conflates the individual man with mankind (see the Man/Mankind thread). But if you express what he’s saying with methodological individualism (which is the only method that make sense when you’re trying to proclaim what individuals ought to do) as I do in the above syllogism, it’s evident that it frankly makes no sense. And Dr. Gordon (whom, as well as Rothbard, I greatly respect) pointing to all the scholars Rothbard cites, all the counterarguments Rothbard attempts to address, and Rothbard’s dialectical skill does nothing to change that fact.
lets try to agree on what the oughts are first…, and then look to see if they need “is’s” to justify them , which they would need if they ‘weren’t’, or whether they just ‘are’ themselves
Ought is simply a statement about a preferred state of affairs, as opposed to what “is”. It is the presumption of value in a state of affairs, while morality is a system of ought statements whos purpose are to attain said valuable state of affairs.
I hold that value is subjective, hence morality is subjective.
The concept property presupposes a value statement. Property is legitimate exclusivity, legitimate meaning constrained to a certain moral code.
Property is subjective. A given moral system can constrain exclusivity to a certain class, while another value system would result in different property rights.
To be more precise, the content of a property right is subjective.
Maybe you misunderstood me. Property is legitimate exclusive use, implying a moral code by which it is constrained. The content of that code determines the conditions of the property right. I do not understand how your response was appropriate.
naturally, if you are skeptic of moral codes, and they are subjective, then other things which you tie to that will seem similarly subjective. like your position on property rights.
if you are a moral realist and posit objectivity to morality, then your property theory will be firmed up.
in my previous post i was making a more general point that meta-ethics is notoriously tortourous whatever ones stake, and there are such things as the limit of language,…
haha, do i have to do it in public or can i do it in private [:P]
i think i would take up pages and pages. but my gist is that moral talk is not gibberish, there are common elements, they point in common directions, they might be said to have a common telos or reason. so i reflect as analytically as i can about what morality purports to be and what properties it should have in order to be what is claimed for it. and by such analysis i whittled down candidate moralities to the true morality of libertarianism. and satisfied myself that, the morality is ‘inforce’ for all moral agents capable of similiar analysis.
this begs lots of questions of course but i dont get paid to type by the paragraph (or at all!)
Anyway, a religious person relying on God for their morality doesn’t need to cross the is/ought gap: if their god declares that something ought not be done, that is the end of the discussion. And of course pointing out God’s views is also an effective persuasion method for all his fellow believers.
“Ought not” in order to bring about what consequences? Only three types of answers are possible:
Ought not, only in order to achieve certain consequences.
Ought not, for reasons purely unrelated to consequences.
Ought not, in order to achieve some consequences and also for reasons purely unrelated to consequences.
If Case 1, the statement is purely consequentialist.
If Case 2, the onus immediately falls on Rothbard to explain precisely what he means by “ought not” (for reasons purely unrelated to consequences) in precise, unambiguous terms - if he did not soon do so, we must reject his whole notion as nothing more than non-logical persuasion and wholly inappropriate for academic discourse.
If Case 3, the statement is partly consequentialist, and the remainder is merely non-logical persuasion if he does not immediately clear up exactly what he means by “ought not” (for reasons purely unrelated to consequences).
Hence until someone can explain how “ought not for reasons purely unrelated to consequences” can make sense in rigorous, precisely-defined, unambiguous language without reference to similarly ill-defined terms, Rothbard’s statement must be either
Purely consequentialist
Pure non-logical persuasion
Partly consequentialist and partly non-logical persuasion
Man ought not to frustrate another man because in so doing he indirectly frustrates himself. By violating the rights of others a man negates his own claim to the same rights and opens himself to just retaliation.
To argue that men don’t have the foresight to realize this is to argue that men are not rational.