I ought to take an aspirin as this thread is killing my brain. [:P]
You suppose that it is self-evident that a man ought be free of frustration. That man should act in his self-interest or utility maximization may be a workable first-principle, but it isn’t self evident and cannot be derived from factual statements.
and
Yes, these are both consequentialism, the only meaningful way to cross the is/ought gap (meaning we allow for ought to mean simply “ought…in order to achieve X”). All other ways are mere persuasive techniques, which are perfectly valid in their own right, but have no place in academic discourse. I welcome any reader or scholar to attempt to demonstrate otherwise.
This begs the question, because his having such a claim in the first place and the notion of retaliation being “just” also presupposes other “oughts”.
And if this is merely a consequetialist argument, then it is false too, because such a man may be quite confident that no such retaliation, just or not, will ever result (as in Plato’s Ring of Gyges scenario). Of course this last is more of a matter for the “Man/Mankind” problem in another thread.
I already gave you one, at the top of the post.
Man is a living thing, and therefore he ought to go on living.
This statement is axiomatic.
Any argument to the contrary negates itself, because those doing the arguing have already agreed to the truth of this statement continuing to live.
If you hold that men ought not to go on living, and you believe this to be rational, then please, demonstrate.
If you post again, it will necessarily mean one of two things:
- You are irrational, and therefore have entered this rational discourse under false pretenses (I believe that’s what’s called a ‘troll’)
or
- You concede the point: Man is a living thing, therefore he ought to go on living.
Yes, when we are not on the same page metaphysically and epistomologically, it does beg the question. We have, I think we can all agree, started in the middle of philosophy and not at the beginning.
I can assure you that it does not beg the question, so long as you understand the philosophical foundation of the statement, but you’ll have to take my word for it…unless you want to start from the beginning, philosophically.
Wrong, confused and/or dishonest.
This is not self-evident.
As I said elsewhere, any action taken to extend life is not an admission of life as a first principle, categorical imperative, what have you. My life may be value-neutral except to the extent it satisfies some unobserved value.
Your argument, that because a man lives is an admission that he “ought” to live, is untenable.
False dichotomy. To reject the proposition that man ought to live does not assert the proposition that man ought not to live.
You fail logic.
Ought to go on living in order to achieve what consequences? If not to achieve any consequences, then please explain precisely what you mean by “ought to go on living,” because your meaning is not obvious unless you mean to refer to consequences. Alternatively, if you mean in order to achieve consequences, the statement is consequentialist. I agree the is/ought gap can be bridged through consequentialism, but it is trivial to do so as I showed here. So I think Lilburne is looking for a non-consequentialist way to cross the is/ought divide.
This statement represents a default on rational discourse. How can we have a discussion if we assert things like “unobserved values” which hold sway over the discussion?
I may as well say “You’re wrong because The Voice Of God spoke to me and told me so.” It has as much verifiability as your statement.
And anyway, a thing can’t serve as a means to a valuable end and remain value-neutral, especially not a thing so important as one’s own life. To assert that it can, with no foundation or defense, is simply to argue arbitrarily, IE irrationally. The burden of proof lies on you. If you want to include the concept of “unobservable ends” in the conversation then you’d better supply some foundation for it.
A “false dichotomy” only exists when there are many choices and only two are presented. However, between the choice to live and the choice to not live, there aren’t a spectrum of possiblities. One either lives or dies, one doesn’t “sort-of die” or “kind-of live, sometimes.”
So, in fact, rejecting the proposition that you ought to go on living does assert the proposition that you ought not to live.
This is what I believe is called a “true dichotomy.”
Anyway, it matters not, because so long as you go on referring to “unobservable values” to bolster your argument, I must conclude that you’re irrational, and not interested in real debate.
All “ought” statements do not imply a purpose. Life is an end unto itself.
For Romantivist, even Rand would never assume that because someone is alive that they ought to continue to live. Rand, and a few other consequentialists, recognized living for living’s sake isn’t always the best option. Should someone knowing they’re going to be tortured for the entire length of their natural life continue to wish to live, when death may give them the means to escape? Should someone that is going to suffer a similar circumstance due to an incurable disease want to live too?
Should I avoid all risks in life just to stay alive? No, avoiding death doesn’t ensure a life in terms of one’s values. If one values their life, they’ll make the best of it, but that’s the kicker, it’s their life without a theoretical framework to tie it to that of others. We’re all heavily into individualism in the argument so far, but no one else has really brought it to the fore the importance of a meta-ethical framework that connects the personal values of individuals to a larger whole that composes society. I’m not necessarily arguing for a greater good, or commonweal, but I am arguing there’s something that is operating between human beings other than blind chance in terms of avoiding ruinous conflicts.
One of my professors at my university, who taught my moral philosophy class, suggested a similar “patch work theory” as I’m suggesting too, but I think I make a distinction from him in that it’s not a mere patch work, but rather a system of open ended actions (and equally open ended value systems) by which a meta-ethical framework can be constructed. Now, what does this mean for the is-ought divide? Not much, other than the ought of personal values can lead to an is in terms of what is true for being a human being in a society. Whether the particular values that evolve are alien from what we’re accustomed to in our age may not be important (beyond some bare minimum of a non-heuristic set of truisms), or whether they retain the same sense of ethos as we do today, the fact will remain that the same structure in the personal individual ethical concerns and the impersonal ‘collective’ ethical concerns will be maintained by the same frameworks.
For me, ought still stands as a signal for alternate actions that one may or may not instantiate in terms of one’s values. The term is is simply a statement of fact (past or present), thus to attempt to make an object the values that each person carries with them is nonsense not from the standpoint that these are indiscrete or arbitrary, but that these depend on the context and choices of each person. So, the is can only signal that a person is following a set of values, the ought is the signal of the choices s/he can make in terms of those values (even in terms of dispensing of one set of values for that of another).
those concerned with the ought/is gap suppose that
a) morality can be reduced down to non-moral facts, in which case they will destroy morality by eliminating that which is special/peculiar about it. squeezing ethics → physics is to say that everything is physics and there is no ethics (not vice versa)
b) that if morality cant be reduced down to non-moral facts, there cant be moral facts, because they suppose that only non-moral facts can be facts.
That does not refute my argument because my argument does indeed show that moral correctness is the same as any other correctness. The simple truth is that all “ought” statements imply a specific “want”. As an Austrian economist, if you wanted to make nonexistent the human race, then you would preach extreme statist and totalitarian ideology. However, if you wanted to be successful, then you would have to pretend that the instillation of such ideology will cause all to prosper because that is, generally, the “want” of humans.
Any disconnect between “ought” and “want” implies totalitarianism and collectivism.
Bingo. Ethics != Cosmology.
Indeed. The only way for morality to be objective is if it bridges the is/ought gap with consequentialism. I don’t think consequentialism is properly called morality, because then it is simply a technical matter of optimizing human action (right/wrong as smart/stupid). Outside of utilitarianism, morality could not be consequentialist and universal at the same time, because likely consequences will differ for different people according to different situations (the man/mankind problem). And nothing in utilitarian theory has convinced me why I as an individual ought to strive for the greatest utility for the greatest number, or force anyone else to.
Casting all these academic contrivances aside, all that is left is the preponderant, inherent decency of the human heart. I just don’t see what’s so scary about that.
The fact that you are defending moral relativism demonstrates that you believe we ought to regard morality as relative. Furthermore, it demonstates that you think there are correct and incorrect moral propositions. Moral relativism/subjectivism/emotivism become instantly dubious once you consider the fact that they entail moral propositions themselves.
Strictly speaking, nothing can cross the is-ought divide. Introducing purpose is basically introducing an ought proposition into the equation. As I elaborated earlier:
Proposition 1 (is): A wants B
Proposition 2 (is): A can attain B through C
Conclusion 1 (ought): A should use C to attain B
This is not valid reasoning without introducing
Proposition 3 (ought): A ought to attain his wants
This is often hidden by the if-then form consequentialists use in their reasoning. Its simply sloppy semantics.
Instead of saying “If A wants B he should do C”, it would be proper to say “If A should attain B, he should do C”.
Just to note we can indeed reduce ‘morality’ into ‘non-moral’ ‘facts’ in a sense. For example, we can reduce the human’s ‘moral’ ‘preference’ to not harm others to the genes that force people to feel empathy and guilt. The ‘existence’ of those genes ‘are’ not ‘preferences’, but ‘objective facts’ about the world. I believe Anarchist Cain and wilderness has defended ‘objective morality’ in this sense.
When you propose this, you demonstrate that you believe we ought to accept it as true. Even in denying that the is/ought gap is bridgeable, you affirm that it, in fact, is bridgeable.
i believe that a rational animal that did not have empathy or guilt ‘emotions’ but could reflect on interpersonal action, freedom etc. could derive libertarian ethics. i dont know how id prove that, or how you would prove the opposite. but i thought i should at least indicate a counter position without letting yours be the only one people read .