trulib,
I think that you’re still taking Hulmann’s idea that there’s a “value inequality between means and ends” for granted. I challenged that idea in my first post in this thread, but regardless of whether I was successful, I still have no idea what the hell it would even mean. I know that you admitted that you and he might simply be comparing 2 different kinds of means, but in your post above, you go back to the original way of saying it (“value inequality between means and ends”). I’m not sure how the theory would hold up if you really took it seriously that it’s meaningless to talk about preferring the ends to it means. I know what it would mean to prefer one means over another (maybe clicking your fingers rather than having to stand there ironing it for 10 minutes), but I have absolutely no idea what it would mean to prefer the end over its means. Again, I know that you already conceded that you and he might be merely comparing 2 means, but then I don’t know why that applies to anything. Sure, you would probably prefer clicking your fingers to standing there ironing for 10 minutes (or would you?), but I’m totally confused about how that would explain where originary interest comes from.
Actually, let’s get back to the dancing example. Why would I dance anyway? Maybe I would feel better afterwards or something? I think that you’re taking it for granted that we could somehow see every part of it as an end in itself. What if it’s simply that engaging in those movements would make you happier once your done? But wait, aren’t you happy the whole time? Yeah, but that happens in all kinds of “labor actions”. I mean, I might really enjoy cooking even if I’m only doing it for the meal, and it might be the same way with the meal itself even if I’m only doing it for the fuel. If you’re simply dancing for the happiness of having danced, why wouldn’t it make sense to say that you wish that you could be happy without having to dance? And the same for anything else. Or it might be that each submovement in the dance makes you happy, which would mean that it’s simply an action where the means and ends alternate in a super fast pace.
But enough of that. If there’s anything here, certainly you could re-state it in a more realistic manner? I find that the terms “means” and “ends” are totally confusing and make everything sound a lot simpler than it really is. In fact, I’m not even sure what the hell they’re supposed to mean. AE often uses the word “means” to refer to something like a hammer, but then turns around and uses that term to refer to something like ironing? Well, is the ironing the means, or is it the iron? It would clear up a lot of stuff for me if you could try to re-state Hulsmann’s theory in some more realistic terms (“imagine”, “see”, “pleasure”, “pain”, “feel desire”, and so on). I’m still not sure where the value inequality is. I mean, I’m even starting to wonder why I would pick willing the shirt to go crease-free instead of having to iron it. Aren’t there a bunch of considerations that we’re missing? If we were in a world where longer production processes were safer, didn’t use any extra energy or anything, and so on, wouldn’t I pick the ironing? I’m starting to question whether it’s even self-evident that we would pick the one over the other. Can’t we imagine a world where I really would pick the longer production process (the ironing instead of willing)? And then what?
Anyway, I still think that the answer is time preference. I think that the PTTP is broken, but that doesn’t mean that I abandoned time preference or anything. But what is time preference? How would I reduce it to my perceptions? I think that the answer is buried somewhere in this post that I wrote to Azure. It’s where I discount the pain/pleasure for one of my further future selves in comparison to one of my nearer ones. But how would that happen? And why? Well, all that I can think of is where you’re not certain that your further future selves are even going to exist. If you don’t expect to make it through the night, your time preference will shoot through the roof. Maybe normally you might want to postpone eating until the next morning to sleep better or something, but with your uncertainty that you’re even gonna be there in the morning, you indulge right then. That’s really all that I can think of. Do you have any ideas? Can your time preference ever come from anything but being uncertain about whether you’re still gonna be around? (And by the way, that would explain why your time preference can’t be negative. You’re either 100% certain or less. You’re never 101% certain or anything like that.)