I came here to learn. Will anyone help me?

Ming is making a good point, though I’m not sure he understands it.

At issue here is the idea that if one piece of property touches another piece of property that a transfer of title occurs. If this is not true in a case of two movable pieces of property, for example, cars bumping. Why should it be true in a case where only one of the properties is movable and the other is land?

Friehiet’s claim that is trespassing to retrieve your property from another person’s land rests on the fact that a transfer of title has occured. If no transfer has occured than it is not trespassing to retrieve your property, should the neighbor refuse to return it.

Thank you, the idea of liens never crossed my mind.

Let me take my neighbor’s point of view in the “accident scenario”. First, the facts:

  1. I have kicked my ball on his property by accident

  2. I want his property removed from my ball

My neighbor has three legal choices now:

  1. Let me retrieve the ball myself and accept a fee for damages to lawn and the service of letting me on his property

  2. With my permission, remove the ball himself and accept a fee for damages to lawn and the service of returning it to me

  3. With my permission, pay for the cost of the ball minus damages to his lawn. He now owns the ball.

In all three choices, I pay for my accident and the neighbor gains a little extra than had I not kicked it on in the first place. If it was not my accident, but an act of nature that caused the displacement (tornado-truck example), then the same would apply but I would not owe for damages. I would, however, still owe for services. If my neighbor flat-out claims my ball as his property, then he has initiated aggression (I did not aggress upon him if it was an accident or natural disaster). If I threw the ball (or any object) at his lawn in order to deliberately damage it, he would be justified in keeping it because I have initiated aggression.

I have thought a bit more on this issue and discovered some interesting implications:

#1: The neighbor can charge whatever he wants to let me on his property. If the price is too high for me, then I will give permission for him to physically move the ball. On to #2:

#2: The neighbor can charge whatever he wants for the service of returning the ball. If the price is too high for me, then we move to #3:

#3: I can charge whatever I want for the ball. If the price is too high for my neighbor, then we move back to #1 or #2.

Moving around #1, #2, and #3, the prices will lower until one of our “supplies” meets the others “demand”. I think this is the perfect way to handle the situation.

Okay, Mingo: I think the fault in your argument here is this concept of ethics as being sort of laws-of-physics type rules. Ethics are rules for human action, not the nature/behavior of non-willful particles.

It is as meaningless to say that the lawn owner’s land is “infringing” upon your ball, as it is to say that your chest is “infringing” upon your murderer’s knife. This isn’t about the laws of physics. This is about human action. It’s about how humans ought to act.

The key concept here is that Person A ought not act toward Person B’s property in a way in which Person A is implicitly presuming a higher claim of ownership over Person B’s property than Person B has over his own property. This is because the concept of “ownership” is that one individual ought to be considered by other individuals to be in a position of ultimate jurisdiction over what happens to the owned thing. When Person A acts toward Person B’s property in a way in which Person A is implicitly presuming a higher claim of ownership over Person B’s property, then Person A is violating Person B’s property right over that owned thing, because Person A is acting on the consideration that he is in the ultimate position of jurisdiction over the owned thing instead of Person B.

Let’s say that Person A takes out a bb gun and shoots Person B with it. It was as a result of Person A’s action that Person A’s property (the BB) became lodged in Person B’s property (his flesh). Because Person A’s action was the catalyst for this event of property transgressing against property, then Person A ought to be considered the infringer here. And since Person B’s action was not the catalyst for this event of property transgressing against property, then Person B ought not be considered the infringer here.

All property violations are, in essence, a form of theft (or the threat thereof). In this case, Person A has really committed a form of theft against Person B’s property. Person A has acted in such a way that he considered himself to be in ultimate jurisdiction (ownership) over Person B’s property (his flesh), to utilize Person B’s property for Person A’s own use.

Thus, since Person B has had his property rights infringed by Person A, Person B is under no obligation to fish out the BB and return it to Person A. And, if Person B decides for some weird reason that he actually wants the BB to stay in his flesh, Person A has no right to fish the BB out of Person B’s flesh. Thus, Person B’s flesh is not infringing upon Person A’s BB. Rather, Person A’s BB is infringing upon Person B’s flesh. Person A loses his property title in that BB, not only because Person A has used that BB to infringe Person B’s property rights, but also because Person A has lost all levels of control (and at least some level control over a thing is necessary for it to meaningfully be called “property”) over that BB (because Person A has lost all levels of physical control over it, AND he has no ethical way to repossess it, as the situation stands).

Now, to apply this to the soccer ball situation:

Let’s say that Person A is playing with a soccer ball, and that he kicks it up into the windy air and the soccer ball lands in Person B’s yard. It was as a result of Person A’s action that Person A’s property (the soccer ball) became lodged in Person B’s property (his lawn). Because Person A’s action was the catalyst for this event of property transgressing against property, then Person A ought to be considered the infringer here. And since Person B’s action was not the catalyst for this event of property transgressing against property, then Person B ought not be considered the infringer here.

All property violations are, in essence, a form of theft (or the threat thereof). In this case, Person A has really committed a form of theft against Person B’s property. Person A has acted in such a way that he considered himself to be in ultimate jurisdiction (ownership) over Person B’s property (his yard), to utilize Person B’s property for Person A’s own use.

Thus, since Person B has had his property rights infringed by Person A, Person B is under no obligation to go out of his way to get the soccer ball and return it to Person A. And, if Person B decides for some weird reason that he actually wants the soccer ball to stay in his yard, Person A has no right to go get the soccer ball out of Person B’s yard. Thus, Person B’s yard is not infringing upon Person A’s soccer ball. Rather, Person A’s soccer ball is infringing upon Person B’s yard. Person A loses his property title in that soccer ball, not only because Person A has used that soccer ball to infringe Person B’s property rights, but also because Person A has lost all levels of control (and at least some level control over a thing is necessary for it to meaningfully be called “property”) over that soccer ball (because Person A has lost all levels of physical control over it, AND he has no ethical way to repossess it, as the situation stands).

The only way that the lawn could be said to be “infringing” upon the soccer ball, would be if the lawn owner’s lawn was portable (like patches of turf), and, as you kicked the soccer ball up into the air, the lawn owner used the patch of turf to purposefuly catch the soccer ball and run off with it. In this case, it would be the lawn owner’s actions that were the catalyst for this transgression of property against property, and it could properly be said that his “lawn” is “infringing” upon your soccer ball.

And, just to cover all the bases, and help make the distinction even clearer, let’s assume that the lawn owner is loading patches of turf off the back of a truck and carrying them over to his lawn. You kick the soccer ball up into the air, and it inadvertently lands on the patch of turf the lawn owner is carrying. In this case, it would be your action that was the catalyst for this transgression of property against property, and it could properly be said that your soccer ball was “infringing” upon his lawn.

Oh, come now. Do I really have to point out the glaring non-sequitirs in your argument here? Read my post over one more time, and then read your reply. If you honestly don’t see how absurdly flawed your thinking is here, then I’ll take the time to point out all your mistakes for you, but really, come on.

Freiheit, TL, DR.

That’s fine, I was responding to Mingo, not you.

Libertarian philosophy is deontological. The ends do not justify the means. I have stated before that there is quite a large difference between aggression and accident; the former is intentional, the latter is not. Whoever causes the aggression or accident is still responsible for damages; only aggression can be punishable by force.

Why are you bringing “punishment” into this discussion?

We’re simply talking about the property status of goods which, due to the owner’s action (whether positive action or passive action), violate another person’s property rights, and, concurrently, the property status of goods which the owner loses all levels of physical control over and loses all ethical means of repossession.

The lawnowner has used force to take my ball. If I intended aggression, then he would be justified, for aggression can be punishable by force.

If I kicked it on by accident, I have not violated his property rights or committed aggression; I have only made the two objects touch. I have not lost ownership of my ball any more than he has lost ownership of his lawn. It is still my fault that they touched and I owe him restitution for damages, but he can not use force to take the ball. I have already posted what would end up happening in such a case.

Take the china shop situation for example. If I pick up a piece of china and it slips out of my fingers, I owe restitution, but the owner can not pull out a gun and shoot me. If I walk in and proceed to destroy everything in aggression, then the owner would be justified in using force as punishment/self-defense.

what the initially agressed person can do is bounded by knowledge, knowledge that the initially agressing person posesses as a secret private priviledge.

you are saying that in natural law, (when the storeowner has not agreed to follow a set code of conduct that would oblige him to act less aggressively), the agressed person must act as though blind to the fact that the aggression experienced was accidental or intentional.

No, I am not.

  1. If the china owner shoots the man and the man genuinely dropped it by accident, the china owner has made an aggression. The man must pay for the china, and the owner must pay for the hospital bills and some retribution

  2. If a man is wrecking the china, it is obvious that he is committing aggression, and the owner is justified in self-defense.

It is up to the courts to determine if #1 was the case.

Also, I have finished reading the chapters of The Ethics of Liberty that deal with self-defense and proportionality (12 and 13), and am a bit disappointed that Rothbard has not mentioned anything about unintentional damages, which is what I am dealing with here.

can anyone but the man himself ever know whether it was by accident or not?

Ah, I have found what I was looking for. Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 8:

“WE HAVE SO FAR been discussing the free society, the society of peaceful cooperation and voluntary interpersonal relations. There is, however, another and contrasting type of interpersonal relation: the use of aggressive violence by one man against another. What such aggressive violence means is that one man invades the property of another without the victim’s consent. The invasion may be against a man’s property in his person (as in the case of bodily assault), or against his property in tangible goods (as in robbery or trespass). In either case, the aggressor imposes his will over the natural property of another—he deprives the other man of his freedom of action and of the full exercise of his natural self-ownership.

I do not think accidentally kicking the ball on my neighbor’s lawn qualifies as imposing my will over his natural property. If I did it to purposely damage his rosebushes or anything else he owns, then yes, it would be aggression.

trespasser

and… when did kicking take no will power?

Trespassing is a deliberate action to defy one’s property rights. Using one’s will power to kick a ball is not the same as imposing one’s will over another’s property.

You walk on another’s property that’s called trespassing. Takes will to walk and step on another’s property.

Of course not. Either way the man still has to pay for the china. Private courts would be used to examine the evidence and make a decision on if the owner owes for the man’s pain and suffering.

Correct, and the owner would be justified in forcing me off. “Trespassing is a deliberate action to defy one’s property rights.” However, the last time I checked, soccer balls do not have will. It is only trespassing if I deliberately kicked it on.