I would expect all laws to apply universally to all citizens (and not some special groups), to all transactions (and not just market trasnactions), to all “roles” the citizens might take in the transaction (so no special laws for consumer, for retailer, for seller or for buyer).
The implied warranty law is not universal since it specifically talks about market transactions and applies exclusively to sellers. So on one hand it seems to me that this law is not a very libertarian law, on the other hand what law can we make to protect parties in a market transaction without specifically mentioned the words “merchandize”, “seller” or “product”?
This is just a matter for customary norms. Whether implied warranties or caveat emptor apply, so long as it is generally understood by all parties there is no problem.
So rape laws are not libertarian because they apply exclusively to rapists? Where are you getting this (specific conception* of the) universability standard and why do you think it ought to be the determining factor in distinguishing between good law and bad law? Why wouldn’t you expect there to be particular laws (or, if you prefer, customs/conventions) for particular parties agreeing to particular contracts?
*For example, I don’t think I’ve heard this principle expressed as “no special laws for consumer, for retailer, for seller or for buyer.” The point is that anyone can be a “seller” in a “market transaction,” and so the law does apply to everyone.
If we get beyond the imaginarium of classificationism, all parties to any exchange are both buyer and seller. I am selling money for an iPod and buying an iPod for money.
I’d say such a law is universal, but it’s “conditionally universal”. By that I mean such a law applies every single time a certain condition arises. So the implied warranty law is universal on every person when he acts as a seller. Michael J. Green made much the same point, but much more obliquely IMHO.
By the way, what transactions do you think can occur besides market transactions?
Other transactions that can occur are contracts of any kind. For example a contract to hold a secret, or to do a certain thing at a certain time, a fidelity/marriage contract. These are all non market contracts.
Regarding rapists. That’s different. You must have very specific laws against aggression. But I don’t think you should have laws in which there is no aggression but simply a voluntary association. That’s because unlike a rape, which is a specific thing, an agreement between consenting parties can be any kind of thing. So how can you make laws about special agreements if any kind of agreement is possible? By having a law you make the system inflexible. You basically ban certain voluntary transactions or put an overhead over them. So voluntary agreements that should have taken place won’t take place. That does hurt freedom.
I’d personally consider those to be market contracts. Are you defining “market contracts” as “contracts involving money or exchange”?
I think the notion of “implied warranty” is actually a matter of fraud. As an example, let’s say I agree to purchase “a computer” from you. Upon receiving “the computer”, I try to turn it on but it doesn’t turn on. It turns out the motherboard was fried long ago. Depending on the going legal standard of what constitutes “a computer”, I could claim that you didn’t actually sell me what I paid for. Hence the transaction wasn’t exactly voluntary, as we were operating under different pretenses.
That’s not so simple. And what if the seller intended to sell you a “not working” computer? Who said such sale should be illegal? Maybe some people are interesting in buying not working computers for collections or for disassembly. You could say that the customer is to blame for not inquiring about the nature of the good, or asking for a certificate of some sort.
Although I’m inclined to agree with that it’s “not so simple”, I’m not entirely sure what you mean by that phrase. Otherwise, I think I already addressed your objections in my last post – the operative phrase there is “the going legal standard”.
The market for broken computers is different from the market for functioning computers. If a buyer wants a broken computer, or a spoiled fruit, he is free to buy them and sellers are free to sell them. If a buyer wants a functioning computer, or a fresh fruit, a person is not free to sell him a broken computer or spoiled fruit without making the defect(s) known (because, again, a broken computer is a different good than a functioning computer). It is indeed a matter of fraud; a person buys the rights to some good, but receives some other good instead. Obviously the buyer has some responsibility to make sure he is buying the good he actually wants to buy, but information is costly and it can be impossible to get all the relevant information prior to purchase. The buyer cannot expect to know everything and the seller cannot be expected to divulge every conceivable piece of information. That’s why there are “ordinary buyer’s expectations,” which are a matter of custom.