In defense of Fiduciary Media
According Selgin and White, fractional-reserve banking are more profitable than full-reserve banking. They say that no one accepts full-reserve banking, which means fractional-reserve banking drives out full-reserve banking.
And sometimes I don’t really understand.
Key points :
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Fractional-reserve banking has never been compulsory. Depositors have always been free to insist on 100 percent reserves.
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Benefits accrue to bank depositors and noteholders, who receive interest and services paid for by the extra bank revenue generated from lending out a portion of its liabilities. As Mises put it: “Fiduciary media tap a lucrative source of revenue for their issuer; they enrich both the person that issues them and the community that employs them.” (which means : money creation gives more revenue).
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It would be farfetched to account for such behavior by insisting that the depositors had run because they had learned to their horror that their own banks had been holding fractional reserves, but were so naive as to put their money into another set of banks without suspecting them of similar practices. But if such a realization (that their bank held only fractional reserves) had been the typical cause of runs in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it would be difficult to explain why runs usually affected only one particular bank or an associated set of banks, and not every single fractional-reserve bank simultaneously. Running depositors who successfully withdrew their money often transferred it to other fractional-reserve banks, thought to be safer, rather than hoarding cash as they would have done if they feared fractional-reserve banks generally.
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Few people have taken the 100-percent-reserve option because (as Rothbard forthrightly acknowledges) it means foregoing interest and paying warehousing fees instead.
Most depositors would rather receive (more) interest on their deposits, and consider it more than adequate compensation for the risk involved in fractional-reserve banking. We think it more likely that 100-percent-reserve banking is just not very widely demanded, because of its foregone-interest cost. -
Hoppe considers but rejects a standard economic argument we accept concerning fractional-reserve banking : that it reduces the resource costs associated with indirect exchange, by partially substituting bank-issued exchange media for commodity money, thereby reducing (inframarginally) the resource costs of producing money.
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Throughout the silver and gold standard eras, consumers given a choice ordinarily demonstrated a marked preference for banknotes over full-bodied coins as a more convenient medium of exchange for all but the smallest transactions.
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Did fractional-reserve banking cause the Business Cycle ? No. Business Cycle will occurs only with the Central Bank or Government intervention (inconvertible paper money, legal tender etc.), according both.
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Banknotes can include so-called “option clauses”. Scottish banknotes bore such clauses before 1765. With an option clause, a bank in effect reserves the right to stop redeeming its notes on demand, on the condition that it must pay interest on the notes during any period of suspension. So long as the interest rate is sufficiently high, option clauses are incentive compatible : they’ll only be invoked when so doing is in the noteholders’ own best interest.
They had them to protect against note raids, where rival banks would pile up notes and then stage a raid to exhaust a bank’s reserves and put it out of business. Such raids occurred in the early days of Scottish banking. The option clause might have been used to protect against random panics.
If you have any answers…
I would appreciate it.