Furthermore also relevant:
- Jeremiah Dyke: I too think it’s insane not to have the ability to contract any percentage of your labor for any duration of time. The problem is that many libertarians like Rothbard, Stephan Kinsella, David Gordon and Barnett, believe that such a condition is either an impossibility or shouldn’t be allowed.."
- Stephan Kinsella: I think a careful reading of Rothbard shows that his view does not rest on “impossibility” (as I used to think). Instead, I think Rothbard was not talking about the case of commission of crime, but only the narrow context of a would-be voluntary slave who has not committed aggression. Rothbard notes that it is impossible for the slave to get rid of his will, and “therefore” the promise to be a slave is not binding, i.e. his body is not alienable. I think what Rothbard was getting at is this: in the normal, default situation, each person IS a selfowner BECAUSE he has a will: i.e., a direct control over his body.
- This direct control is the natural position, and gives the person a better claim to his body than anyone else. That is WHY he is a selfowner. Hoppe later makes this argument explicitly: the reason we are self-owners is that each person has a unique and direct connection to his body: his direct control over it–or, as Rothbard says, his will. Now Rothbard is implicitly recognizing that the slave who promises to be slave still has his will, as he did not literally alienate it. Therefore, he still has the best link to his body, and thus he is still its owner. Now it is true that it is possible for someone to alienate their rights to their body, despite still having a will: by committing aggression. When you commit aggression you overcome the default presumption that you have the best right to control your body; now your victim has a better right to your body, despite your having the direct link to and direct control over it. But the point is the would-be voluntary slave never did commit aggression, so for him, he is able to change his mind.
- In short, a promise about what you will consent to in the future is just a prediction. IT may be right or may be wrong…
Edit: yes, here.