If I create a child out of my DNA and my labor, then I don’t own it, right?
If I make an android who is as smart as a human, then do I own it or not?
If I genetically engineer a chimpanzee to be as smart as a human, then do I own it?
What happens if the android or superchimp decides to work for someone else and pay its own way through the world? Does my right as creator prevail over its right to be free?
Right, no, no, kudos to Mr. Chips.
Assuming “smart as a human” means “conscious, moral agent”, for which the scenario in the last sentence would be defacto proof. You have no property rights as a creator of a consciousness, whether the raw material is DNA or silicon.
Does that also mean that a chimp who is born smart should get the same rights as a human?
Many kids these days work and I think do a worse job than some chimps would.
Not only the same rights, he should become the master of all humans. Like in Planet of the Apes.
I qualified it with “conscious, moral agent”. Being one of those is where rights come from, so, yes. Anything that can “decide to work for someone else and pay its own way through the world” is a moral agent - “decide” being the key word - or, if somehow not, you have no way to tell the difference anyway.
That’s enough spamming the board to push your own agenda, Dr Zeus.
OK. When I build Frankenstein then I’ll make sure he’s a conscious, immoral agent. That way he remains my slave. I’ll just program him not to turn on me.
If another being has the ability to reason like a human being, then it should have the rights of a human being. Animals don’t have the same rights has humans because they don’t have any concept of rights. Please see Ethics and Economics of Private Property by Hans Hoppe.
You mistake the meaning of “moral agent”, but then I’m beginning to doubt the seriousness and good faith of your efforts here.
I presume you mean that you have no property rights as a creator of consciousness if that consciousness has the ability to reason like a human. Otherwise I would say if you create a conscious being that has no ability to reason, you do have property rights in it.
It may process information as fast and as accurate as a human, but to the extent it doesn’t have conscious, emotions and all that, it’s still a machine.
But to the point, if your creation has the capacity of claiming freedom, then I’d say you have to let it go. Just like a child can ask for emancipation from its parents.
With regard to any abuse to those creations, I certainely agree with having laws against animal cruelty, and it’s certainely legitimate to provide protections against unnecessary force to those creations. How reaching they should be is very much into debate.
I agree; that’s essential point. If it knows what freedom is, and claims it, you have no right to keep it.
I’m meaning consciousness to subsume reason as well - I don’t think they are seperable. It’s certainly an arguable point, but when I say consciousness, that’s how I mean it. And I did hedge a bit even then by including moral agency. And, actually, moral agency is enough on it’s own, even if it could somehow exist sans reasoning faculties.
I don’t see how you can say consciousness and reason are inseperable. An ant has consciousness, but it cannot reason. Its motions are instinctual, not the result of a process of ratiocination. It cannot act in the way a human does because action (in the praxeological sense) involves reason, and therefore it cannot claim any rights for itself. It has absolutely no means to understand the concept of rights, nor the means to claim them.
What I understand you to be saying is that the crucial test is whether the creature is either:
I find it hard to fit a baby into these of these categories. Can the test be made to exclude babies (without provoking a heated debate about abortion).
You’re arguing against the wrong side of it. I don’t think ants are conscious, nor are dogs and cats. Chimps are a little greyer of an example, but I lean toward no. My definition of consciousness is the ability to conceptually place one’s self in alternate future circumstances and compare the outcomes against a valued exernal state. By “conceptually”, I mean without actually performing the actions and changing any state in the external world.
A prerequisite for that is self-awareness, but self awareness by itself is not consiousness. Another pre-requisite is reason, and if anything, while I don’t think consciousness is possible without reason, it may be true that reason is possible without consciousness - an exact reversal of the relationship your argument starts from. But if so, reason alone is not sufficient for consciousness, and not sufficient for moral agency and rights.
Consciousness by this definition, is sufficient for moral agency, and thus for rights.
A baby is a human and has the potential to do all of those things. While it is unable to argue for itself, it is in a custodial relationship with its guardian who has the ability to claim and exercise rights on its behalf. The same applies to someone who is mentally incapacitated.
The fact that a baby is unable to engage in argumentation does not provide any moral grounds for abortion. That’s a completely separate issue.
I think you meant include babies, since you seem to be claiming that the tests already exclude them.
I’ve been taking a bit of a shortcut since I didn’t think it would be relevant, but since you have made it so, I’ll try to explain.
The idea of inherent rights is a fallacy. Rights do not inhere to an individual, they are a requirement on the part of a moral agent for the kind of behavior that can be directed toward another moral agent. A baby has the capacity for moral agency, but it does not yet have the intellectual contents in its mind to exercise that capacity. But since another’s consciousness, and the contents of it, are entirely inaccessible to another person - whether the subject is an adult or a baby - we cannot actually know the difference between capacity and concrete ability. All we have to go on is a categorical definition of what kind of entities have the capacity - we cannot make that judgment based on the concrete contents of another consciousness
Further, parents are a proxy for the interests of a child until the child can excercise his own moral agency. In that sense, a baby has not only the capacity, but the concrete instantiation of moral agency, even if only by proxy. Since they have it, aggression would be a violation of it. The extension of rights to babies without such a proxy is just a more complicated formulation.
I was replying to your question on the “right to be free”. A baby can’t claim it. I guess a small child could though, and it would be most likely irresponsible to just let him go because he didn’t like to be grounded… Would be interesting to know how maturity is evaluated for emancipation purposes. I guess you need to show you understand what being free, responsible for yourself, implies…
Anyway, if you are talking about property, I think there are some restrictions and responsabilities you have to take when we are speaking of animals. Like if you abandon them inside your house to die, you certainely should be punished. Likewise, your paper as a guardian of some baby, small child, human in vegetable state, a challenged adult, etc also has restrictions and responsabilities. It’s hard to say what constitutes abuse and what not though…
Well, your defintion of consciousness is very different to mine then. My defintion of consciouseness is simply awareness of ones surroundings-- the ability to sense ones surroundings-- and it’s strictly confined to the present. A dog, a cat and , yes, even an ant is aware of its surroundings. The ability to “conceptually place oneself in alternate future crcumstances and compare the outcomes against a valued external state” is called reasoning, and it is a completely different thing. Consciousness is required for reasoning, but reasoning is not required for consciousness.