For those logicians out there: Why is slippery slope a logical fallacy?
If such a statement can be a fallacy, is there a way to structure it so it won’t be?
Here are some examples:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slippery_slope
Eugene Volokh’s Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope (PDF version) analyzes various types of such slippage. Volokh uses the example “gun registration may lead to gun confiscation” to describe six types of slippage:
Cost-lowering: Once all gun-owners have registered their firearms, the government will know exactly from whom to confiscate them.
Legal rule combination: Previously the government might need to search every house to confiscate guns, and such a search would violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Registration would eliminate that problem.
Attitude altering: People may begin to think of gun ownership as a privilege rather than a right, and thus regard gun confiscation less seriously.
Small change tolerance, colloquially referred to as the “boiling frog”: People may ignore gun registration because it constitutes just a small change, but when combined with other small changes, it could lead to the equivalent of confiscation.
Political power: The hassle of registration may reduce the number of gun owners, and thus the political power of the gun-ownership bloc.
Political momentum: Once the government has passed this gun law it becomes easier to pass other gun laws, including laws like confiscation.
Slippery slope can also be used as a retort to the establishment of arbitrary boundaries or limitations. For example, one might argue that rent prices must be kept to $1,000 or less a month to be affordable to tenants in an area of a city. A retort invoking the slippery slope could go in two different directions:
Once such price ceilings become accepted, they could be slowly lowered, eventually driving out the landlords and worsening the problem.
If a $1,000 monthly rent is affordable, why isn’t $1,025 or $1,050? By lumping the tenants into one abstract entity, the argument renders itself vulnerable to a slippery slope argument. A more careful argument in favor of price ceilings would statistically characterize the number of tenants who can afford housing at various levels based on income and choose a ceiling that achieves a specific goal, such as housing 80% of the working families in the area.
http://www2.law.ucla.edu/volokh/slippery.htm
Slippery slopes are, I will argue, a real cause for concern, as legal thinkers such as Madison, Jackson, Brennan, Harlan, and Black have recognized.[2] And these arguments comport at least partly with our own experience: We can all identify situations where a first step A has led to a later step B that might not have happened without A, though we may disagree about exactly which situations exhibit this quality.[3] A may not logically require B—but for political and psychological reasons, it can help bring B about.[4]
But, as legal thinkers such as Lincoln, Holmes, and Frankfurter have recognized, slippery slope arguments are of limited utility.[5] We accept, because we must, some speech restrictions. We accept some searches and seizures. We accept police departments, though creating such a department may lead to arming it, which may lead to some officers being willing to shoot innocent civilians, which may eventually lead to a police state (and all this has happened with the police in some places). Yes, each first step involves risk, but it is a risk that we need to run.
This need makes many people impatient with slippery slope arguments.[6] The slippery slope argument, the flip response goes, is the claim that “we ought not make a sound decision today, for fear of having to draw a sound distinction tomorrow.”[7] To critics of slippery slope arguments, the arguments themselves sound like a slippery slope: If you accepted this slippery slope argument, then you’d end up accepting the next one and then the next one until you eventually slip down the slope to rejecting all government power (or all change from the status quo), and thus “break down every useful institution of man.”[8] Exactly why, they ask, would accepting, say, a restriction on “ideas we hate” “sooner or later” lead to restrictions on “ideas we cherish”?[9] If the legal system is willing to protect the ideas we cherish today, why wouldn’t it still protect them tomorrow, even if we ban some other ideas in the meanwhile? And of course, even if one thinks slippery slopes are possible, what about cases where the slope seems slippery both ways—where both alternative decisions seem capable of leading to bad consequences in the future?[10]