Yes, it’s an arbitrary distinction, like any, but I notice that free marketers, classical liberals, and liberals of the Austrian tradition in general tend to safely avoid discussing matters of social taboos and sanctions, in order to sound credible.
It’s also the right thing to do.
But I remember an article by Rothbard I read recently which very boldly claimed there was a connection. The argument and example in favour of it was not much so - he said that the war on drugs was a means of hurting people’s economic liberties because cash would now be a means of carrying drugs and you are required to do large transactions through government-controlled banks.
Again, very poor example, but since he brought it up, do you think liberals should worry about civil liberties?
I think it’s a dangerous ground to tread into, knowing full well that a private property-based society could enforce restrictions and discriminations on personal actions and behaviours of people who are seen as undesirable. That would make a lot of those points moot, so what do you think?
You cannot have civil liberties without economic liberties. It can be shown that without private property rights, no other rights can be exercised. Private property rights and economic freedom are in all practical terms, synonymous.
Without control over the disposition of scarce resources one can not do anything. If the ‘state’ or the ‘community’ chooses who gets paper, they choose who may publish.
Of course, under certain circumstances, a certain amount of control of resource uses may be called for. When chaos reigns, you will have license and not freedom. Freedom without order is anarchy. This is why, for example, there is censorship of press in Singapore on political topics: to prevent the inflammation of democratic tendencies.
Define anarchy? If you are using it as synonymous with chaos that’s one thing, but if you are implying that some coercive and monopolistic central authority must exist for order to emerge, then I’m afraid that I must disagree, as many others here will also.
The problem is that “certain circumstances” is arbitrary. If X is required for the government to be able to perform Y action that it desires you can be sure that the government will be certain that X will occur.
Self-government is impossible, you will wind up with some sort of coercive central authority - there is no ‘natural law’ or ‘natural right’ which is either automatically emergent nor obvious to all rational men (as though men were rational to begin with). The question is what kind of authority, or who’s authority? Frederick the Great or Adlolf Hitler? This is a matter to be decided by the spirit of the nation, people get the government they deserve.
This is not to imply that there is no emergent law (or customary law) merely that such customary law always codifies itself into heirarchies, commands, authorities, privileges (privilege means private laws) where the interests of the elite define what is - and what is not - to be tolerated. If your elites a simpering left-wingers, you will end up with Democracy (or its splinter, Communism); otherwise you have a chance at some actual civilization.
The problem is that “certain circumstances” is arbitrary. If X is required for the government to be able to perform Y action that it desires you can be sure that the government will be certain that X will occur.
That is why you need a good government, with good incentives, and which can ignore ‘popular’ opinion.
Neither is there any “natural [way to build computers] which is either automatically emergent or obvious to all rational men”. But of course, that does not mean that either we need to instate a monopoly to build computers or just forget about being able to get them.
People are not only social but heirarchical in their modes of operation.
People are status seeking, and will ally themselves to ‘leaders’ who have their own status and power and promise to bring it to their followers.
Actual power relationships to exist, and will manifest themselves formally in complex of command and obedience.
Elites have an interest in forming corporate bodies for the protection of their property and privileges.
Truthful power structures are stable and conducive to the development of civilization.
But of course, that does not mean that either we need to instate a monopoly to build computers or just forget about being able to get them.
I do not propose any specific programme for all peoples at all times, only state that there will be such a structure and it is both inevitable and desireable that it exist. Just as it is desireable to have computers.
One must have peace, then security, then order. Only then can one have liberty, only then can one exist in an environment where an extended market order becomes meaningful. This is not to say there must be a single overarching control figure - just as more than one corporation producing PCs can exist, so more than one sovereign corporation exist. Nonetheless, they provide an invaluable service and can not be replaced by democracy - either democratic centralism (IE, welfare-communism) or Maoism (i.e. left-libertarianism). Both are recipes for cultural suicide.
It will be territorial. Not for any primarily economic reasons (as Nozick contends) but because humans are territorial, and because the control of propaganda and social organization requires a territorial sovereign - and elites do not form sovereign corporations merely to protect imagined ‘rights’, but to protect their power, their privilege, their property and their cultural organization. To make sure communism is illegal, not merely ‘immoral’.
So worse case, we’ll end up where you want to begin.
But this type of argument is rooted in a type of Marxist myth, that free markets naturally converge to monopolies. Do you believe this?
There does not need to be any such law. Or more accurately, not all people need to believe that there are any such "natural laws’ or whatever, however, there are fundamental human action axiomatic laws, and there are also propositions of economics that can be deduced from such laws.
The order that is required for the modern society can only emerge spontaneously and not by any sort of centrally planned authority. There are knowledge problems with the hierarchical structure of the centrally planning board. Such hierarchical authoritarian and coercive structures can only exist on a limited scale as parasites in the spontaneous order that has already emerged. There must first be production before the thief can loot.
Basically, you want a benevolent dictator. But you will also need a dictator with God like features so he can overcome the knowledge limitations that are inherent in any such centrally oriented structure. Are you familiar with the knowledge problem? Or it’s counterpart, the socialist calculation problem?
Look, Liberte,
The debate can be reduced to this. What type of services do you think a civilized and ordered society must have but can only be produced by coercion, as oppose to voluntary action?
You are saying: “People are” and “Actual power…” and “Elites have…” and “Truthful power structures are…” [my emphasis]
In other words, you are saying these are the realities of existence for humans. To put it directly, you’re saying these are laws of nature pertaining to human existence. Such laws that humans can’t avoid but actually partake with for better or worse.
I don’t propose any such thing. I propose a sovereign, independent and responsible government. One that derives its revenues from property values and its support from the privileged super-rich. I could give a damn about Republican delusions.
So worse case, we’ll end up where you want to begin.
No, if you spread the no-government myth you wind up with a bunch of fake-no-government propaganda and left-wing lies leading to decentralized and maniacal government (like the United States). You need real sovereignty and real authority.
But this type of argument is rooted in a type of Marxist myth, that free markets naturally converge to monopolies. Do you believe this?
Not at all - those who don’t want to organize a controlled society which ruthlessly deals with troublemakers and actually creates order and security (something the no-government plan can not do, except by luck for a short term with the right population) will set up a government. If not them, someone else who wants power and status. Someone who denies this does not understand history, much less economics.
The order that is required for the modern society can only emerge spontaneously and not by any sort of centrally planned authority.
Yes, like Hayek, I have read my Burke. The law is customary, as is authority. There is authority nonetheless because of this. No one voted or unanimously appointed the King of England. It was simply the case that he was sovereign.
Basically, you want a benevolent dictator.
Yes. I also want there to be some reason for him to be benevolent (as the CEO of a corporation is generally benevolent towards its shareholders and employees, within reason of maintaining the corporate structure itself).
But you will also need a dictator with God like features so he can overcome the knowledge limitations that are inherent in any such centrally oriented structure.
I am not talking about central economic planning, moreover I do not much care for the ‘knowledge’ interpretation as opposed to the ontological limitations on interpersonal comparisons of utility. That, however, is beside the point. What I am talking about is a sovereign, authoritarian government - not a totalitarian government dominated by Progressive fantasies of omnicompetence.
What type of services do you think a civilized and ordered society must have but can only be produced by coercion, as oppose to voluntary action?
Your entire argument is centered around straw man attacks, thus, you have no argument. You are confusing the voluntary society with lawlessness and chaos. Your argument is just asserting the equivalence with no attempt to prove it. Maybe you don’t understand the premises of the free society that I am making. namely, that law and order are economic goods that are bought and sold on the market. They can either be provided by a coercive monopoly, or by voluntary institutions in a free market. There is no middle.
Does this “sovereign, independent and responsible government” finance itself by expropriation? Does it claim its sovereignty, which I will interpret as monopoly over law and violence over a given territory, by force or threat of force?
If you answer yes to either one, they we are talking bout a limited government. It makes no difference that you have some other better idea on how to implement one. Or you can call it what you want, but in principle, it’s the same thing. Let’s not argue over terminology.
Are we still dealing with human beings or not? Because if not, then I have nothing to argue against. But if we are, then “responsible” is a big word for politics but absolutely useless in our discussion. How do you keep this “government” from deviating from its initial duty of being “good and responsible”? And the knowledge problem is very important here although you are underplaying it. If these alleged services are to actually provide a service to its alleged “customers”, then knowledge is vital.
Only because of the nature of private property owners engaged in voluntary exchange. No type of government, or a monopolistic coercive institution si compatible with the above. Only the voluntary free market. You are entangled in endless self contradictions.
You are confusing the voluntary society with lawlessness and chaos.
No, I am not. I am saying that nature abhors a vacuum, and that people without a corporate sovereign will proceed to lawlessness and chaos sooner or later. The formation of that corporate sovereign by the elite is inevitable, and depending on the constitution of the people it can be good or not, but in any case it is better than the chaos that results from ‘no-government’ over the long term. Anarchy is a democratic myth, which was known long ago.
They can either be provided by a coercive monopoly, or by voluntary institutions in a free market. There is no middle.
Are you from another dimension? Coercive and voluntary have many shades, and what is important is order not how it is achieved.
Does this “sovereign, independent and responsible government” finance itself by expropriation?
Ideally it owns a portion of property-equity and an income derived thereby. You can call it whatever you want.
Does it claim its sovereignty, which I will interpret as monopoly over law and violence over a given territory, by force or threat of force?
If necessary. Of course, all governments rely on consent (excepting supermajority countries militarily ruling tiny ones).
If you answer yes to either one, they we are talking bout a limited government.
It’s not limited government. It is authoritarian, absolutely sovereign and directed solely to the interest of its owners and operators (i.e., the ultrawealthy and those in association with them).
Only because of the nature of private property owners engaged in voluntary exchange.
Naturally property owners are not going to surrender themselves to a sovereign unless they feel they can trust it to protect their actual property. The whole purpose of the corporate body is to, more or less, maintain property values.
Wait, what? Where in that contains the argument that “[i]t will be territorial”?
Just the fact that “humans are territorial” does not prove that a state has to exist. I mean, it is pretty uncontroversial that Rothbard envisioned that private property would exist in his “ideal” society.
So just because X requires Y, Y has to exist? Just because the enslavement of the people of an entire territory requires a lot of willing participants, those “willing participants” have to exist?
Wait, what? Where in that contains the argument that “[i]t will be territorial”?
You must have control of a region, its inhabitants and its activities in toto to attain cultural and social order. This is why China censors the internet.
“Just the fact that “humans are territorial” does not prove that a state has to exist.”
Human elites will form corporate groups to protect their interests (which are temporally more important than the ‘freedoms’ of the plebians) and will impose them upon those around them. This is called civilization.
"You either threaten and support the initiation of physical aggression, or you don’t. (NAP)
Please enlighten me on what these “many shades” are."
This whole assertion is just silly to me. One does not have a definition of torts (aggression) if one does not have actual customary law and enforcement, there is no mystical (or ‘rational’, if you prefer) definition as to what is ‘aggression’, and certainly no a priori reason why ‘aggression’ is ‘bad’. I support the ‘initiation’ of any sort of ‘aggression’ whatsoever is necessary to stomp barbarian faces into the mud before they bring their mob ape-olitics into my home. I couldn’t give a damn about ‘rights’. The whole point of bombs is to ‘violate people’s rights’ and ‘initiate aggression’.
Well, you failed to prove or elucidate these “many shades”, all you really did is try destroy the concept.
To restate the question more broadly: will freemarket adjudication result in just decisions? 29 Leoni (1961) provides a theoretical framework on which we can build an answer to this question. We offer a sketch of his theory.30 In a market, economic operators regard prices to be ultimate data upon which they base their calculations and actions, fully realizing that these are flexible to some extent, but quite fixed for a particular transaction. By analogy, Leoni suggests that legal operators regard legal norms to be the ultimate data upon which they base their actions, fully realizing these are flexible to some extent, but fixed for a particular adjudication. Extending the analogy, Leoni notes that
29 Here, we regard justice to mean what libertarians take it to mean, fully recognizing that even libertarians dispute particulars. We follow de Jasay (2002) in noting that justice is simply justice, and not any other social concept.
30 See Leoni (1961), specifically the chapter “The Law as Individual Claim”, p. 189- 203.
the economist does not regard prices to be fixed at all, but subject to immutable rules of distribution acting on contingent facts. Likewise, the proper legal theorist does not regard legal norms to be fixed, but subject to immutable rules of argumentation acting on contingent facts of cases within particular cultural contexts. Indeed, the direction of causation of these social elements is often misapprehended. It is the offers to buy and sell in the market that causes prices (the norms of the market) to settle into relative fixity; they are not fixed before agents enter the market, though it appears that way to most economic agents. Likewise, it is the advancing of legal claims in an adjudicative setting and hearing the arguments on both sides that determines the outcomes of proceedings; and the outcomes of many proceedings thereby establish legal norms. It is not the case that legal norms are fixed before legal agents advance their arguments, although it appears that way to lawyers who learn legal norms in law school and then apply them to cases to guess how judges will rule on cases.
But does this mean that legal norms could be anything at all? No, and a number of libertarian theorists have explained why.
As Hoppe pointed out, by rationally advancing your claim against another, you are implicitly claiming that your claim is rationally defensible to a greater extent than your opponent’s: “…any ethical proposal, as well as any other proposition, must be assumed to claim that it is capable of being validated by propositional or argumentative means.” (Hoppe 1993, Ch. 10) All who make claims; or who criticize torts, crimes, legislation, laws, and judicial decisions—in short, all who debate legal norms—implicitly hold that there is a standard against which these decisions are to be measured.
Narveson agrees, applying the insight in the context of egalitarianism:
Here I need merely remind the reader that we are talking about arguments for equality, as distinct from sheer assertions of it. Appeals to intuition—that the commitment to equality is “moral bedrock,” as I have heard it said—must, on the face of it, count in the latter category. As a device for supporting equality, this invites the response that, unfortunately, my “moral bedrock” might be something quite incompatible with the proponent’s: say, that equality is a snare and a delusion. Strange bedrockfellows! So where would we go from there? If it’s anywhere, it’s going to have to be either back to arguments, or to non-rational or irrational activity, such as politics—waving flags, Bosnia, etc. [Narveson 2002, p. 51]
But if the continual clash of individual claims results in rational adjudications, to what legal norms are we led? Narveson takes the case of murder:
It is absurd to say that what’s wrong with murder is that I don’t like it. The obvious response is: “So?” The reason it is the obvious response is that if we are out to regulate the behavior of people in general by suggesting a rule for their deliberate action, then the plausibility of our effort is zero if it turns out that all my proposal has going for it is that I want it or would like it. Who, indeed, cares? Until I can explain why others should care, my proposal will be irrelevant to them. And if it isn’t directed to them, we’re wasting their time. [Ibid.]
Hoppe and Narveson have much in common in their arguments about arguments. Narveson notes that the appeal to universal norms is necessary from the first. That is, if A and B come together to adjudicate a dispute in a milieu devoid of background legal norms, to what do they address their arguments? Hoppe writes: “Quite commonly it has been observed that argumentation implies that a proposition claims universal acceptability, or, should it be a norm proposal, that it is ‘universalizable.’” (Hoppe 1989, Ch. 7). Narveson quite simply notes: “No generalization, no morals.” (Narveson 1988). But this is not the only rule. Narveson again:
When in general will a proposal [for a norm] be reasonable for a certain set of people? The very general answer to this is that it will be so when it serves each person’s interest well enough, and at least as well as any other obviously available proposal. That is the general thesis of contractarianism in morals. [Ibid.]
We favor Narveson’s approach, so we will outline his contractarian program a bit more.
On the right view of the foundations of morality, there are no moral bedrocks. Everything is arguable, and arguable by reference to considerations that have to be meaningful to those concerned, antecedently to the moral theory put forward—namely, their various values and preferences, whatever they may be, plus a variety of empirically manageable factual claims. [Ibid.]
It is the grounding of morality in fact that makes moral values fundamentally different than mere preferences. But what are these facts? One of Narveson’s favorite facts is Hobbes’s disturbing (but true) claim that almost every person, no matter how weak, has enough strength to kill the strongest among us, and also the power to make others’ lives quite miserable. He goes on to show that the Prisoner’s Dilemma is “the paradigmatic situation to which morals addresses itself”. With the relevant facts (including valuing one’s life, and one’s life “projects”) distilled into the Prisoner’s Dilemma, he shows that rational actors will choose to cooperate instead of defect, and encourage others to cooperate. This is the “contractarian case” for morals. Since the very term “contractarian” is a bit confusing to some, a clarification is needed:
The general idea of [contractarianism] is that the principles of morality are (or should be) those principles for directing everyone’s conduct which it is reasonable for everyone to accept. They are the rules that everyone has good reason for wanting everyone to act on, and thus to internalize in himself or herself, and thus to reinforce in the case of everyone.
…
Contractarianism can be made to seem arbitrary and silly: consider, for instance, the suggestion that long, long ago our remote ancestors made this deal, see, and from that day to this everyone has had to go along with it!
…
The problem is that morality is obviously not the result of a literal contract: and, indeed, it cannot be… Clearly, the sense in which morality is founded upon or due to or represents an “agreement” is going to have to be less straightforward than that. [Ibid.]
Narveson explains further:
[Contractarian morals are] the output of a course of deliberation…[chosen to have] the best chance of realizing values actually held by the agent. Those values, of course, need not be and in the first instance cannot be “moral” values. Morality is an output, and what makes it rational is the same as what makes any action or decision rational: it best fills the bill specified by one’s general set of values, whatever they are. [Ibid.]
This subjectivism of values is important to Narveson, and he regards it as a defining element of the liberal tradition:
…the liberal must justify principles, policies, and institutions, to any person affected by them, by showing that person they are for his or her good as seen by that person… Each person is regarded as being the ultimate authority on what is good for himself. [Ibid.]
But where will all of these arguments be advanced? Indeed, where will the complementary arguments of Hoppe (1993), Kinsella (2008), and others (Kinsella 1996) be advanced? We argue that two of the important venues for these arguments, or at least practical applications of them, are mediations and arbitrations.
Section Conclusion
Narveson’s vision of norms is well-adapted to considering the question of this section. The arbiter of a dispute is led by contractarian logic to choose minimally-constraining norms to apply to disputes. One way to consider contractarianism is as a philosophical theory of how free-market adjudication of norms results in the minimal legal norms of libertarian ethics. This theory of adjudication is confirmed in history. All of the historical free or nearly free markets in law (Roman law, common law, Law Merchant, etc.) have resulted in libertarian-leaning decisions and legal norms.
To the support of attempting to destroy the concept and muddy the waters, I gather there is a reason you put ‘initiate’ in brackets. Is this because you understand that fundamentally - defense against aggressors, is not actually initiation? You’ve merely worded it this way to get a rise out of people?
Seems like you would have a tendency to do that - as you yourself admitted when introducing yourself elsewhere.